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ABSTRACT 
ESSAYS ON DISPERSION, FAIRNESS PERCEPTION AND 
PARTITIONING OF ONLINE PRICES 
 
by 
Yiyuan Liu 
The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, 2013 
Under the Supervision of Professor Sanjoy Ghose 
 
My dissertation is primarily on online pricing, by empirically investigating how formats 
and structures of prices influence consumer responses and subsequent purchasing 
behavior, brand choice, etc. Currently, three essays of my dissertation explore topics on 
price fairness perception, price dispersion, as well as price partitioning. 
First, although previous researchers have tested effects of price changes on consumer’s 
perceptions on price (e.g., Maxwell 1999, Campbell 2007), little work has focused on the 
effects of prices/costs levels on online price judgments and virtually none has examined it 
jointly with both internal/external reference prices from multiple comparison parties. 
Less work has applied price decreasing and increasing together to observe (un)fairness or 
associated them with asymmetric liking and disliking judgments (Herr and Page 2004). 
To fill this gap, we employ an expected utility model incorporating emotional factors 
such as disappointment (elation) and regret (rejoicing) to model online price fairness 
perceptions. We demonstrate a two-stage evaluation and find interesting asymmetric 
patterns of significant effects of four emotions on price fairness. Second, there does not 
exist yet a quantitative review synthesizing and explaining the discrepancy of findings on 
price dispersion. An empirical generalization is conducted to statistically and 
  
iii 
 
quantitatively summarize in which way online price dispersion goes, and what are the 
true determinants of the magnitude of price dispersion in E-commerce. By a meta-
analysis study, we find that product category, measurement of price dispersion, 
controlling for heterogeneity in the study and so on, are significant factors. Third, 
shipping and handling (S&H) fee is examined as a popular form of partitioned price 
offered by E-tailers. We employ a Gain-and-Loss Utility model incorporating different 
levels of price gains and losses presented to customers in the transactions to model online 
purchase behaviors in a strategic pricing framework. We find significant asymmetry in 
the effects of price surcharges and price discounts on purchase quantity as well as on how 
customers organize and manage their shopping baskets. 
Keywords: price fairness, price dispersion, price partitioning, behavioral pricing, 
reference price, Meta-Analysis, multi-dimensional pricing, price surcharges, shipping and 
handling fees, online pricing 
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ESSAY I  
ASYMMETRIC EFFECTS OF DISAPPOINTMENT AND REGRET ON PRICE 
FAIRNESS PERCEPTION: A UTILITY MODELING APPROACH 
Although previous researchers have tested effects of price changes on consumer’s 
perceptions on price (e.g., Maxwell 1995, 1999, Campbell 1999, 2007), little work has 
focused on the effects of prices/costs levels (represented by different product attributes 
and designs) on online price judgments and virtually none has examined it jointly with 
both internal/external reference prices from multiple comparison parties. Less work has 
applied price decreasing and increasing together to observe (un)fairness or associated 
them with asymmetric liking and disliking judgments (Herr and Page 2004, Russell and 
Carroll 1999). To fill this gap, we employ an expected utility model incorporating 
emotional factors such as disappointment and regret to model online price fairness 
perceptions in an attitude-oriented framework, by designing in both positive and negative 
price differences simultaneously. In addition, multiple price comparison points, contexts 
of purchasing and transaction, and the characteristics of respondents are considered in the 
model to evaluate their effects on customers’ judgments about price offered online. Using 
a hierarchical ordinal logit model, we find significant asymmetry in the effects of elation 
and disappointment, as well as asymmetry in the effects of rejoicing and regret on 
fairness perception. These also vary across product designs and reference price levels. 
1.  Introduction 
Think about this scenario: Ann purchased a small digital gadget on Amazon.com and 
spent $60 with free shipping fee. Before long, she found a similar product online at price 
$50. It is okay, thought Ann, no big difference, huh. 
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The other day, Ann wanted to buy an electronic device on the Internet. Multifarious 
websites provided quite a lot model options and prices. After checking several E-tailers’ 
offers, Ann made a decision matching her own expectation and spent $400 on this digital 
device. Several days later, she found her friend Dave had also bought one, but he only 
paid $300. Look at the price I paid, I’m so disappointed, said Ann. However, she soon 
got delighted again and showed no regret at her purchase any more after finding that the 
same model was labeled at $500 in store. What a nice price I’ve got online, Ann told to 
herself. 
Is $400 that Ann has paid fair? 
Consumers are comparing prices all the time.  A price comparison can be done at any 
time when it is convenient to consumers, especially in the current socially-networked 
world and web-oriented marketplace. After taking great efforts in looking for the 
products at the best price, customers keep on learning about price increasing and 
decreasing. However, do they always feel unfair when they find the price decreases? Is 
the price forever fair if their own purchasing prices are lower than those of other offers?  
Starting from research on justice (Homans 1961) and equity theory (Adams 1965), to the 
numerous studies on marketplace factors through price comparison processes (Zeithaml 
1988, Campbell 1999, etc.), and the papers on new moderators such as pre-purchase 
goals, price-matching refund policies (Xia, et al. 2009), and culture effects (Bolton, Keh 
and Alba 2009), researchers have developed various theories and models to explain how 
consumers perceive price (un)fairness. From previous studies, we conclude that 1) price 
judgment is perceived through comparisons and acknowledgement of price change; 2) 
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consumers are using multiple comparison parties, involving price or procedure with self 
standard, other references or marketplace norms (Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004). 3) 
cognitive reactions are used to explain (un)fairness perceptions. Positive emotions mirror 
fairness perception, while negative emotions signal unfairness or less fairness (Campbell 
2004).  
Although previous researchers have tested effects of price changes on consumer’s 
perceptions on price (e.g., Maxwell 1995, 1999, Campbell 1999, 2007), little work has 
focused on the effects of prices/costs levels (represented by different product attributes 
and designs) on online price fairness judgments and virtually none has examined it jointly 
with both internal and external reference prices from multiple comparison parties. Less 
work also has applied price decreasing and increasing together to observe (un)fairness or 
associated them with asymmetric liking and disliking judgments simultaneously (Herr 
and Page 2004, Russell and Carroll 1999). 
To fill this gap, we employ an expected utility model incorporating both positive and 
negative emotional factors such as elation and disappointment, as well as rejoicing and 
regret to model online price fairness perceptions in an attitude-oriented framework, by 
designing in price increasing and decreasing simultaneously. In addition, multiple price 
comparison points, contexts of purchasing and transaction, and the characteristics of 
respondents are considered in the model to evaluate their effects on customers’ judgments 
about prices offered online. The main contribution of the current study is to empirically 
examine how price differences associated with various types of emotions influence 
consumers’ perceived fairness on prices, while controlling for the comparative 
4 
 
 
 
transaction context variables such as transaction similarity, choice of comparison parties, 
product price levels, the buyer-seller relationship, and so on. 
The current paper aims to capture these differences and see how they might induce 
different levels of price (un)fairness perceptions. We hypothesize that different types of 
emotions (e.g., elation, regret, etc.) resulted from positive and negative price differences 
in two stages of price evaluation (pre-purchase and post-purchase) influence customers’ 
price fairness perception in different ways. Positive gaps between prices lead to positive 
perception, therefore resulting in a higher level of perceived fairness. Negative gaps 
between prices lead to negative perceptions, therefore resulting in a lower level of 
perceived fairness. Meanwhile, the magnitudes of effects are expected to be asymmetric 
for positive and negative emotional outcomes, and vary across pre-purchase and post-
purchase evaluation, as well as product price levels and choices of comparison parties. 
The context of our investigation is fairness perception of online prices for digital 
cameras. We collect and utilize the data from a survey with 202 subjects. Specifically, we 
design three scenarios with three combinations of digital camera attributes at different 
price levels and therefore multiple observations are obtained from each subject. In all, we 
investigate fairness perceptions on 1616 observations. We utilize a hierarchical ordinal 
logit regression type utility model and find significant asymmetric effects of 
disappointment and regret on price fairness perceptions. 
In the following elaboration, we begin by discussing the concept and framework of price 
fairness. Then, we use a Disappointment-Regret Model to explain factors that influence 
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consumers’ price (un)fairness perceptions for online purchasing. Finally, we discuss the 
results and implications from the study. 
2.  Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Price fairness perception is an important issue in pricing, since it focuses on how 
consumers perceive and respond to prices and it results in different subsequent 
purchasing behaviors. In this section, we first conduct a literature review by highlighting 
four important issues regarding fairness perception; then we propose the theoretical 
framework and hypotheses of our current study. 
2.1 How Previous Researches have explained Price Fairness 
Starting from 1960s’ research on justice (Homans 1961) and Equity theory (Adams 
1965), to the numerous empirical studies on marketplace factors through price 
comparison processes (Zeithaml 1988, Campbell 1999, Bolton, Warlop and Alba 2003, 
Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004) and recent papers on new moderators such as pre-purchase 
goals, price-matching refund policies (Xia, et al. 2009), and culture effects (Bolton, Keh 
and Alba 2009), researchers have developed various theories and models to explain and 
understand how consumers perceive price (un)fairness. Four important issues can be 
summarized in existing researches and are elaborated below. 
First, price judgment and fairness are perceived through price comparisons and 
acknowledgement of price changes. From the perspective of consumers, price is what is 
given up or sacrificed to obtain a product (Zeithaml 1988). So people initially have some 
expectations and determinations on how much they would like to give up to obtain a 
certain product. This willingness to pay usually comes from customers’ belief and 
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knowledge about product, previous experiences, and some standard norms.  To make 
further judgment on the price, people need to find a reference point or even multiple 
reference points (Ordonez, Connolly 2000). And they notice the price changes through 
comparisons and thus perceive differently based on the changes or gaps they find. From a 
cognitive aspect of fairness, it can also be defined as a judgment of whether an outcome 
and/or the process to reach an outcome are reasonable. “It is defined as a consumer’s 
assessment and associated emotions of whether the difference (or lack of difference) 
between a seller’s price and the price of a comparative other party is reasonable, 
acceptable, or justifiable” (Xia, Monre and Cox 2004).  So after comparisons or noticing 
price changes, people perceive price fairness or unfairness cognitively on whether the 
gaps or the differences are reasonable or not. Most researches apply price increase to 
perceive unfairness and some studies provide participants alternative percentages of price 
discounts (Niedrich, Sharma and Wedell 2001). However, less work has applied price 
decreasing and increasing together to observe (un)fairness or associated them with 
asymmetric liking and disliking judgments (Herr and Page 2004, Russell and Carroll 
1999). 
Second, studies demonstrate that consumers are using multiple comparison points 
(Ordonez, Connolly and Coughlan 2000). In fact, people are comparing prices all the 
time especially in a Triple W world where they can find a huge amount of price 
information. People are faced with past prices they purchase at, reduced prices under 
promotion or with the maturity of the product in the market, friends’ prices, competitor 
brands’ prices, vendor-cost-adjusted prices, and so on. To summarize, the comparison 
involves price or procedure with self standard, other references or marketplace norms 
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(Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004). Researchers reach conclusions that there are multiple 
reference points in fairness assessment, and thus effects vary in different situations.  
When making judgment on prices through comparisons, two types of reference points are 
summarized in terms of two streams of reference price (Mazumdar, Raj and Sinha 2005). 
The first one is Internal Reference Price, developed by consumer themselves, which is 
usually defined as self comparison (Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004). It could be consumers’ 
memories, past purchasing prices experienced, expectations based on knowledge of 
product and initial price they are willing to pay. This reference point from self is easy to 
obtain and it is formed unconsciously before consumers make any purchasing decision. 
The second type is External Reference Price, coming from alternative resources other 
than consumers themselves. It could be the prices people find through another transaction 
channel, competitor brand, acquaintances such as friends or relatives, or the vendor cost. 
It is usually defined as third party comparison (Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004), and it is 
sometimes obtained after a purchase decision. Sometimes, these two types of reference 
points have influences on each other. For example, the competitor brands prices affect 
consumers’ own expectations and change self comparison points.  
Third, much research focused on cognitive reaction accompanied by (un)fairness 
perceptions. Positive emotions mirror fairness perception on the deal, while negative 
emotions signal unfairness or less fairness. Concepts of asymmetry and bipolarity of 
liking and disliking (Herr and Page 2004, Russell and Carroll 1999) can also be applied 
to price fairness and unfairness perceptions. When consumers are faced with multiple 
comparison prices, price change plays a causal role in customers’ judgments of price. It 
makes people perceive differently with various emotions accounted with perceptions. 
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From the definition of (un)fairness perception in cognitive aspect, observed difference 
between two prices will lead to emotional reactions, which occur concurrently with or 
even before the fair or unfair perceptions (Campbell 2004, Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004).  
Even in the same direction of price change or difference, various types of emotions will 
be perceived depending on the stages of price evaluation and the associated comparison 
points. Positive affect includes being happy, pleased, and elated; while negative affect 
could be feeling disappointed, unhappy, and upset (Russell and Carroll 1999). Inman, 
Dyer and Jia (1997) use two pairs of opposite emotions expressed by antonyms such as 
elation and disappointment, rejoicing and regret. They design a choice experiment 
incorporating these two pairs of emotions to examine the asymmetric disappointment and 
regret effects on post-choice valuation. In addition, there are even some severe unfairness 
perceptions discussed, which “typically comes with heat and passion, anger, and outrage; 
and they insistently press for action or redress” (Finkel 2001). Emotional reaction 
becomes a very important factor on people’s (un)fairness perceptions. This current paper 
mainly focuses on it to see how different types of emotions induce various levels of price 
(un)fairness perceptions. 
Fourth, there are a few clarifications and recent findings on the (un)fairness concept that 
helps us to understand people’s evaluations of prices further. Fairness is not the absolute 
opposite of unfairness and it is possible to be clear about one without having clarity about 
the other (Finkel 2001). Fairness and unfairness may be conceptually different constructs 
(Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004). This could also be due to the asymmetry in emotional 
outcomes. So it is easier for us to perceive things to be unfair since notions of unfairness 
are typically clearer, sharper, and more concrete than notions of fairness. People know 
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what is unfair when they see or experience it, but it is difficult to articulate what is fair. 
Besides, fairness is not equal to satisfaction although they are highly correlated (Oliver 
and Swan 1989a, b). Researchers find different patterns from fairness and satisfaction 
ratings (Ordóñez, Connolly, and Couglan 2000). Our current research expects to observe 
asymmetric patterns of fairness and unfairness, by designing in both increasing and 
decreasing prices simultaneously with the same stimuli. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
Although previous researchers have tested effects of price changes on consumer’s 
perceptions on price (e.g., Maxwell 1995, 1999, Campbell 1999, 2007), little work has 
focused on the effects of prices/costs levels (represented by different product attributes 
and designs) on online price judgments and virtually none has examined it jointly with 
both internal/external reference prices from multiple comparison parties. Less work has 
applied decreasing and increasing prices together to observe (un)fairness or associated 
them with asymmetric liking and disliking judgments (Herr and Page 2004, Russell and 
Carroll 1999). To fill this gap, we employ an expected utility model incorporating factors 
such as disappointment and regret to model online price fairness perceptions in an 
attitude-oriented framework, by designing in both positive and negative price differences 
simultaneously. In addition, actual price levels represented by product designs, choices of 
multiple price comparison points, contexts of purchasing and transaction, buyer-seller 
relationship, and the characteristics of respondents are considered in the model to 
evaluate their effects on customers’ judgments about price offered online. Figure 1 
illustrates the main conceptual framework and rationale upon which we elaborate in the 
following discussions. 
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-------------------Insert Figure 1 about here------------------- 
A Two-stage evaluation 
A growing number of studies connect price evaluations and purchasing intentions with 
fairness perceptions. A recent research finds that price fairness perception has influenced 
shopping intention indirectly through perceived value at the actual paid price (Kukar-
Kinney, Xia and Monroe 2007). Actually, consumers start evaluation with some initial 
judgments right after they compare the actual price online with their own expectations. 
This self comparison is based on people’s own expectations and the price they would like 
to give up to obtain a certain product. We consider self expectation as an important 
internal reference point that customer use to compare with the actual prices before they 
make any decisions when shopping online.   
We have previously discussed two types of reference points people use to make price 
comparisons. However, there is yet no conclusion or inference from previous studies on 
how people choose comparison points and the possible two-stage procedure of formation 
of (un)fairness perceptions. In the following elaboration, following Xia, Monroe and Cox 
(2004), we consider self comparison before the purchasing decision making, and consider 
the third comparison party after the purchasing decision making. By designing in both 
self and third party reference points in the study, we expect to capture a two-stage 
evaluation from customers’ initial purchasing intentions to price fairness perceptions. 
When consumers are faced with multiple comparison prices during the purchasing and 
price evaluation procedure, they choose different reference prices at different stages of 
the procedure, and they judge the price based on differences between these prices. 
Different reactions and emotions are associated. We hypothesize that people work online 
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and form their own willingness and expectations, resulting in a certain level of initial 
purchasing intention in the first stage of price evaluation. Once they make the purchasing 
decision, customers may compare the price with in-store price, as well as other 
comparison parties, and finally perceive the price by judging difference between prices 
offered online and the forgone prices in the second stage of price evaluation. 
H1(a): (pre-purchase stage) Price differences between consumer expectations and 
actual prices provided by E-tailer website result in pre-choice initial purchase 
intentions. If the actual price is lower than price self expectation, people will have 
higher purchase intentions; if actual price is higher than self price expectation, 
people will have lower purchase intentions. 
H1(b): (post-purchase stage) As one of main reference points, self belief of 
purchasing and initial buying intention affects the post-choice price fairness 
positively. Knowing the actual price of products provided by online websites, 
customer makes an initial judgment of buying or not. More intended to purchase, 
more fairness customer will perceive after purchasing when comparing with other 
third party comparison prices. Although there is a lower forgone price, the actual 
price is still within their self expectation range or not far from their expected 
price.  
Context of Online Purchasing 
Most previous researches put the context of purchasing in a particular department store or 
regular stores. Internet marketing has become a main stream phenomenon of the 
marketplace. According to U.S. Census Bureau, 3.6% of total retail sales in U.S come 
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from E-commerce and yearly about 130 billion dollars sale goes online. However, there 
is a lack of work on price fairness perception evaluation when online store or E-tailers’ 
website is the purchasing transaction channel.  
For online pricing, various conclusions have been made by empirical studies on 
decreasing or increasing price competition (Bakos 1997, Lal and Sarvary 1999, Lynch 
and Ariely 1999) and contradictory evidences are found by researchers about price 
dispersion online compared with traditional stores (Kung, Monroe, Cox 2002, Pan, 
Ratchford, Shankar 2004). Drawing from those studies on Internet Price Dispersion, 
websites indeed provide higher price dispersion on prices, which give more options and 
information for consumers. Large price dispersion online inspires our current research, by 
focusing on the choice of reference point and comparing with online price and in-store 
price.  
H2:  Different choice of comparison parties will affect post-purchase price 
fairness (in the second stage of price evaluation) differently. Apart from self 
comparison, customer will compare price with other party (online vs. in-store 
price), other customer, and price from the competitor brand. We expect to see a 
higher effect from in-store price, since it is directly competing with the online 
price. 
Moderators from Individuals and Market context 
Individual purchasing behavior and market context will also affect people’s fairness 
perceptions, such as buyer-seller relationship, individual’s previous purchasing 
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experience, knowledge and familiarity of the marketplace, and customer’s sensitivity 
of prices.  
H3: Relationship between buyer and seller As an emerging relatively new 
purchasing channel, online E-tailer is different from traditional conventional 
stores. Relationship between online E-tailer and buyer is also an important 
factor on price fairness formation. Trust in online seller will improve 
relationship between buyer and seller, while repeating purchasing behaviors 
show whether customer know better about online purchasing.  
We propose that when the comparative outcome is positive or neutral (third 
party price is lower than actual purchasing price), trust in the seller and 
repeated purchasing online has a positive effect on price fairness perceptions. 
When the comparative outcome is negative (third party price is higher than 
actual purchasing price), trust in the seller and repeated purchasing online has 
a negative effect on price fairness perceptions. 
H4: Previous buying/Familiarity of product If customer know better about 
product and have previous buying behavior, they will perceive more fairness 
when noticing the change of prices, than those who are not familiar with 
products or have never bought before. 
H5: Price Sensitivity People perceive differently on price due to different 
levels of price sensitivity. When the comparative outcome is positive or 
neutral (compared price is lower than actual price), a more sensitive person 
will perceive higher fairness of price change. Consumer’s price sensitivity 
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has a positive effect on price fairness perceptions. When the comparative 
outcome is negative (compared price is higher than actual price), more 
sensitive person will perceive lower fairness of price change. Consumer’s 
price sensitivity has a negative effect on price fairness perceptions. 
Effect of Physical Attribute/Design as Signal of Cost Level 
Price is an important causal reason for (un)fairness perceptions. Early in 1970s, Olson 
(1974), Wheatley and Chiu (1977) have endowed price the characteristic of a product 
“attribute” (Erickson and Johansson 1985). The multi-attribute evaluation model has been 
well established and it proves that price is an essential signal of quality and cost 
(Wolinsky 1983, Bagwell and Riordan 1991).  Product differentiations, diverse 
combinations of product physical attributes and configurations result in different price 
and cost levels. 
Previous researchers examine price fairness perceptions among different categories, 
ranging from daily consumption items such as polo shirts (Bolton, Warlop and Alba 
2003) to durable products such as cars (Herrmann, Xia, Monroe and Huber 2007). We 
propose that even for the same product category, there would exist various combinations 
of product attributes and it is an important issue to separately examine different potential 
cost levels by providing various product attributes as well as designs to discover their 
effects on people’s judgments on the price change.  
We hypothesize that potential cost level of product will moderate the effect of price 
change on price perceptions. Specifically, the effects will be inflated at higher cost levels 
with larger price gaps, and the effects will be reduced at lower cost levels with smaller 
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price gaps. For higher price levels equipped with comparatively high configurations and 
good designs, people will easily perceive more fairness or unfairness since they see big 
gaps after comparison, while for lower price levels with relatively low configurations and 
designs, gaps between consumers’ own expectations and other third party reference 
prices are smaller and people will not clearly and sharply perceive price (un)fairness.  
H6: Different combinations of product attributes and levels of designs of 
product model will affect price fairness perceptions. For a lower 
configuration or lower design model, people’s price perception caused by 
price change is not as sharp as for higher configuration or better design 
models. People perceive more (un)fairness as product level price goes higher. 
As a signal of product quality, actual price level affects price fairness 
perception positively. 
When the comparative outcome is positive or neutral (compared price is 
lower than actual purchase price), higher actual price level results in higher 
fairness of price change. Product’s actual price has a positive effect on price 
fairness perceptions. When the comparative outcome is negative (compared 
price is higher than actual purchase price), higher actual price level results in 
lower fairness of price change. Product’s actual price has a positive effect on 
price fairness perceptions. 
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Four Emotions 
From consumers’ initial purchasing intention in the pre-purchase stage to fairness 
perception in the post-purchase stage, we expect the see four emotions resulting from 
price comparisons, which are from elation or disappointment to rejoicing or regret. 
H8: Elation (D
+
) In the first stage of price evaluation, when the offered actual 
price online is lower than customer’s expectation, the difference between 
expected price and actual price is a positive value. We use D
+
 to label the positive 
price difference, since people’s response is elation rather than disappointment. In 
this situation, the higher D
+
 is, the larger is the positive difference of actual price 
and self expectation, resulting in higher price fairness perception. So we 
hypothesize that D
+
 has a positive effect on price fairness. 
H9: Disappointment (D
-
)  When the actual price is higher than customer’s 
expectation of price, the difference between expected price and actual price is 
negative, which is termed disappointment and we label it with D
-
. In this situation, 
the higher |D
-
| is, the larger is the absolute gap between actual price and self 
expectations. This results in lower price fairness perception or higher unfairness 
perception. So we hypothesize that |D
-
| has a negative effect on price fairness. 
H10: Rejoicing (R
+
)  In the second stage of price evaluation, when the actual price 
is lower than the third party comparison price, difference between third party 
comparison price and actual price is positive, then the difference is termed as 
rejoicing and we use R
+
 to label the positive gap. In this situation, the higher R
+
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is, the larger is the positive difference of actual price and forgone comparison 
price, this results in higher price fairness perception.  
H11: Regret (R
-
)  When the actual price is higher than the third party comparison 
price, difference between third party comparison price and actual price is 
negative, then we call it regret labeling with R
-
. In this situation, the higher |R
-
| is, 
the higher is the absolute difference of actual price and forgone comparison price, 
this results in lower price fairness perception.  
3.  Modeling Framework 
3.1  Base Model 
Initiated by Shand (1914) and Savage (1954), the utility model including combined 
positive or negative disappointment and regret is developed by Inman, Dyer and Jia 
(1997) and applied in psychology and behavior research (Zeelenberg, Dijk, Manstead and 
Pligt 2000). The generalized model incorporates intuitively appealing notions of 
disappointment and regret jointly and thus could help explain consumers’ reactions to 
losses and gains on product prices when they compare to other alternative price offers. 
Following Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997), in our proposed base model
1
, we capture opposite 
emotions (expressed by antonyms as elated and disappointed, rejoiced and regretted) by 
price differences of multiple reference prices in the price judging two-stage procedure. 
We decompose two emotional outcomes into four emotions to reflect asymmetries of 
                                                 
1
 We do not include price expectation in our model as Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997) did, since it is highly 
correlated with differences of price expectation and actual price. Similarly to Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997), 
we also do not include the interaction term between regret and disappointment, since the empirical study 
shows the interaction term’s parameter is not statistically significant and it also does not result in a 
significant improvement in model fit. 
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people’s liking and disliking (Herr and Page 2004) at two stages of price evaluation. 
When the price gap is negative, i.e., when the customer expects a lower price than the 
actual price encountered or finds other actual less expensive offers, it results in negative 
emotions such as disappointment or regret. When the price gap is positive, i.e., the 
customer pays less than what they expected or notices third party price offers higher than 
what he/she has paid, the resultant emotion is that of elation or rejoicing (constructs 
opposite to that of disappointment and regret
2
). Our proposed base model is shown in 
formula (1). 
Fairness = 0 + 1D+ + 2D- + 3R+ +4R-                                       (1) 
= 0 + 1 (Expected-Actual)+ + 2 (Expected-Actual)- + 3 (Forgone-Actual)+ +4 (Forgone-Actual)- 
The base model consists of four components: 1) elation (D
+
) capturing the positive 
discrepancy between expected and actual price, and 2) disappointment (D
-
) capturing the 
negative discrepancy between expected and actual price 3) rejoicing (R
+
) capturing the 
positive difference between reference price from the forgone item and actual purchase 
and 4) regret (R
-
) capturing the negative difference between reference price and actual 
price.  
Specifically, there are two stages of evaluation when we relate price differences to 
emotional reactions. Before purchasing, a buyer might be elated (a very high activation 
positive effect) when the purchasing price is lower than self expectation of price, and the 
buyer may be disappointed when the purchasing price is higher than the expectation since 
the expectation is not fulfilled. After making purchasing decision, the buyer might feel 
                                                 
2
 Note that D
+
 and D
-
 (elation and disappointment, respectively) cannot occur simultaneously, nor can R
+
 
and R
-
 (rejoicing and regret, respectively) 
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regretful since the buyer finds another lower price through some other channels (a 
forgone outcome that might have happened), or will rejoice because the consumer finds a 
friend who purchases at a higher price level for the same product. The current paper aims 
to capture those differences and empirically study how they induce various levels of price 
(un)fairness perceptions.  
3.2  Full Model 
Further, since the dependent variable in our research (Fairness Perception) is captured by 
a 1-9 rating scale, we apply a hierarchical ordinal logit model after a trichotomy 
classification of the response variable. 
First, a trichotomy classification is applied to the response variable to explain customers’ 
evaluation on prices and their perceived fairness. Let Price Fairness perception ratings (1-
9 scale) be separated into three parts, resulting in outcomes of the multinomial choices 
respectively. For the resulting ordinal logistic model, perception ratings are decomposed 
into three levels, with 1-3 scale as “1” Very Unfair, 4-6 scale as “2” Moderate Fair, and 
7-9 scale as “3” Very Fair. Therefore, three levels of fairness perceptions are generated to 
represent customers’ judgment on product prices.   
                     =   
                                              
                                           
                                                 
  
Second, since price perception ratings have reflected ordered response to prices and the 
given reference prices, an ordinal logit model is the most appropriate model to use. Let 
                      denote the probability that the response of individual i with 
product and subject characteristics   falls in the jth response category, where j is a 
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constant representing the baseline value of the transformed cumulative probability for the 
j
th
 category. Let     denote the corresponding cumulative probability               
that the response falls in the j-th category or below, so 
                  
Suppose further that there is an underlying unobserved continuous variable   using the 
cut point 
      
                    =   
                                               
                                         
                                                    
  
        
where X is the vector of independent variables, and   is the vector of regression 
coefficients which we wish to estimate, and error term   that captures the unobserved 
effects and we assume          . There are two groups of observed factors: individual 
or personal factors, and product attributes or purchasing context factors. For instance, the 
more the consumer is familiar with the product, the more likely the buyer perceives 
fairness with positive emotions. Or the more expensive the product is, the more likely the 
buyer feels unfair when he/she observes a less expensive offer for the same model. 
Assume   follows a logistic distribution, which means cumulative distribution of   is 
      = exp ( )/(1+exp( )). For example, the probability that fairness perception falls into 
“Very Fair” category for example, is shown in formula (2). 
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Third, there is a hierarchical structure in the ordered logit model, since we have captured 
eight price fairness perceptions by designing different product price levels and features, 
for each of 202 subjects (N=1616). To account for the lack of independence across 
product models for the same subject, we allow random effects in both intercept and 
slopes across each independent respondent and control for the within-subject error 
correlation between price fairness perceptions. In the full model with hierarchy, there are 
two levels: the collected 1616 price fairness perceptions are at the first individual level. 
These observations are nested in 202 subjects that we set as the second subject level. 
Price fairness perception observed within the same subject share several individual 
characteristics, such as gender, previous shopping experience, and so on. Therefore, we 
introduce a subject specific parameter    in the utility function, and assume 
         
   for sth subject.  
            (3) 
Applying all independent variables into the model shown in formula (3), we have the full 
utility function shown 
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(4) 
where Group dummies are 3 product types including Compact DC, Prosumer DC and Large DC; or 3 
price comparison points including in-store price, price obtained from Friend, and competitor product 
price. 
X variables represent consumer and market context characteristics, such as previous buying behavior, 
familiarity of product, etc. 
In the full model shown in formula (4), product attributes and choice of references at 
purchasing online are also designed in the model to see their effects on customers’ 
judgments on price offered online. We first use group dummy variables to form 
interactions terms, then we include several X variables that describe the individual 
characteristics of respondents in our proposed full model.  
Overall, our proposed expected utility model with disappointment (D
+
, D
-
) and regret 
(R
+
, R
+
) has the following features. 
1. The model is based on sum of four components, with each representing a factor 
that logically contributes to consumers’ assessments of an offered product price. 
2. Following Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997), we decompose emotional factors that 
might affect customers’ post-purchase fairness perception into positive and 
negative parts to examine the asymmetry of these effects; unlike them, we focus 
on price fairness perceptions. 
3. Consumers’ price perception judgment is considered as a two-stage evaluation, 
with the first stage before their purchase decision by comparing their expectations 
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on price and the actual price, and the second stage after the purchase decision by 
comparing reference price and the actual price. 
4. More purchasing context factors are considered in the model, including customers’ 
purchase history and familiarity about the product, gender, etc. In addition, 
interaction terms of the main factor and group dummy variables are used to group 
people into different reference price scenarios and product design scenarios.  
5. To control for the heterogeneity (observed and unobserved) across individual and 
homogeneity within each individual in a random parameter framework, a 
hierarchical ordered logit model is used to capture the correlation of error terms. 
4.  Data and Applications 
Subjects. 202 students received extra credits to participate in a survey. Of these 202 
subjects, 120 students (57%) are female, 82 students (43%) are male. Approximately 
75% of them are senior grade students aging from 18 to 25 years old. As the purpose of 
this research is to test perception in the marketing area and the product is an electronic 
device that is popular among students who can afford to buy one, our data collected from 
higher grade students at a university is appropriate (Mook 1983). 
Procedure.  At the beginning of each scenario with one type of digital camera, 
participants were presented with introductive information. Brief descriptions of features 
and images of digital camera models are provided to help participants recognize the 
differences and diverse price levels of three product types. Product pictures along with 
attribute description encourage participants to think more about price ranges they can 
accept and their own willingness to pay. Therefore, both two types of elaboration 
24 
 
 
 
(attribute and image) have eliminated the bias in the information processing and product 
judgment procedure (Malaviya, Kisielius and Sternthal 1996). The descriptions for three 
scenarios are shown follow. 
 
Different from previous research methods, we do not manually impose participants’ price 
expectations. Instead, based on the price ranges for each product model we measure 
respondent’s expectation by calculating their expected price (Helgeson and Beatty 1987, 
Inman, Dyer and Jia 1997). Therefore, after being presented the context-based details of 
camera features and visual images of the cameras, participants were first asked to specify 
their lowest and highest expected price points for these cameras, by writing down a low 
price and a high price in the form shown below. Meanwhile, the chances of encountering 
low or high price are given to explain the trend and direction of prices due to the price 
dispersion for online purchasing for each specific model.  
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Prices on line are known to vary over time. So there is a chance that you can face 
a high (premium) price point or a low (economy) price point on the specific 
day/time occasion that you plan to buy the product.  
Let us assume that, on E-tailer websites you’ve got 60% chance of getting a low 
price, 40% chance of getting a high price.  
For above displayed model (M1), what do you think these prices are likely to be? 
60% chance of Low Price:  $______                 40% chance of High Price:  $_____ 
After specifying their expectations on the given product model, the participant could find 
the actual price
1
 under a covered post-it, or by turning back the page. At this moment, 
respondents are asked to tell their Initial Purchasing Intention, by providing the ratings on 
“how likely are you to purchase at this actual price level?” (1 = “very unlikely”, and 9 = 
“very likely”). Then, participants are presented a forgone price from a third party price 
point, which is also exposed by uncovering post-it, or found by turning back the page. 
Let us assume that you finally purchased online at above actual price level. 
Then in a couple of months, you find the price of the same model purchased at 
traditional store (other than website) is      $85 
The third party price levels were randomly provided in different sequences to the 
respondents.  Some subjects saw a higher (than actual price) price followed by a lower 
price; other subjects saw a lower (than actual price) price followed by a higher price. In 
addition, third parties can come from varying sources. In this study we utilized three 
different third party sources: prices paid by friends, in-store brand prices, and prices of 
competitor brands.  The third party source name was randomly presented to subjects. 
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Finally, respondents were asked to rate their fairness perceptions on the actual price of 
the product, by telling their exact Fairness Perception in a given 1-9 likert-scale (1 = 
“very unfair”, and 9 = “very fair”) for the question “What do you think about the actual 
price you paid to make the online purchase?” The procedure was repeated in three 
scenarios with three combinations of camera attributes at different levels and eight 
observations were obtained from each subject. At the end of survey, participants 
indicated their gender, age, and other information such as previous purchasing 
experience, and familiarity with product category. 
Price set and price change.  We provide eight digital camera models from three types.  
The actual price sets
3
 are $70, $90, $260, $280 for (ultra) Compact DC; $540, $600 for 
Prosumer/Medium DC; and $500, $700 for Professional SLR/Large DC. These prices are 
collected on Amazon.com from various DC models distributed not long before the time  
when we took the survey and we use the mode price from price distribution for each 
model. Table 1 describes the main features for cameras in each scenario.  
-------------------Insert Table 1 about here------------------- 
Considering that price dispersion exists (Ratchford 2009, Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 
2004) and prices on line usually vary over time (Ancarani and Venkatesh, 2004) or vary 
across different sellers (Baye and Morgan 2009), we tell participants that “there is a 
chance that you can face a high (premium) price point or a low (economy) price point on 
the specific day/time occasion that you plan to buy the product.” This chance 
                                                 
3
 The actual price we enter in the survey is the mode price of multiple price offers provided online that 
match the attributes combination 
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(probability) is captured by calculating the probability that price options on line is lower 
or higher than the mode of the price distribution (which we consider as the actual price). 
In addition, price change between actual and forgone price is set as 20% price decrease 
and 20% increase of the actual price offer. Based on different levels of actual prices, we 
obtain different price changes by taking 20% up and down on the actual prices. Table 2 
summarizes all forgone prices with the positive and negative offset on the base of actual 
price, which are randomly distributed to participants with equal probability. Being 
exposed to eight product models, half the participants noticed the price increases for the 
first four models, with the following price decreases for the latter four models, while the 
other half noticed the price decreases first following by price decreases. 
-------------------Insert Table 2 about here------------------- 
Measuring Expectation.  Different from previous research methods, we do not put 
manipulations on participants’ price expectations. Rather, we ask them to tell a range of 
prices given higher and lower chance of encountering high and low price. Therefore, for 
each product model we measured consumer’s expectation by calculating their expected 
price (Helgeson and Beatty 1987, Inman, Dyer and Jia 1997) by the formula below. 
Expected Price (Expectation) = prob.low × pricelow + (1-prob.low) × pricehigh 
Price comparison Points.  In the study, we put online channel as the context of 
transaction for buying the DC product, which is the pure-play E-tailer’s website such as 
Amazon.com, Ebay.com, etc. As one popular channel for electronic product, pure-play E-
tailer’s website provides rich information about price offers and product features. 
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Therefore, we assume participants learn or at least realize the price dispersions online 
(Pan, Ratchford and Venkatesh 2004). 
To capture the effect of comparison points and regret-type (as opposed to 
disappointment-type) effects on fairness perception, we set three reference price channels 
including In-store, Friend and Competitor brand as price comparison parties against 
online purchasing. In addition to the Self Expectation comparison in the 1
st
 stage price 
evaluation, these three reference points, which we consider in the 2
nd
 stage price 
evaluation, have been examined in previous studies and are the main resources of price 
information (Kukar-Kinney, Xia and Monroe 2007). However, no study has empirically 
examined three channels together and tested the effect of information resource on price 
perceptions jointly. In the current study, three channels are evaluated as the transaction 
contexts and they are also randomly distributed among participants, with three randomly 
assigned groups. Of all 202 subjects, 82 respondents (40.6%) are randomly assigned in 
“In-store” group, and 65 respondents (32.2%) are assigned in “Friend” group, and 55 
students (27.2%) are assigned in “Competitor” group. Which channel as reference price 
information has the most significant effect on price perception is remained to be explored 
in the following test. 
5.   Results 
5.1. Basic Descriptive Statistics 
We first examine consumer’s overall price judgments in terms of their initial purchase 
intention and fairness perception, for groups exposed to three types of product. Table 3 
shows the overall average ratings and average rating for (ultra) Compact, 
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Prosumer/Medium and SLR/Large digital cameras. We find significant differences 
between three types of digital cameras in both initial purchase intention (F value = 19.72, 
p value =.000) and price fairness perception (F value = 21.75, p value =.000). It is 
understandable since two price judgment (purchase intention and fairness perception) 
themselves are not significant different from each other (t = .45, p value =.65).  
-------------------Insert Table 3 about here------------------- 
We present consumer’s price judgment on price increase and price decrease respectively 
in Table 4, in terms of their initial purchase intention and fairness perception.  Consistent 
with our expectation and previous research, subjects should have been happier when the 
actual price they find is lower than their expectation, and when they find a foregone price 
more expensive than their purchasing price and vice versa. 
-------------------Insert Table 4 about here------------------- 
In addition, Table 5 shows the trichotomy classification results, indicating that three 
categories of fairness perception have significant differences in the perception ratings. In  
a 1-9 scale rating, people feel “very unfair” when they rate price at 1.98 on average, 
“moderate fair” when the average rating is 5.1 and they feel “very fair” with the average 
rating to be as high as 7.92. We capture the fairness perception in a better way by 
designing a 1-9 scale than a 1-3 scale, because consumer rate their perception in a more 
detailed format and it can be transformed into a 1-3 scale easily.   
-------------------Insert Table 5 about here------------------- 
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5.2 Estimation Results 
Our analysis shows that both disappointment (D
+
, D
-
) and regret (R
+
, R
-
) have 
statistically significant asymmetric effects on price fairness perceptions, which also vary 
across different product types and comparison parties. In addition, initial purchase 
intention, trust in online websites, importance of price in decision making, familiarity of 
product and customer’s gender are significant factors on price perception.  
Effects of Emotions and the moderating role of price level 
Table 6 presents the parameter estimates for fairness perception model we propose in (4), 
when it is grouped by product types representing three price levels: less expensive, 
moderate expensive and more expensive product. 
-------------------Insert Table 6 about here------------------- 
As expected, for less expensive products (compact DC) with price from $70 to 280$, the 
effects of four emotions are all significant but perform differently in both magnitude and 
signs. Both disappointment (= -.508) and regret (=-.885) have negative impacts on 
price fairness perception while elation (=.308) and rejoicing (=.503) positively affect 
price fairness, which is consistent with our hypotheses H8-H11.  Magnitudes of rejoicing 
and regret effect are greater than magnitudes of elation and disappointment respectively, 
indicating that the comparison between actual price and forgone price has higher effect 
on consumer’s judgment of fairness that the comparison between actual price and self 
expectation. The post-purchase evaluation plays a more important role.  
More interestingly, the absolute impact of disappointment is greater than that of elation. 
Reflecting a similar pattern, the absolute impact of regret is greater than that of rejoicing. 
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This finding implies that the asymmetry effect of positive and negative emotion exists in 
fairness perception judgment, which is consistent with Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997). 
For a more expensive product (SLR/Large DC) with price $500 and $700, we also find 
similar patterns of effects on price fairness perceptions. Both disappointment (=-.570) 
and regret (=-.835) have negative impacts on price fairness perception and the absolute 
magnitude of regret effect is again higher than that of disappointment effect, confirming 
the asymmetry of negative emotions in two stages of price evaluation for higher-end 
product. However, effects of positive emotion related to elation (=-.094) and rejoicing 
(=.009) are not significant. 
If we compare the two groups of significant effects from disappointment and regret, for 
lower-end product ( disappointment=-.508,  regret = -.885) and high-end product ( 
disappointment=-.570,  regret = -.835), we could find that the directions are consistent by 
showing both negative effects, and the magnitude of effects are very close. Therefore, we 
could generalize the consistent findings for less expensive and more expensive product, 
that when consumers feel disappointed about the actual price or feel regretful for a 
forgone price, they will judge the price of the product they purchase at to be unfair. 
Meanwhile, the regret has a greater negative impact than that of disappointment.  
For moderately expensive product (Prosumer/Medium DC) with prices $540 and $600, 
we do not observe any significant effects from emotions, although the signs of parameter 
estimates show consistency with other two groups.  
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Effects of Emotions and the moderating role of price comparison points 
We then examine consumer’s overall price judgment in terms of their initial purchase 
intention and fairness perception, for groups exposed to three comparison points. Table 7 
shows the overall average ratings and average rating for In-store comparison group, 
Friend comparison group and Competitor brand comparison group. We find significant 
differences between three comparison groups in initial purchase intention (F value = 6.02, 
p value =.002) but no significant differences in price fairness perception (F value = .77, p 
value =.465).  
-------------------Insert Table 7 about here------------------- 
Table 8 shows the parameter estimates for fairness perception model we propose in (4), 
when it is grouped by third party price comparison including In-store, Friend and 
Competitor brand. 
-------------------Insert Table 8 about here------------------- 
As expected, in-store prices have significant impacts on fairness perceptions. When 
consumers are faced with forgone price obtained from in traditional stores, the effects of 
four emotions are all significant and also perform differently in both magnitude and 
signs. Both disappointment (=-.351) and regret (=-.763) have negative impacts on 
price fairness perception while elation (=.204) and rejoicing (=.308) positively affect 
price fairness, which is also consistent with our hypotheses H8-H11.  Similar to our 
previous finding, magnitudes of rejoicing and regret effect are greater than magnitudes of 
elation and disappointment respectively, indicating that the post-purchase evaluation 
influence more than the pre-purchase evaluation.  
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Similarly, the absolute impact of disappointment is greater than that of elation. Reflecting 
a similar pattern, the absolute impact of regret is greater than that of rejoicing. This 
finding again confirms that the asymmetry effect of positive and negative emotion exists 
in fairness perception judgment when we use in-store price as the resources of forgone 
price that consumer use to compare with the actual price.  
When price comparison party is friend, someone who is the consumer’s acquaintance, we 
find that only regret (=-.847) has significant negative impact on price fairness 
perception. And when the forgone price is obtained from a competitor brand, we observe 
that only rejoicing (=-.427) and regret (=-.570) have significant influences on price 
fairness, and both show negative signs. By comparing the absolute magnitude of effect, 
regret has the highest influence and one dollar gap between forgone price and actual price 
will result in the largest decrease (=.847) in price fairness perception.  
Effects of Individual and Market Context Variables 
In addition to effects of four main emotions we focus on to explain price fairness, we 
have also examined how individual demographic variables, consumer’s history of 
purchasing behavior, and their initial purchase intentions influence fairness perceptions.  
First, in accordance to hypothesis H3, results show that relationship with online seller has 
positively significant effect on consumer’s judgment of prices. As shown in Table 6, 
when we model price fairness grouped by product types, we observe significant effect of 
trust for all three types of digital cameras, with consistently positive parameter estimates 
( trust /compact DC = .465,  trust /medium DC = .863, trust /large DC = 1.063). We find that the 
impact for large DC type is the highest, indicating that the more expensive item 
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consumers are purchasing, the higher involvement and the more important role trust in 
the sellers play in the evaluation. However, repetition purchasing shows a negative effect 
( repetition /Large DC = -.380) when consumer evaluates prices for SLR/large DC. The 
consumer involvement is high for repeated buyer on expensive items, and therefore 
consumers are even more sensitive to any change or difference of prices than those who 
do not repeatedly purchase in the same transaction channel. Thus, repeat buyer’s fairness 
perception significantly is lower than that of non-repeat buyers. 
Second, as shown in Table 8, when we model price fairness grouped by comparison 
points, whether enough information is provided by the seller also affects fairness 
judgment positively (information /friend = .380). If the consumers acquire forgone price 
information through their friends, the more product and price information they learn from 
the online channel, the more fairness they perceive when they notice the price 
differences. Meanwhile, we find importance of price in consumer’s purchasing decision 
making is positively ( price importance/ competitor = .265) affecting fairness perception, for 
competitor group, which supports hypothesis H5. 
Third, we find gender plays an essential role in price fairness perception, whichever 
product type we examine or when we use in-store price as the comparison point. When 
we examine price fairness across product types, gender dummy shows significantly 
negative effect with female as the base level, meaning that male customers rate fairness 
lower than female customers, for all three types of digital cameras ( gender/compact DC = -
.535,  gender/prosumer DC = -.676,  gender/large DC = -.589). Similarly, when we test price 
fairness across comparison points, gender dummy also shows significantly negative 
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effect, indicating that male customers rate fairness lower than female customers, for in-
store price comparison ( gender/in-store = -.831).  
Finally, as expected in our hypothesis H1, consumer’s initial purchase intention in the 
pre-purchase stage is closely related to fairness perception, by showing a significantly 
positive sign and large magnitude in its parameter estimates, whichever product type we 
examine or whichever price comparison point we use to compare with the actual 
purchase. When we examine price fairness across product types, initial purchase intention 
shows a positive effect, meaning that customers who have higher initial purchase 
intention before their purchase decision will perceive more fairness than those who have 
lower purchase intention at the beginning. The effect is significantly high for all three 
types of digital cameras ( intention/compact DC = .853,  intention /prosumer DC = 1.409,  intention /large 
DC = 1.274) as shown in Table 6. Similarly, when we test price fairness across 
comparison points, the effect is significantly high for all three comparison points ( 
intention/in-store = 1.236,  intention /friend = 1.160,  competitor = 1.245) as shown in Table 8.  
6.  Discussions 
In sum, we propose an expected utility model incorporating four emotional factors from 
Disappointment-Regret model, by designing both positive and negative price differences 
simultaneously in the attitude-oriented framework. Our theoretical framework includes 
the role of choices of price comparison points, two stages of price evaluation, price levels 
represented by product attributes and designs, as well as four main emotions as the key 
stimuli of price fairness perceptions.  
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We derive three sets of hypotheses from our theory. Specifically, the first group of 
hypotheses is regarding choices of price comparison points in two stages of price 
evaluations. From empirical study, we find significant evidence to support these 
hypotheses, indicating that pre-purchase evaluation of price by comparing consumer’s 
self will expectation and the actual price significantly has a positive effect on price 
fairness after purchase decision making. The higher the initial purchase intention, the 
higher the fairness perception. Further, the post-purchase evaluation influences more than 
pre-purchase evaluation on fairness perception, indicating that even if we are faced with a 
higher price offer than our own expectation, resulting in a lower purchase intention, it is 
possible that we could still feel fair when we find a forgone price higher than the actual 
price. Customers may feel first disappointed and then rejoice, resulting in a high fairness 
perception for the price offer. In addition, the choice of comparison points plays a 
moderating role on effects on price fairness and we find in-store price has the highest 
effect on price fairness when we compare with online price offer.  
The second group of hypotheses is regarding individual and market context variables. We 
also find significant evidence to support our expectations that seller-buyer relationship is 
important for customer’s fairness perception formation. Trust in online seller and whether 
people can obtain enough information on the website are influencing consumer’s 
judgment on prices. The more trust people have in E-tailer, or the more information 
provided by E-tailer, the higher fairness perception people will perceive, even if they 
notice a negative price difference that should have negatively affected fairness 
perception. In addition, the importance of price in customer’s purchase decision is 
positively affecting fairness perception. The more important price plays in the decision 
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making, more fairness people perceive after price comparison. However, if consumers are 
repeat buyers, they more sensitive and conscious about online purchasing, and results 
show that they perceive more unfairness after price comparisons. Moreover, female and 
male consumers behave quite differently on fairness perceptions, with the results 
indicating that the male customer rates fairness significantly lower than female customer, 
no matter which types of digital cameras they purchase. 
The third group of hypotheses is regarding the four emotions we focus on. We have 
captured both significant effects of signs and magnitude of price differences on fairness 
perception that are associated with elation and disappointment in the pre-purchase stage, 
rejoicing and regret in the post-purchase stage. Asymmetric effect does exist in fairness 
perception. The effects of negative emotion (disappointment and regret) are higher than 
those of positive emotion (elation and rejoicing). In some sense, it is easier for people to 
perceive unfairness than fairness.  
For managers, our findings suggest that online E-tailers need to ensure that they provide 
enough price and product information on their websites. It is important to keep a close 
relationship with customers since loyalty is related to both trust and repetition of 
purchase. Price information plays an essential role in customer evaluation, before and 
after customer’s decision making. More price offers online is not a negative sign for E-
tailers; however it might even be helpful for the E-tailer. When customers are faced with 
large price dispersions online, they keep on obtaining price information from the third 
parties and form a new will expectation on the product. If the price dispersion is left 
skewed, customer might form a higher price expectation. The question is when is the 
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proper time for customer to be exposed to other price offers, since post-purchase 
evaluation is more important in their fairness perception formation.  
While providing support to our theoretical framework, our results have some limitations. 
First, we focus on price fairness perception as the dependent outcome, even though there 
are some other subsequent behavioral actions, such as perceived value, future purchase 
intention, and recommendation for other people. It would be good if we can assess these 
actions jointly with fairness perception to how these might subsequently affect 
customer’s purchasing behaviors. Second, we set the price change as 20% of the actual 
price in the current study, including both price increasing and decreasing. We do not 
design a lower or higher percentage of price change since our structure is already very 
complex. We should, therefore, test how more options of price change will affect price 
fairness perception. These limitations shed some light for future research to handle.  
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Figure 1. Conceptual Framework 
  
First Stage Evaluation 
Second Stage Evaluation 
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          Table 1. Main Features and Price Range of Three Digital Camera Types 
Type Features Actual Price Prob.(Low) Prob.(High) Cost level 
(ultra) 
compact 
Thickness < 2" 
Weight < 250g 
Screen <2.5" 
70 
90 
260 
280 
.60 
.55 
.50 
.45 
.40 
.45 
.50 
.50 
low 
Prosumer 
/Medium 
Thickness 2.5"-4" 
Weight  300g-
400g 
Screen  3.5"-4" 
540 
600 
.40 
.50 
.60 
.55 
medium 
SLR 
/Large 
With 3× lens or 
Body Only 
Thickness 4" 
Weight > 400g 
Screen  2.5"-4.0" 
500 
700 
.55 
.40 
.45 
.60 
high 
 
         Table 2. Price offset between actual price and forgone price 
Type Actual Price 
Price increase (20%) Price decrease (20%) 
Forgone Price Price Gap Forgone Price Price Gap 
(ultra) 
compact 
70 
90 
260 
280 
85 
110 
310 
320 
-15 
-20 
-50 
-50 
55 
70 
210 
220 
15 
20 
50 
50 
Prosumer 
/Medium 
540 
600 
650 
720 
-110 
-120 
430 
480 
110 
120 
SLR 
/Large 
500 
700 
600 
840 
-100 
-140 
400 
560 
100 
140 
 
         Table 3. Distribution of Data across Product Types 
Price Comparison 
Parties 
# of 
Subjects 
# of  
Observation 
Initial Purchase Intention1 Price Fairness Perception2 
Mean Std. Mean Std. 
(ultra) Compact 202 807 (1 missing) 5.352 2.439 5.456 2.277 
Prosumer/Medium 202 402 (2 missing) 4.896 2.557 4.475 2.598 
SLR/Large 202 402 (2 missing) 4.543 2.667 4.690 2.695 
Overall 202 1616 5.035 2.548 5.076 2.497 
             1 Significant difference (F value = 19.72, p value =.000) 
             2 Significant difference (F value = 21.75, p value =.000) 
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     Table 4. Distribution of Data across Product Price Change 
Price Change 
# of 
Subjects 
# of 
 Observation 
Initial Purchase 
Intention1 
Price Fairness 
Perception2 
Mean Std. Mean Std. 
1st Stage 
Expectation > 
Actual 
202 888 (3 missing) 6.20 2.30 5.88 2.35 
Expectation < 
Actual 
202 722 (3 missing) 4.09 2.34 4.42 2.42 
2nd Stage 
20% increase in 
forgone price 
202 806 (2 missing) 5.37 2.49 6.01 2.30 
20% decrease in 
forgone price 
202 705 (3 missing) 4.68 2.55 4.11 2.31 
      1 Significant difference in 1st stage (M=2.112,  t value = 18.16, p value =.000) and 2nd stage of comparison (M=.697, t value =         
5.54, p value =.000) 
      2 Significant difference in 1st stage (M=1.465, t value = 12.24, p value =.000) and 2nd stage of comparison (M=1.899, t value =  
16.5, p value =.000) 
 
     Table 5. Distribution of three categories of Fairness Perception 
Three categories 
# of  
Observation 
Price Fairness Perception1 
Mean Std. 
Very Unfair “1” 496 1.98 .88 
Moderate Fair “2” 525 5.10 .80 
Very Fair “3” 550 7.92 .83 
Overall 1616 5.07 2.49 
      1 Significant difference (F value = 734.7, p value =.000) 
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     Table 6 . Model Estimates for Fairness Perception (Grouped by Product Types) 
Variables Estimate Std. Error P-value VIF 
Intercept   (Fair =Very Fair) -1.193** .477 .013 - 
Intercept  (Fair =Moderate Fair) 1.251*** .477 <.01 - 
Compact DC Group .05 .507 .921 2.9 
Medium DC  Group 1.466 1.004 .144 3.9 
Large DC Group (base) - - - - 
Previous Buying/  Compact DC  Group .162 .304 .594 3.3 
Trust/  Compact DC Group .465** .180 .010 2.4 
Repeat/   Compact DC Group .266 .182 .144 2.4 
Familiarity/   Compact DC Group .065 .137 .635 1.4 
Information/   Compact DC Group .196 .125 .116 1.2 
Price Sensitivity/   Compact DC Group .047 .145 .746 1.6 
Price Importance/   Compact DC Group .112 .145 .746 1.6 
Gender/   Compact DC Group -.535* .243 .028 1.9 
Initial Purchase Intention/   Compact DC Group 1.236*** .109 <.01 1.5 
Asymmetric Disappointment/   Compact DC Group 
Elation D+ 
(Actual<Expected) 
Disappointed D- 
(Actual>Expected) 
.308* 
 
-.508*** 
.171 
 
.177 
.072 
 
<.01 
1.3 
 
1.8 
Asymmetric Regret/   Compact DC Group 
Rejoicing R+ 
(Actual<Forgone) 
Regret R- 
(Actual>Forgone) 
.503* 
 
-.885*** 
.294 
 
.299 
.081 
 
<.01 
4.5 
 
3.4 
Previous Buying/  Medium DC  Group -.328 .368 .372 4.3 
Trust/  Medium DC  Group .863*** .226 <.01 2.4 
Repeat/  Medium DC  Group -.343 .225 .128 2.5 
Familiarity/  Medium DC  Group -.044 .167 .790 1.5 
Information/  Medium DC  Group .142 .157 .365 1.2 
Price Sensitivity/  Medium DC  Group -.120 .175 .493 1.6 
Price Importance/  Medium DC  Group .171 .174 .325 1.6 
Gender/    Medium DC  Group -.676* .306 .027 2.3 
Initial Purchase Intention/    Medium DC  Group 1.160*** .140 <.01 1.3 
Asymmetric Disa./    Medium DC  Group 
Elation D+ 
(Actual<Expected) 
Disappointed D- 
(Actual>Expected) 
-.125 
 
-.016 
.153 
 
.108 
.414 
 
.886 
1.2 
 
1.5 
Asymmetric Regret/    Medium DC  Group 
Rejoicing R+ 
(Actual<Forgone) 
Regret R- 
(Actual>Forgone) 
.594 
 
-1.504 
1.049 
 
1.147 
.571 
 
.190 
5.8 
 
5.7 
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Variables Estimate Std. Error P-value VIF 
Previous Buying/   Large DC  Group -.116 .381 .760 4.3 
Trust/   Large DC  Group 1.063*** .234 <.01 2.4 
Repeat/   Large DC Group -.380* .230 .098 2.4 
Familiarity/   Large DC  Group .158 .169 .352 1.4 
Information/   Large DC Group -.179 .159 .261 1.2 
Price Sensitivity/   Large DC Group -.179 .181 .323 1.6 
Price Importance/   Large DC Group .050 .177 .776 1.6 
Gender/   Large DC  Group -.589* .309 .057 2.3 
Initial Purchase Intention/  Large DC  Group 1.245*** .139 <.01 1.3 
Asymmetric Disappointment/   Large DC  Group 
Elation D+ 
(Actual<Expected) 
Disappointed D- 
(Actual>Expected) 
.094 
 
-.570* 
.077 
 
.282 
.226 
 
.059 
1.3 
 
1.3 
Asymmetric Regret/  Large DC  Group 
Rejoicing R+ 
(Actual<Forgone) 
Regret R- 
(Actual>Forgone) 
.009 
 
-.835*** 
 
.311 
 
.282 
 
.977 
 
<.01 
 
2.2 
 
2.8 
     *** < .01 
     ** < .05 
     * <.1 
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     Table 7. Distribution of Data across Price Comparison Parties 
Price 
Comparison 
Parties 
# of 
Subjects 
# of 
Observation 
Initial Purchase 
Intention1 
Fairness Perception2 
Mean Std. Mean Std. 
In-store 65 
519 (1 
missing) 
4.78 2.52 4.96 2.53 
Friend 55 440 5.35 2.60 5.15 2.58 
Competitor 82 
652 (4 
missing) 
5.02 2.50 5.10 2.40 
     1 Differences are significant (F = 6.02, p value = .002) 
     2 Differences are not significant (F = .77, p value = .465) 
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     Table  8. Model Estimates for Fairness Perception (Grouped by Price Comparison Party) 
Variables Estimate Std. Error P-value VIF 
Intercept   (Fair =Very Fair) -1.047*** .384 <.01 - 
Intercept  (Fair =Moderate Fair) 1.295*** .384 <.01 - 
In-Store Group -.305 .532 .567 6.2 
Friend Group .262 .617 .671 5.2 
Competitor Group - - - - 
Previous Buying/ In-Store Group .571 .350 .103 3.1 
Trust/ In-Store Group .306 .242 .207 2.6 
Repeat/  In-Store Group .244 .231 .291 2.5 
Familiarity/  In-Store Group -.300* .166 .072 1.3 
Information/  In-Store Group .161 .158 .306 1.2 
Price Sensitivity/  In-Store Group -.123 .206 .551 2.4 
Price Importance/  In-Store Group .102 .225 .651 2.4 
Gender/  In-Store Group -.831*** .320 <.01 2.2 
Initial Purchase Intention/  In-Store Group .853*** .117 <.01 1.4 
Asymmetric Disappointment/  In-Store Group 
Elation D+ 
(Actual<Expected) 
Disappointed D- 
(Actual>Expected) 
 
 
.204* 
 
-.351*** 
 
 
.109 
 
.114 
 
 
.06 
 
<.01 
 
 
1.2 
 
1.4 
Asymmetric Regret/  In-Store Group 
Rejoicing R+ 
(Actual<Forgone) 
Regret R- 
(Actual>Forgone) 
.308*** 
 
-.763*** 
.112 
 
.137 
<.01 
 
<.01 
1.8 
 
1.9 
Previous Buying/  Friend Group -.183 .488 .708 5.7 
Trust/   Friend Group .220 .281 .434 3.3 
Repeat/   Friend Group .008 .300 .978 3.6 
Familiarity/   Friend Group .097 .231 .674 2.0 
Information/   Friend Group .380* .231 .074 1.7 
Price Sensitivity/   Friend Group -.055 .241 .818 2.5 
Price Importance/ Friend Group .142 .223 .526 2.1 
Gender/   Friend Group -.511 .376 .174 2.7 
Initial Purchase Intention/   Friend Group 1.409*** .144 <.01 1.5 
Asymmetric Disa./   Friend Group 
Elation D+ 
(Actual<Expected) 
Disappointed D- 
(Actual>Expected) 
 
 
.168 
 
-.090 
 
 
.121 
 
.149 
 
 
.167 
 
.548 
 
 
1.2 
 
1.6 
Asymmetric Regret/   Friend Group 
Rejoicing R+ 
(Actual<Forgone) 
Regret R- 
(Actual>Forgone) 
.168 
 
-.847*** 
.158 
 
.142 
.287 
 
<.01 
1.8 
 
1.7 
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Variables Estimate Std. Error P-value VIF 
Previous Buying/  Competitor Group .317 .375 .399 4.4 
Trust/   Competitor Group -.017 .198 .931 2.1 
Repeat/   Competitor Group .003 .198 .989 2.2 
Familiarity/   Competitor Group .262 .151 .105 1.4 
Information/   Competitor Group .033 .150 .827 1.2 
Price Sensitivity/   Competitor Group -.033 .164 .839 1.2 
Price Importance/   Competitor Group .265* .150 .078 1.2 
Gender/   Competitor Group -.332 .276 .228 2.0 
Initial Purchase Intention/   Competitor Group 1.274*** .115 <.01 1.2 
Asymmetric Disappointment/   Competitor 
Group 
Elation D+ 
(Actual<Expected) 
Disappointed D- 
(Actual>Expected) 
 
.071 
 
-.083 
 
.098 
 
.118 
 
.470 
 
.481 
 
1.2 
 
1.4 
Asymmetric Regret/   Competitor Group 
Rejoicing R+ 
(Actual<Forgone) 
Regret R- 
(Actual>Forgone) 
.427*** 
 
-.570*** 
.123 
 
.117 
<.01 
 
<.01 
1.7 
 
2.0 
     *** < .01 
     ** < .05 
     * <.1 
 
 
  
47 
 
 
 
References 
Ancarani, Fabio, and Shankar, Venkatesh (2004), "Price Levels and Price Dispersion 
Within and Across Multiple Retailer Types: Further Evidence and Extension", Journal of 
the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol.32, No.2, 176-187 
Bolton, Lisa E., Warlop, Luk, and Alba, Joseph W. (2003), “Consumer Perceptions of 
Price (Un)Fairness”, Journal of Consumer Research, 29 (March), 474-491 
Bolton, Lisa E., Keh, Hean Tat, and Alba, Joseph W. (2010), “How Do Price Fairness 
Perceptions Differ Across Culture?”, Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. XLVII (June 
2010), 564-576 
Campbell, Margaret C. (2007), “Says Who?!” How the Source of Price Information and 
Affect Influence Perceived Price (Un)fainess”, Journal of Marketing Research, 44 (May), 
261-271 
Campbell (1999), “Perceptions of Price Unfairness: Antecedents and Consequences”, 
Journal of Marketing, Vol.XXXVI (May 1999), 187-199 
Erickson, Gary M., and Johansson, Johny K. (1985), "The Role of Price in Multi-
Attribute Product Evaluations", Journal of Consumer Research, Vol. 12, No. 2 
(September), 195-199 
Finkel, Norman J. (2001), “Not Fair! The Typology of Commonsense Unfairness”, 
American Psychological Assocation.  
Helgeson, James G., and Beatty, Sharon E. (1987), “Price Expectation and Price Recall 
Error: An Empirical Study”, Journal of Consumer Research, 14 (December), 379-386 
Herr, Paul M., and Page, Christine M. (2004), “Asymmetric Association of Liking and 
Disliking Judgment: So What’s not to like?”, Journal of Consumer Research, 30 (March), 
588-601 
Herrmann, Andreas, Xia, Lan, Monre, Kent B., and Huber, Frank (2007), “The influence 
of price fairness on customer satisfaction: an empirical test in the context of automobile 
purchases”, Journal of Product $ Brand Management, 16/1, 48-58 
Homans, George C. (1961), Social Behavior: Its Elementary Forms, New York: 
Harcourt, Brace & World 
Inman, J.Jeffery, Dyer, James S., and Jia Jianmin (1997), “A Generalized Utility Model of 
Disappointment and Regret Effects on Post-Choice Valuation”, Marketing Science, 
Vol.16, No. 2, 97-111 
Jacobson, Robert, and Obermiller, Carl (1990), “The Formation of Expected Future 
Price: A Reference Price for Forward-Looking Consumers”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 16 (March), 420-431 
48 
 
 
 
Kalynaram, Gurumurthy, and Winer, Russell S. (1995), “Empirical Generalization From 
Reference Price Research”, Marketing Science, Vol. 14, No. 3, Part 2, G161-G169 
Kukar-Kinney, Monika, Xia, Lan, and Monroe, Kent B. (2007), “Consumers’ perception 
of the fairness of price-matching refund policies”, Journal of Retailing, 83, 325-337 
Kung, Mui, Monroe, Kent B., and Cox Jennifer L. (2002), “Pricing on the Internet”, 
Journal of Product & Brand Management, Vol. 11, No. 5, 274-287 
Lal, Rajivand and Sarvary, Miklos (1999), “When and How is the Internet Likely to 
Decrease Price Competition?”, Marketing Science, Vol. 18, No. 4, 485-503 
Malaviya, Prashant, Kisielius, Jolita, and Sternthal, Brian (1996), “The Effect of Type of 
Elaboration on Advertisement Processing and Judgment”, Journal of Marketing 
Research, 32 (November), 410-421 
Marcel Zeelenberg, Wilco W. van Dijk, Antony S.R. Manstead and Joop van der Pligt 
(2000), "On bad decisions and disconrmed expectancies: The psychology of regret and 
disappointment", Cognition and Emotion, 14(4), 521- 541 
Mazumdar, Tridib, Raj, S. P., and Sinha Indrajit (2005), “Reference Price Research: 
Review and Propositions”, Journal of Marketing, 69 (October), 84-102 
Niedrich, Ronald W., Sharma, Subhash, and Wedell, Douglas H. (2001), “Reference 
Price and Price Perceptions: A comparison of Alternative Models”, Journal of Consumer 
Research, 28 (December), 339-354 
Niedrich, Ronald W.,Weathers, Danny, Hill R. Carter, and Bell, David. R (2009), 
“Specifying Price Judgments with Range-Frequency Theory in Models of Brand Choice”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, Vol. XLXI (October 2009), 693-702 
Oliver, Richard L. (1997), “Satisfaction: A Behavioral Perspective on the Consumer.” 
Burr Ridge, IL: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
Ordonez, Lisa D., Connolly, Terry, and Coughlan, Richard (2000), “Multiple Reference 
Points in Satisfaction and Fairness Assessment”, Journal of Behavioral Decesion 
Making, 13, 3 (July/September), 329-344 
Pan, Xing, Ratchford, Brian T., and Shankar Venkatesh (2004), “Price dispersion on the 
internet: A review and directions for future research”, Journal of Interactive Marketing, 
18, 4, 116-135 
Russell, James A., and Carroll, James M.(1999), “On the Bipolarity of Positive and 
Negative Affect”, Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 125, Nu. 1, 3-30 
Xia, Lan, Monroe, Kent B., and Cox Jennifer L. (2004), “The Price Is Unfair! A 
Conceptual Framework of Price Fairness Perceptions”, Journal of Marketing, 68 
(October), 1-15 
49 
 
 
 
Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1988), “Consumer Perception of Price, Quality, and Value: A 
Means-End Model and Synthesis of Evidence”, Journal of Marketing, 52 (July), 2-22 
William, Boulding, Kalra, Ajay, Staelin, Richard, and Zeithaml, Valarie A. (1993), “A 
Dynamic Process Model of Service Quality: From Expectation to Behavioral Intentions”, 
Journal of Marketing Research, 30 (February), 7-27 
 
  
50 
 
 
 
ESSAY II 
DETERMINANTS OF PRICE DISPERSION IN E-COMMERCE: A META-
ANALYTIC REVIEW 
 
The notion of one price law that follows from a model of perfect competition no longer 
exists, especially in the context of E-commerce. Reasons include consumers’ extensive 
online search efforts, increasing adoption of mixed pricing strategy by companies, 
proliferation of differentiated services, as well as markups and markdowns by sellers to 
meet demand uncertainty. Those trends have sparked considerable research on price 
dispersion, defined as the magnitude of price variation for any given physically identical 
product items, which is either spatial (across sellers at one point in time), or temporal 
(prices vary within a seller over time). However, empirical analyses on the nature of price 
dispersion have led to conflicting results. There does not exist yet a quantitative review 
synthesizing and explaining the discrepancy of these findings. In the present research, the 
authors conduct a Meta-Analytic review on 790 price dispersions collected from studies 
across 34 articles between 1998 and 2010. By a hierarchical linear model, we 
systematically integrate and uncover 1) significant underlying factors that are driving 
price dispersion in different directions, such as scales and measurements of price 
variation, average price level, product category, distribution channel, geographic scope, 
etc., 2) whether neglect of heterogeneity in the study or other research characteristics 
result in discrepancy of findings, 3) the method bias-corrected mean price dispersion 
online. 
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1.  Introduction 
With the explosive growth of e-commerce activities and online purchasing, the notion of 
one price law that follows from a standard model of perfect competition (Stigler 1961) no 
longer works. There exists ubiquitous and persistent online price dispersion, even in the 
markets for apparently homogeneous products (Baye, Morgan, Scholten 2004b). Drivers 
for price dispersion include consumers’ extensive online search efforts, increasing 
adoption of mixed pricing strategy by companies, proliferation of differentiated online 
services, as well as frequent markups/markdowns by E-tailers to meet demand 
uncertainty and competitive rivalry within industry, etc. Consumers are broadening their 
online search efforts over time or through different channels by realizing the possibility 
of other prices they are unaware. Such search efforts are limited since customers need to 
balance the money they save from the searching with the potential search costs. 
According to Ratchford (2009), a rational consumer will accept a price above the 
minimum (lowest acceptable price, Stoetzel 1970) when the expected gain from 
searching further is less than the cost. This is because it only pays to search up to the 
point where the marginal benefits of search equal its marginal costs on the Internet. 
Consumers would accept a price higher than the minimum, while companies want to 
offer different price online. Therefore, price dispersion exists widely and persistent in the 
digital world.   
These trends have sparked considerable research from a variety of perspectives to explain 
price dispersion, defined as the magnitude of price variation for any given physically 
identical items. It is either spatial (across sellers at one point in time), or temporal (prices 
vary within a seller over time) (Varian 1980). In most researches, the price dispersion is 
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spatial, meaning there is “price distribution of an item with the same measured 
characteristics across sellers at a given point in time” (Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2004). 
Price dispersion reflects differences in prices charged for the identical products. It is 
usually indicated by measures such as range and standard deviation of prices, or these 
two measures weighted by the average price resulting in the percentage of differences 
and coefficient of variation respectively.  
However, empirical analysis on the nature of price dispersion has led to mixed and 
contradictory results, thereby debates existing in different studies. For example, empirical 
evidence has showed results in both directions that online price dispersion is either 
decreased
4
 or increased
5
, or at least no lower
6
 relative to offline price dispersion. Some 
studies
7 
find no significant evidence to support reduced price dispersion in the digital 
channel. Moreover, although various factors are taken into account by different studies, 
these possible drivers are found affecting price dispersion in different directions, 
including for instance, product mean price
8
, market structure
9
, channel service in terms of 
shipping fees
10
, and search cost
11
. For example, studies conclude commonly significant 
factors with either positive or negative direction, such as the effect of market structure 
                                                 
4
 Morton et al. 2001, Tang and Xing 2001, Brown and Goolsbee 2002 
5
 Clemons 1998, Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Ancarani and Shankar 2004 
6
 Bailey 1998, Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2002 
7
 Lehmann 2003, Scholten and Smith 2002 
8
 e,g., Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2001, 2002, Baylis and Perloff 2002 verses. Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 
2003b, 2007, Grover, Lim and Avagani 2006 
9
 e.g.. Cohen 2000, Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2004a verses. Ruppert and Kattuman 2003, Lidsey-
Mullikin And Grewal 2006) 
10
 e,g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, Baye and Morgan 2004 verses. Ancarani and Shankar 2004 
11
 e.g., Sorensen 2000, Zhao 2006, Walter, Gupta and Su 2006 verses. Ellison and Ellison 2004 
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represented by the number of competitors is found either increasing
12
 or decreasing
13
 
price dispersions with greater, or even non linear
14
 as a “double-edged sword”. 
Therefore, there is great need for a quantitative review summarizing and synthesizing 
those findings, by modeling observation or estimate of price variation and its all possible 
drivers. To fill this gap and explore the truth, the current research proposes a Meta-
Analytic study by digging into some common factors and discrepancy of findings. The 
main contribution of the current study is to quantitatively and comprehensively analyze 
the online price dispersion and empirically aggregate and generalize the results from 
previous studies across periods of market development and categories of product. By a 
systematic Meta-Analytic review, we investigate how well price dispersion on the 
Internet are explained by the factors in previous research studies, how the results vary 
across studies and time periods, and how other related factors explain price dispersion. 
 We put the context in the E-commerce, and provide quantitative generalizations on 790 
online price dispersions from studies across 34 previous articles between 1998 and 2010. 
Using a hierarchical linear model, we systematically integrate and uncover 1) significant 
underlying factors that drive price dispersion in different directions, such as scales and 
measurements of price variation, average price level, product category, distribution 
channel, geographic scope, etc., 2) whether neglect of heterogeneity in the study or other 
research characteristics result in discrepancy of findings, 3) the method bias-corrected 
mean price dispersion online. 
                                                 
12
 e,g., Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2003, Ruppert and Kattuman 2003 
13
 e.g., Clay, Krishman and Wolff 2001, Baye and Morgan 2004 
14
 e.g., Cohen 2000, Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2004a, Morgan, Orzen and Sefton 2006 
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We organize the remainder of this article as follows. We next provide the theoretical 
background from detailed literature review for our research. We then describe the 
methodology and data that we use for our investigation. Next we present our empirical 
approach and results. We conclude with a section summarizing our findings, providing 
some managerial implications. 
2.  Framework and Hypotheses 
In the previous empirical studies, researchers take into account different sources in 
electronic market (Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2004, Ratchford 2009) to explain price 
dispersion. According to the nature of these factors, we categorize them into three parts, 
including marketing, consumer and retailer/E-tailer characteristics. From a market 
perspective, for example, factors include mean price level
15
, price competition
16
, market 
structure
17
 represented by the number of competing companies, and product rank or 
popularity in the market
18
. From a customer perspective, researchers have examined 
consumer’s awareness of information 19 , search costs 20 . From a distribution channel 
perspective, factors examined include retailer type
21
, differentiation in channel services
22
 
and so on. Baye Morgan and Scholten (2005) summarize that price dispersion stems from 
either frictions related to the acquisition and transmission of information (search intensity 
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proxied by marketing variables that affect the benefits and costs of search) or the subtle 
differences in firm’s service levels and environmental factors, which matches with three 
components of market, consumer and E-tailer’s perspectives. 
2.1  From a Market Perspective 
From a market perspective, with the growth and maturity of e-commerce, researchers 
evaluate impacts of a number of market characteristics involving features of the digital 
market on price dispersion. Each specific market differs in structure, consumer 
involvement of online purchasing, fraction of popular product, heterogeneity of product, 
and so on. Among these possible factors, market structure, mean price level and product 
popularity are repeatedly examined in different contexts to evaluate their effects on the 
level of prices and its dispersion. 
Market Structure  Baye, Morgan and Scholoten (2004, 2004a) prove that market structure 
represented by the number of competing firms has a significant effect on observed price 
dispersion online, even after controlling for shipping costs and firm heterogeneities. They 
argue that in the online environment, firms change price levels randomly to create 
uncertainty for other competitors. The number of competitors also reflects the 
competitiveness of the market and researchers consider it as a “double-edged sword” 
(Cohen 2000, Baye and Morgan 2009), leading to a potential nonlinear relationship 
between the number of players and magnitude of price dispersion.  
Product Base Price Level Product’s mean price level is an important characteristic of a 
certain market as a key signal of product quality and cost, which determines consumer’s 
willingness to pay, purchasing involvement, and so on.  Mean price might also lead price 
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dispersion in two directions (Lindsey-Mullikin and Grewal 2006). From a market 
efficiency perspective, the prices of standardized items online are driven to a common 
level and therefore results in lower price dispersion. From a contextual influence of 
relative price perspective, base price level reflects consumer involvement and search cost 
and therefore higher prices drive people involve more and search more, which results in 
higher price dispersion. Researchers find empirical support for both two directions of 
relationship between average price and price dispersion (Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 
2002, Baylis and Perloff 2002).  
Product popularity The popularity of a certain product reduces customer’s search cost 
and thus potentially has effects on price dispersion. Whether selecting products from 
bestselling items or randomly (Clay, Krishnan and Wolff 2001), or from a mainstream or 
a niche market (Lee and Gossain 2002) will result in variations in prices are discussed 
and examined. In addition to these three mainly focused market characteristics, other 
market factors such as product category, geographic scope and area will be discussed in 
the hypotheses settings. 
2.2  From Consumer Perspective 
Information search cost Search cost of asymmetrically informed consumers is examined 
from several aspects as the most typical and prevalent source of price dispersion online. 
Research in relationship between information search and price dispersion originates from 
early discussions in traditional physical markets by Stigler (1961), who propose that price 
dispersion is prevalent due to information asymmetry, and Bakos (1997) puts it into an 
electronic market context in which buyers and sellers communicate in a digital format. 
From a consumer standpoint, there are three types of search costs: 1) consumer’s cost on 
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time and effort in searching for price information (typically lower prices), 2) product 
quality information, and 3) brand information such as a competing brand for a potential 
substitute. More search costs spent, more additional price quotes and product related 
information obtained.  
Search Cost in a digital world In the online market, based on the Salop and Stiglitz 
(1977) model of price differences across informed and uniformed consumers, Baylis and 
Perloff (2002) find in their empirical study that the way firms vary the prices for 
informed and uninformed consumers or serious shoppers is one of the reasons why prices 
for a homogeneous good still vary across retailers. Many researchers argue that search 
costs and price dispersion are much lower compared with those in traditional physical 
stores. For example, it takes only a few mouse clicks on the computer to figure out 
product prices on E-tailer’s website. Also some price comparison sites such as 
BizRate.com and NexTag,com provide a list of price quotes from different sellers 
charging for the same item at one time. The whole searching procedure can be finished in 
a few seconds. Therefore, information asymmetry between consumer’s costs of 
obtaining/acquiring information and firm’s costs of transmitting information to 
consumers is expected to be dramatically reduced and lower when everything goes 
online, thereby resulting in a convergence in prices with reduced price dispersion at the 
lowest competitive level (Grover, Lim and Ayyagari 2006). Zhao (2006) studies various 
degrees of price dispersion and finds it positively correlated with higher consumer search 
cost, more intense competition and greater consumer heterogeneity.  
Discrepancy in findings However, the contention that low search costs result in one price 
without too much price dispersion is not fully supported by empirical studies and 
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persistent online price dispersion has still been found in the literature. Baye, Morgan and 
Scholten (2005) summarize theoretical models from a information search perspective 
(benefit, cost of search, purchase frequency, number of sellers, price persistence). The 
study reveals that reductions in consumer search costs need not reduce price dispersion 
and their empirical study shows that both online and offline price dispersions are sizable, 
pervasive, and persistent -- and do not purely stem from subtle differences in firms’ 
products or services. Ellison and Ellison (2004) consider that price search engine plays a 
dominant role in Internet-based retailing and they examine how online and offline retail 
get affected by obfuscations that firms bring to consumers, theoretically and empirically.  
They conclude that the extent to which the Internet will reduce consumer search cost is 
not clear and the Internet allows firms to adopt a number of strategies that make search 
more difficult. Looking at the dark side of information, Grover, Lim and Ayyagari (2006) 
examine information overload (due to too many alternatives for customers) and 
information equivocality (due to ambiguity such as quality uncertainty in online 
marketing) as two negative attributes of information that lead sellers to different pricing 
decision and strategies in digital markets. Authors propose that even with techniques such 
as usage of search engines in the Internet, consumers actually spend a higher degree of 
time and effort (Du, 2004) since some want to be compensated by finding a lower price 
while others will abandon further search by finding it too costly to locate the lowest price 
in the market, thereby leading to a higher price dispersion. Consumers in a digital market 
can also have opportunisitic purchasing behaviors. Ratchford (2009) summarizes that 
although more salient online price information increases consumer price sensitivity and 
discourage high prices, richer non-price information leads to lower consumer price 
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sensitivity and wider range of prices. In whichever direction price dispersion goes, it can 
be concluded that costly search mostly contribute to price differences. 
2.3  From a E-tailer Perspective 
From a E-tailer perspective, a pure play E-tailer or the online branch of a retailer differs 
in nature from traditional physical brick-and-mortar stores, thereby influencing price 
competition, price structure and distribution, and the level of price dispersion in the web-
oriented purchasing environment. When purchasing goes digital, store’s location is no 
longer a dominant element that affects consumer’s information search cost. Research 
studies take E-tailers’ characteristics such as firm ranking, type of distribution channel, 
and service quality into account (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Simith 2000, Baylis and Perloff 
2002, Ancarani and Shankar 2004) to investigate their effects on online price dispersion.  
Firm ranking, Channel service A number of studies examine firm ranking, channel 
service as important E-tailer characteristics that affect degree of price dispersion. Baylis 
and Perloff (2002) find high priced stores remained high-priced with superior service and 
low-priced remained low priced with poor service. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) take 
shipping and handling charges and tax into account and find no significant difference in 
price dispersion. Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2002) find the proportion of online price 
dispersion explained by retailer’s service quality to be small, by examining prices from 
both pure-play E-tailers and bricks-and-clicks. Cao, Gruca, Smith (2004) use customer 
ratings to measure pre-purchase and post-purchase service to explain price dispersions in 
the online book market and they find that differences in pre-purchase service satisfaction 
do not contribute to price differences across sellers and that higher prices charged by the 
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three market leaders are due to higher pre-purchase and post-purchase satisfaction 
ratings.  
Switching to Multichannel In addition for channel services, the trend of retailers’ 
switching from pure brick-and-mortar market to multichannel retailing due to boost of e-
commerce activity and online purchasing gives rise to a stream of research on online 
price dispersion and a comparison between different types of channels.  
Discrepancy in findings  On the one hand, researchers empirically observe smaller priced 
dispersion online compared with that from conventional stores. For example, 
Brynjolfsson and Smith (2002) find smaller price dispersion online (pure-play Internet E-
tailers) than offline (bricks-and-mortar retailers) when controlling for E-tailer’s branding, 
awareness and trust by using Web traffic as a proxy for market share. Morton, 
Zettelmeyer and Silva-Risso (2001) compare dealer (offline) and online car retailing, and 
conclude that Internet referrals increase buyer information and bargaining clout, thereby 
resulting in smaller price dispersion online. Tang and Xing (2001) compare pricing in 
DVD category between online branch of multichannel retailers (bricks-and-clicks) and 
pure-play E-tailers, observing that the prices from pure Internet retailers are significantly 
lower and the price dispersion is much smaller (less than a half of) than that from online 
channel of multichannel retailers.  
On the other hand, a number of research studies also find online price variation is no less 
than that of offline retailers. Lehmann (2003) finds no evidence for lower prices and price 
dispersion advertised in the online medium, for the nearly homogeneous services – 
holiday packages from online travel agencies. Similarly, Ancarani and Shankar (2004) 
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compare price dispersions of Book and CDs among three types of retailers: pure-play 
Internet, brick-and-mortar (traditional) and bricks-and-clicks (multichannel) and found 
price dispersion online (pure-play Internet) is higher than offline (brick-and-mortar), 
while it becomes lower after accounting for shipping fees in two formats (single shipping 
fee, and shipping fee divided among 3 items). In addition, Xing, Yang and Tang (2006) 
discover that the online branch of multichannel retailers charge significantly higher prices 
(of DVDs) than dotcoms (pure-play firms that do not have a physical presence); then 
prices tend to converge over time, therefore reducing price dispersion. The mixed 
findings that multichannel retailer have higher posted price than pure-play E-tailers’ 
posted price can be explained if turns out that traditional retailers have even higher posted 
prices, thereby allowing multichannel retailer to be positioned between pure-play and 
traditional players (Ancarani and Shankar 2004). 
2.4  Why a Meta-Analysis is needed 
Overall, these potential drivers proposed and examined from three perspectives should 
jointly affect the direction and magnitude of price dispersion. Starting from consumers’ 
awareness of information and search effort, if dispersion itself is a function of the average 
amount of search, it is then a function of the nature of the commodity (Stigler 1971). 
Search intensity from consumer’s perspective is closely related with market and retailer 
characteristics. For example, more competitive and more repetitive sellers in the market, 
higher expenditures by the customer on product buying, or larger geographic area 
coverage in the market, a greater the amount of search effort and vice versa.  
Understanding price dispersion is essential to both marketing researchers and 
practitioners, from the perspectives of consumers, sellers and the whole marketplace. The 
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high levels of price dispersion are a strong empirical disconfirmation for the frictionless 
commerce and price convergence hypothesis (Bakos 1997) as well as a signal that it 
might be possible to design and implement consumer value-based pricing strategy by 
different types of competing retailers (Ancarani, Shankar 2004). It is also important to 
find the true drivers of price dispersion for different environmental settings, and examine 
the possible alternative offerings in the market and how they affect consumer’s choice 
and purchasing behavior.  
About the true drivers of price dispersion, Ratchford and Shankar (2004) point out that 
the online cases are examined in many studies under different settings of marketing 
environments; however, which matters most or least remains an unanswered question. 
Moreover, measurements of price dispersion, cross-category differences, base price 
levels, volume sold, services and reputation of retailer/E-tailer are proposed to be the 
research directions and some previous research had not covered these yet by then. A 
recent article by Ratchford (2009) emphasizes that product differentiation is another 
plausible cause of price dispersion and service factors including reliability, shopping 
convenience, product information and shipping and handling are identified to explain 
price definition. Existing evidence indicates that much of price variation cannot be 
explained by differences in retail services, at least with current measures of services. 
Other aspects of E-tailer characteristics including trust and reputation can also be 
considered to be factors on different prices.  
To test hypotheses of the theoretical interest and research-oriented factors, we categorize 
independent variables for our Meta-Analysis into three categories including market 
characteristics, channel characteristics and research characteristics (See Figure 1).  
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-------------------Insert Figure 1 about here------------------- 
3.  Methodology 
3.1 Database Compilation 
We identify documents and compile the database from the following sources. 1) All 
relevant papers and references in previous price dispersion empirical studies and review 
literatures
23
 and references in these articles; 2) All available computerized bibliographic 
publication search services from database such as ABI/INFORM, EBSCO, ScienceDirect; 
3) All relevant working papers in the research topic domain available on the web; 4) 
Papers obtained through hand searching in journals. Here we define paper as a distinct 
document (e.g., journal article, unpublished paper, or working paper), and define study as 
a distinct data source for price dispersion. Since one paper mostly reports multiple price 
dispersions from different data sources with various product categories or price structures 
with or without shipping and handling fees, we treat them as multiple studies. Further, we 
include no duplication or redundant paper on data sets (e.g., Ancarani and Shankar 2004). 
Applying all these definition and restrictions, we retrieve information from data sets that 
include 790 price dispersions from 34 distinct research papers from 1998 to 2010, 
covering price data obtained from February 1997 to November 2006 with the integrated 
sample size as large as 373,147. 
To select research works from previous literatures, we make the selection of papers on 
well-specified subjects, e.g. internet pricing, price dispersion, price variation, consumer 
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information search, etc., and we decide to include unpublished papers to avoid 
publication bias (file drawer problem).  
3.2 Price Dispersion in the Meta-Analysis 
By applying quantitative summarization to collections of research, Meta-Analysis focuses 
on finding out the overall direction and magnitude of the price dispersion across studies. 
The online price dispersions in our Meta-Analysis are obtained from physically identical 
or similar product items sold by single or multiple channels and stores at one period of 
time or over time. For online markets covered in the current study, we only include price 
information obtained through E-tailer or online branch of conventional retail store, 
starting around the year of 1997. In addition, we include both absolute and relative 
measurements that are used most commonly by previous researches when evaluating the 
level of price variation over time or across sellers. Absolute measures include price range 
and standard deviation, while relative measures are usually percentage of price difference 
and relative difference from the mean price, which is also called coefficient of variation. 
Specifically, four price dispersion measures covered in the current study include: 1) the 
coefficient of variation of the price distribution, defined as price standard deviation 
divided by mean price, 2) the percentage difference of the highest and lowest price, 
defined as price range divided by mean price, 3) the standard deviation of the price 
distribution, 4) the price range. First two are relative percentage measures while the latter 
two are absolute measures.  
Our selection of data restricts articles on price dispersion based on five criteria. 
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1. We limit price dispersion to four commonly used measures. From the search 
process, we recognize the coefficient of variation of the price distribution and the 
percentage of difference of prices to be the two most commonly used relative 
metrics reported in studies and price range, standard deviation of price as the two 
most commonly used absolute metrics reported. For example, Baye, Gatti, 
Kattuman, and Morgan (2002), Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2002) use coefficient 
of variation and the percentage of difference as two measures of price dispersion, 
while Sorensen (2000), Ancarani, Shankar (2004), Lindsey-Mullikin, Grewal 
(2006) use price range, standard deviation of price as two measures of price 
dispersion, and Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2004b, 2005) use both absolute and 
relative measures.  
To conduct the analysis with comparable metric of price dispersion, we 
implement model estimation separately for relative and absolute data sets. 
Therefore, we exclude other measures of price dispersion, such as ratio of 
difference of item price and overall mean price (Lee and Gossain 2002), 
difference of mean price and minimum price (Morgan and Scholten 2004a), 
difference of two lowest prices (Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2004a, 2006), 
difference between lowest price and 12
th
 or 24
th
 lowest price (Ellison, Ellison 
2004), and other index used for a specific product category such as airfares 
examined by Marin and Koo (2009). We also exclude research papers for data 
selection that have not reported any price information in details (e.g., Lin, Chen, 
Song 2009) or those that only provide theoretical or experimental analysis or 
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review (e.g., Smith, Bailey, Brynjolfsson 1998, Lee 2002, Goolsbee 2002, Biswas, 
Burman 2009). 
2. Price dispersion obtained from empirical studies with the real digital market data 
(panel data or time series data) of prices, price dispersions, price variations, price 
competitions are included in our study. In these studies, price information is 
obtained from online branch of retailers or pure-play Internet E-tailers that charge 
prices differently to examine pricing behavior on the Internet, the value of 
information, price competition, or product differentiation in the market. Usually, 
the prices are collected for physically identical or similar products across one or 
more than one product categories in one period of time or over time. Therefore, 
we exclude price dispersion merely obtained from pure conventional physical 
store (bricks-and-mortar retailers) (Cohen 1998, Cohen 2000, Morgan, Orzen and 
Sefton 2006, Zhao 2006, Yiu, Wong and Chaupaper 2009) without information on 
online price disepersion. In addition, price is defined as either online 
posted/quoted/listed price or other price such as normalized price, price 
perception, weighted price by product item ranking, sales, or popularity of E-
tailers. We include all of them in the data and specify a dummy variable to 
identify different price definitions. 
3. Price dispersion derived from estimation of price levels, product sales and brand 
rankings (Ratchford, Pan and Shankar 2003) is included in the study. 
4. Price dispersion derived from mean prices, price ranges, price standard deviation 
and/or relevant data reported in the paper is added to the data set of our study. 
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Since we can indirectly calculate price dispersion if we have the data of mean 
price, standard deviation of price, and price range reported in the paper, we obtain 
more price dispersion observations and broaden our data set. For example, if a 
certain paper uses price range as the measure of price dispersion and reports mean 
price at the same time, we then could calculate the percentage of difference by 
dividing price range over its mean and obtain other measurements of price 
dispersion covered in our study.  
5. We find significant price dispersions claimed in the research studies from several 
product categories and mainly categorize them into fast-moving consumer goods 
(such as Books, CDs, foods, etc.), electronics and computer product (such as 
scanner, digital camera, MP3s, etc.) and services (such as online air flight ticket). 
We exclude durable product category such as cars (Morton, Zettelmeyer, Silva-
Risso 2001) because the nature of a durable product varies a lot from those other 
products. In addition, the mean price of durable product (such as cars) is very high 
and these observations should be excluded as outliers in our data. 
Table 1 summarizes 34 papers examined in our Meta-Analysis study and information 
including authors, year, publication title and product examined. 
-------------------Insert Table 1 about here------------------- 
The quest for price dispersion yields a set of 34 articles (see Table 1) and a total of 820 
price dispersions. 30 price dispersion observations (.5% of all data) are considered as 
outliers and are omitted from the study, since they are outside the interval of the mean 
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price dispersion plus or minus six times the standard deviation. The final number of price 
dispersions is 790 from 34 articles.  
The final data covers a period of 12 years of research studies, from the growth stage 
(before year 2000) to the mature development of the Internet use in E-commerce. Data 
includes price dispersion measurements from the North America (US and Canada), 
Australia, Europe (UK, Ireland, Germany, France, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, UK, 
Denmark), and Asia (China, Singapore). Categories covered are wide in scope, ranging 
from popularly examined fast consuming products such as Books, DVDs, CDs, 
prescription drugs, computer and electronic products such as  laptops, PDAs, digital 
camera, scanner, to the less covered consumer service products such as airline ticket 
offerings of Online Travel Agents (OTA), phone unlocking, etc. The total sample size 
integrated from 34 papers is 347,147. Of the final 790 price dispersions examined in the 
current Meta-Analysis, we have 358 (45%) absolute measures (standard deviation and 
Range) and 432 (55%) relative measures (coefficient of price variation and percentage of 
price difference).  In between, the average price dispersion for relative measure is 21.2, 
with standard deviation 24.6, and the average price dispersion for absolute measures 
(standard deviation and range of price) is 73.9 and its standard deviation is 153.7.  
3.3 Independent Variables and Hypotheses 
Market Characteristics 
Market characteristics are mostly examined in previous research studies for explaining 
online price dispersion and a solid theoretical foundation has been established in previous 
research. We include them to synthesize prior research to explore whether and how these 
69 
 
 
 
factors affect the magnitude and direction of price dispersion while controlling for all 
other variables. 
Mean Price (+).  The mean price (average of the prices offered by all the E-tailers 
carrying the identical or similar product) is known to affect price dispersion, reflecting 
both consumer involvement (Kujala and Johnson 1993) and contextual influence of 
relative prices (Lindsey-Mullikin, Grewal 2006).  Given the centralized nature (Stigler 
1961) of pricing information on the Internet, researchers expect to find increased 
common price which is likely to make retailers more vigilant about their pricing 
strategies and more likely to provide competitive prices in the marketplace. As one 
consequence of such competitive benchmarking from the Internet and market efficiency 
perspective, Lindsey-Mullikin, Grewal (2006) propose that the prices of standardized 
items are driven to a common level and therefore results in lower price dispersion. 
Similarly, some other studies find average price is negatively related to price dispersion 
(e.g., Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2003b, 2007, Ratchford, Pan and Shankar 2003, 
Grover, Lim and Avagani 2006, Venkatesan, Mehta and Bapna 2007).  
From the nature of price perspective, if we consider the contextual influence of relative 
prices (Lindsey-Mullikin, Grewal 2006), the other direction of relationship between price 
dispersion and mean price is to be hypothesized. As an essential signal of quality and cost 
(Wolinsky 1983, Bagwell, Riordan 1991), base price level represents the amount of 
money sellers charge and customers pay for the product, which also reflects consumer 
involvement (Kujala and Johnson 1993). Moreover, most previous marketing 
practitioners and researchers examine price dispersion from different multiple categories, 
ranging from daily consumption items such as milk and soft drink (Bolton, Warlop, Alba 
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2003) to durable product such as electronic product (Baye, Morgan, Scholten 2004a), 
with large variation in prices. Meanwhile, different price levels in the same category may 
imply product differentiated quality and potential cost levels, hence thereafter are also 
influence price variations and could be an important causal reason for price dispersion. 
Therefore, two possible directions may be found in the relationship between mean price 
and dispersion. Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2001) find increase in absolute price 
dispersion (price range and standard deviation) with price level or involvement while 
relative price dispersion (percentage of price difference and the coefficient of variation of 
price) declines with price and high involvement products exhibit less relative price 
dispersion. Baylis, Perloff (2002) find high priced stores remained high priced and 
superior service, while low-priced remained low priced and poor service.  
In the current Meta-Analysis, we propose that for lower price level with relatively low 
configuration and designs of product, price will not change sharply; while for higher 
price level equipped with comparatively high configuration and more complex features, 
price dispersion would seem obvious even with small percentage of price change. A 
product’s actual price level has a positive effect on price dispersion. We also include in 
our model a quadratic term of the mean price to capture the possibility of non-linear 
relationships. 
H1: Price dispersion is higher in market settings involving products with higher 
base prices than products with lower base prices. 
Product Category. Previous empirical studies have developed studies on various product 
categories, from less expensive CDs, Books, to higher priced categories such as Laptops, 
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Air flights, Cars; from daily used consumer product such as drinks, milk to product with 
longer life time circle such as computer memory, CPU, and printer; from physical 
products to invisible service products.  
When evaluating price dispersion, some research studies have only examined one product 
category
24
, while many other researches cover multiple product categories
25
. When more 
than one category is evaluated, it is more reasonable to separately investigate each 
product category to guarantee product homogeneity rather than combining them together 
to calculate the price dispersion. 
The differences among product categories may affect the degree of dispersion in prices 
(Peterson et al. 1997). Products in different categories vary in their inherent natures, 
frequency of purchasing, customers’ involvement, price level, usage, purchasing channel, 
post-purchase services, etc. (Pan, Ratchford, Shankar 2007). When Rupert and Kattuman 
(2003) test the number of firms in the market, they also take into the differences among 
different product categories into account. Even within the same broad definition of 
product category, authors include category dummies to capture industry differences 
between consoles, games, CDs, PDAs, Printers and Scanners. Similarly, to eliminate 
contamination by unmeasured product heterogeneity, Pan, Ratchford, Shankar (2007) 
investigate homogeneous items within product categories and find significant and 
consistent effects of product categories for both two measures of price dispersion (price 
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range and standard deviation). They have observed different degrees of price dispersion 
in categories of books, computer software, and computer hardware.  
H2: Fast-moving consumer goods have the largest price dispersion, and 
electronic/Computer have smaller price dispersion, while the service product has 
a moderate level of price dispersion. 
Number of categories (+).  Most previous studies examine homogeneous products with 
single product category while some studies pool all products together and examine 
multiple categories at one time to examine price dispersion across different categories. 
More product categories involved represent combination of different price levels, product 
usage, consumer purchasing involvement etc. and therefore may result in higher price 
dispersion, since the prices from different categories do not converge.  
H3: Price dispersion will increase when more categories of products are 
examined together. 
Number of Sellers (Market Structure) (+). As defined before, price dispersion is the 
magnitude of price variation for given physically identical items. It can be spatial that 
occurs across multiple sellers at one point in time or temporal that occurs when prices 
vary within a seller over time. So how many sellers are in the market or examined in the 
study is an important factor on how large price variation could be. Most previous studies 
examine prices across sellers and try to cover as many retailers/E-tailers as possible in the 
market.  
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Cohen (2000) first points out that the number of alternatives from competitors in the 
market is “a double edged sword”. On the one hand, price dispersion is reduced with 
greater rivalry. On the other hand, distortion in information function also increases and it 
results in enlarged price dispersion. Some other researchers also find empirical support 
for a non linear relationship between the number of sellers in the market and level of 
price dispersion (Ratchford, Pan, and Shankar 2003b, Baye, Morgan, Scholten 2004a, 
Morgan, Orzen and Sefton 2006, Venkatesan, Mehta and Bapna 2007, Baye and Morgan 
2009). For example, Baye, Morgan, Scholten (2004a) find that levels of price dispersion 
vary systematically with the number of listing retailers and the prices do not converge 
after controlling for shipping costs and firm heterogeneities, although the average range 
in prices falls when the number of competing firms decreases. Their empirical study 
tends to show an inverted U-shaped relationship. Therefore, a nonlinear relationship 
between number of retailer/E-tailer and price dispersion could be proposed.   
Empirically, a single direction of the relationship is also found in a number of studies, in 
either a positive or a negative way. Baye, Morgan, Scholten (2003) examined the effect 
of the number of firms and rank of firms on the value of information (measured by the 
difference between average price and the minimum price). The value of the price 
information varies systematically with the number of firms listing prices. It is about 11 
percent when only two firms list prices, compared to about 20 percent when more than 30 
firms list prices. Similar positive relationship is also found by Ruppert and Kattuman 
(2003). Conversely, the lower price dispersion resulting from greater competition with 
more players in the market is discovered by studies such as Krishnan, Wolff (2001), Pan, 
Ratchford and Shankar (2001), Baye and Morgan (2004), Clay, Krisnan and Wolff 
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(2001), Lindsey-Mullikin and Grewal (2006). The pattern of how market structure affects 
price variation is not only tested in US market, but also in other areas. For example, 
Baye, Gatti, Kattuman and Morgan (2002) put the context in Europe and examine the 
impact of the Euro on prices charged by online retailers within the EU. Their model 
examines the effect of the varying number of competing firms across countries on 
average prices and suggests that as the number of competing firms in a given country 
becomes larger, prices tend to be more competitive resulting in reduced price dispersion.  
To investigate how settings of the number of retailers and E-tailers affect magnitude of 
price dispersion, we include it in our model as a market characteristic. To capture the 
possibility of a  non-linear relationship, we also include a quadratic term in the model. 
Although more players in the market make the competition fiercer, more retailers/E-
tailers suggest heterogeneity of product features, services bundled, store image, as well as 
more market alternatives and information, etc., hence we propose that larger the number 
of sellers, the greater price variations would be. 
H4: Price dispersion is higher when there are more sellers in the market with a 
more competitive environment.  
Product Rank /Popularity (+).  When examining price dispersion, homogeneity of 
products is an important selection criterion. Some literatures take product rank or 
popularity into account and find that, for more popular items with potential more buyers, 
the price dispersion is larger since it reduces customers’ search effort and the demand is 
also with more forces. For example, substantial amount of price dispersion for online 
book industry is found especially for bestselling books, due to more discounts for 
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bestselling books and typically zero discount for random books (Clay, Krishnan, Wolff 
2001, Clay, Krishnan, Wolff, Fernandes 2002), which is contrary to their expectation that 
more advertised products should exhibit less variation because of greater information 
flow and easier consumer search. By comparing current-hit albums and old-hit albums, 
Lee and Gosain (2002) suggest that the degree of price dispersion depends on the product 
type, whether the product is a popular (mainstream) or a niche product. So we propose 
that price dispersion from products with higher rank and popularity (such as best selling 
items) is larger than that from randomly selected product items, without consideration of 
popularity. 
H5: Price dispersion from products with higher rank and popularity (such as best 
selling items) is larger than that from randomly selected product items, without 
consideration of popularity. 
Search Effort (-).  Search cost of prices as well as price information efficiency among 
customers is considered to be one of the key drivers of price dispersion (Brynjolfsson and 
Smith, 2000, Baylis and Perloff 2002, etc.).  
Bakos (1997) first analyzes the role of electronically mediated markets in lowering search 
costs, and proposes that lower search costs should lead to lower and more homogeneous 
prices. Empirically, the prediction is not supported by many studies for several measures 
of dispersion. For example, Ellison and Ellison (2004) consider price search engine to be 
a dominant player in Internet-based retailing and examine how online and offline retail 
get affected by obfuscations that firms bring to consumers, theoretically and empirically 
using difference between the lowest price and the 12
th
 or 24
th
 lowest price as the measure 
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of price dispersion. They conclude that the extent to which the Internet will reduce 
consumer search cost is not clear and Internet allows firms to adopt a number of 
strategies that make search more difficult. Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2005) 
theoretically and empirically reveal that reduction in consumer search cost reduces price 
dispersion. From information search in terms of benefit, cost of search, purchase 
frequency, number of sellers, price persistence, they propose three different frameworks 
of information acquisition/transmission, including sequential search, fixed sample search 
and a clearinghouse model and reveal that reduction in consumer search cost tend to 
reduce price dispersion. Grover, Lim and Ayyagari (2006) explicitly examine the dark 
side of information and points out that overload and equivocality of information are two 
dark attributes of information, which lead sellers to different pricing strategy in e-
markets. Similarly, some other studies find positive relationship between search cost and 
price dispersion (Zhao 2006, Walter, Gupta, and Su 2006).  
H6: Price dispersion is lower when search effort for product price information is 
considered in the data. 
Retailer/E-tailer Channel Characteristics 
Characteristics of the retailer lead to another main stream of drivers that researchers 
propose and examine to explain price dispersion in previous empirical studies. They 
focus on the heterogeneity of channels in different research studies. We assess the effect 
of E-tailer characteristics in the study by including two main factors that are mostly 
discussed in the previous literature: type of channel, and channel services represented by 
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whether shipping & handling fees are accounted in the study, as well as the related 
interactions.   
Type of E-tailer. With an obvious trend in E-commerce with the emergence of Internet as 
a significant channel, more traditional brick-and-mortar retailers go beyond their 
traditional channel and establish an on-line branch channel (Zettelmeyer 2000). 
Therefore, types of channel examined in the current study include 1) multichannel with 
both online and offline branches, 2) physical store which is called bricks-and-clicks 
retailer, and 3) the pure play E-tailer. 
One question is that whether multichannel retailers with both online and offline channels  
charge price differently from pure-play E-tailers with a single online channel, and 
whether the type of transaction channel is the reason for the price dispersion. By 
comparing price dispersion between multichannel and pure E-tailer, we could prove a 
strong empirical confirmation or disconfirmation for the frictionless commerce and price 
convergence hypothesis (Bakos 1997); this would signal that it might be possible to 
design and implement consumer value-based pricing strategy by different types of 
retailers (Ancarani and Shankar, 2004). Multichannel retailers combine online and offline 
channels, with prices likely reflecting the variability in prices of all the retailers in both 
channels, and therefore will likely have greater price dispersions than other types of 
retailers (Ancarani and Shankar, 2004). If the brick-and-click channel has a wide 
geographic scope, those retailers can provide value added services such as the ability to 
order products online and pick up or return offline, or return by mail at no charge. This 
kind of offer helps customers save time and provides ease of using the online channel to 
check product attributes and reviews without going to the store. For pure-play E-tailers 
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,lower price dispersion is predicted to be lower due to the lower inventory costs of the 
single distribution (Venkatesan, Mehta, Bapna 2007).   
Empirical evidences show contradictory results to the theoretical prediction of price 
convergence. A few studies find larger price difference for pure-play E-tailers (pure 
click) than multichannel
26 
while some findings point in the opposite direction
27
. Xing, 
Tang and Tang (2006) find that multichannel retailer has much higher price dispersion 
measured by price standard deviation than that among pure-play one, however as time 
elapses, the price dispersion among pure-play becomes larger. Yang, Gan and Tang 
(2010) studies evolution of toy price dispersion over two periods of time  and find price 
dispersion of multichannel is higher than that of pure-play ones at the beginning and does 
not change much over time. Above all, we propose
28
 that retailer type is one reason for 
the price dispersion online (Pan, Ratchford, Shankar, 2004) and multichannel retailers 
have higher prices than pure-play E-tailers. 
H7: Price dispersion is larger when retailers selling the product are of 
multichannel type, which contains both traditional in-store channel and E-tailer 
channel than that of pure-play E-tailer. 
                                                 
26
 i.e., Pan, Shankar and Ratchford 2003b use percentage difference in price as the measure of price 
dispersion, Ancarani and Shankar 2004 observe higher dispersion from pure-play than that of multi-channel 
retailers when using price range as the measure 
27
 i.e., Tang and Xing 2001 find price dispersion among pure-play Internet retailers is smaller or even less 
than a half of that among multichannel retailers, Ancarani and Shankar 2004 when they use standard 
deviation as the measure of price dispersion 
28
 We do not include pure physical bricks-and-mortar retailer as one type of channel because in the current 
study we focus more on drivers of online price dispersion in recent two decades and do not include price 
dispersion from pure physical stores. 
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Service (shipping and handling) (-).  Prices with and without shipping and handling costs 
across online and offline types of retailers might result in various price dispersions based 
on full prices and this is also managerially important. Previous empirical analyses have 
examined prices both with and without adjustments for retailer services. It is possible that 
E-tailers offer more of the service if it could obtain a large enough price increase to cover 
its cost. Therefore service differentiation is considered as one reason for price dispersion. 
Empirical studies define a set of measures for E-tailer services and examine effects of 
those components on price dispersions, such as ease of ordering, product selection, online 
delivery, tracking, shipping and handling, etc. (Pan, Ratchford , Shankar 2002), E-tailer 
website’s reliability, shopping convenience, and certification (Ratchford, Pan, and 
Shankar 2003). They find that the proportion of online price dispersion for both pure-play 
E-tailers and bricks-and-clicks does can be explained by the E-tailer characteristic 
(service quality); however the effect is small. Baylis, Perloff (2002) take E-tailers’ 
rankings into account and find high priced stores remained high-priced with superior 
service and low-priced ones remained low priced with poor service. They examine 
whether firms charge a higher price to consumers who desire services or to those who are 
ignorant. Their service premium model gets empirical evidence from digital camera and 
scanner market.  
Shipping and handling fee is one important characteristic that a traditional retailer does 
not have as a form of price partitioning. Some studies get consistent result by examining 
the prices including or excluding shipping fee. For example, Ancarani, Jacob and Jallat 
(2009) find higher degree of online price dispersion than offline, with or without shipping 
costs. Similarly, Baye, Morgan, Scholten (2004a) find that after controlling for shipping 
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costs and firm heterogeneities, the prices do not converge, although the average range in 
prices falls when the number of competing firms decreases. To further evaluate its effect, 
some studies focus merely on shipping and handling fee as representative of retailer 
service quality and take it into account to compare price dispersion with and without it. 
Ancarani and Shankar (2004) find the absolute price dispersion (range) from Internet 
retailer to be  higher than the traditional retailer, while it becomes lower after accounting 
for shipping fees in two formats (single shipping fee, and shipping fee divided among 3 
items). However, some studies do not find significant empirical support of the effect of 
channel services on price dispersion. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) take shipping and 
handling charges and tax into account and find no significant difference before and after. 
Similarly, Scholten and Smith (2002) compare online price dispersion with and without 
shipping fees and find that adjusting for transaction costs only slightly reduces price 
dispersion by 1% and the results are not significantly different. 
Following Ancarani and Shankar (2004), we consider shipping and handling fee as the 
representative of channel service provided, and propose that including or not including it 
in product prices will have an effect on the magnitude of price dispersion, and the prices 
including shipping and handling fee will have lower dispersion than that does not include 
it.  
H8: For product items that have already included shipping and handling fees in 
prices, price dispersion will be lower than those without shipping and handling 
fees accounted in prices. 
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Research/Study Characteristics 
To control the heterogeneity of research studies such as the year of data, research model 
and consideration of heterogeneity control, and the process of the data collection, etc., we 
include several research and study characteristics in the Meta-Analytic analysis.  
Price Dispersion Measure. As we have discussed previously, excluding all other less 
used measures, four most commonly used measures of price dispersion grouped into 
relative and absolute measure data sets are examined in the current study. Different 
measures of price dispersion capture different information about price variation and 
therefore it is essential to distinguish which measure has a larger or smaller magnitude of 
price dispersion. Researchers usually adopt multiple measures of price dispersion to 
guarantee robustness of results and they also examine various outcomes by using 
different measures for price dispersion. For instance, Ancarani and Shankar (2004) find 
that the comparison of price dispersion between multichannel and pure play retailers 
depends on the measurement of price dispersion, and using range as measure of price 
dispersion results in a larger value than using standard deviation. Baye, Morgan and 
Scholten (2005) also point out that standardization of the data is needed if we want to 
compare magnitude of price dispersion across product categories and over time. 
Coefficient of variation is advantageous compared to other measures, since it preserves 
the comparative static predictions of the model of interest. Moreover, range as a measure 
of price dispersion is also widely used but like coefficient of variation, it suffers from a 
potential theoretical defect that the apparent price dispersion is arguably not 
economically relevant because the unique transactions price is the marginal cost.  They 
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agree that the predicted impact of drivers on levels of price dispersion depends not only 
on the model, but also on the metric used for measuring dispersion. 
H9: Price dispersion derived from percentage of price difference (price 
range/mean price) is higher than that from coefficient of variation (price standard 
deviation/mean price); Price dispersion derived from price range is higher than 
that from price standard deviation. 
Price Definition. As discussed in the section of data collection, we find previous 
empirical studies test price dispersion based on prices of either regular online 
posted/quoted/listed price or other prices including price discount (Bailey 1998), prices 
weighted by sales or purchase quantity (Walsh and Whelan 1999, Lee and Gossain 2002) 
or E-tailer popularity (Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000), price index (Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, 
and Morgan 2002), and price perception (Pan, Shankar, Ratchford 2002). Therefore, we 
use a dummy variable to identify price definition to see whether regularly defined price 
or other prices will result in different levels of price dispersion. Since other prices are not 
the real quoted price in the online market but are determined by some other factors such 
as purchase quantity, consumer’s perception, we expect to see more variation in the 
corresponding price dispersions than those from regularly defined price. 
H10: Price dispersion derived from regularly defined price is higher than that 
from other prices such as prices weighted by sales, price perception and so on. 
Year of Data.  As the Internet develops into a relatively robust channel for commerce, it 
is important to understand how the maturity of this channel over years has influenced 
price variation in the market.  
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At different stages, price dispersion proves to be different due to the usage of the Internet 
channel to make purchase, with the development of cross-channel sales strategies, 
infomediaries and shopbots (Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson 1999), improved supply 
chain management, and new information markets. For example, both prices and price 
dispersions from multiple websites are found to be no lower than conventional channel in 
an early exploratory study by Bailey (1998), which could be attributed to the immaturity 
of the Internet market in the year of 1997 with only a few popular E-tailers and fewer 
online purchasing behavior comparative to purchases in physical stores. 
Following Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2006), based on the data collection time, we 
include two dummy variables to specify three periods of Internet development including 
boom (before year 2000), shakeout and reconstructing (2001-2003), and mature (2004-
2006
29
). And we propose than as Internet market grows mature over time, price 
dispersion increases with more information in the market, although there is a decline 
period during shakeout and reconstruction period. 
H11: From the boom (before 2000) of Internet market, price dispersion grows as 
Internet market goes mature (2004-2008), with a declining trend in the shakeout 
period (2001-2003).  
Customer Heterogeneity (-).  Heterogeneity in consumers’ knowledge and information 
search efforts may explain some of the price dispersion. Price dispersion arising from 
differences in search cost has been analyzed by a variety of researchers. Burdett and Judd 
(1983) and Stahl (1989, 1996) model the role of search cost in explaining price dispersion 
                                                 
29
 The year of 2006 is the most recent time of price and price dispersion data collected from papers we’ve 
covered for Meta-Analysis. 
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in a setting where consumers engage in a costly search for price quotes. As noted 
previously, Bakos (1997) analyzes the role of electronically mediated markets in 
lowering search costs, and finds that lower search costs should lead to lower and more 
homogeneous prices. Empirically, search costs have been found to explain price 
dispersion in auto insurance markets (Dahlby and West 1986) and, more recently, in 
prescription drug markets (Sorensen 2000). The typical result is that some stores charge 
low prices in an attempt to attract informed consumers while other stores charge high 
prices to sell to uninformed consumers. Baye, Morgan and Scholten (2003) point out that 
the classical view is that maturing Internet markets will cause prices to decline toward 
marginal cost, however a number of papers suggest that firms might avoid this outcome 
by price discriminating to take advantage of consumers’ heterogeneities or obfuscating 
price information (e.g., Ellison and Ellison, 2004).  
If customer heterogeneity is controlled in the study, we expect to see smaller price 
variation since customers’ knowledge about the product features and prices have been 
considered. 
H12: Price dispersion is lower when customer heterogeneity is controlled in the 
study.  
Product Heterogeneity (-).  Since products examined in previous studies are not always 
perfectly physically identical, they are just similar and therefore occurrence of 
corresponding price variation should not be surprising. Smith, Bailey and Brynjolfsson 
(1999) point out that even if products are physically identical ones, they are not always 
good substitutes. Therefore controlling for product heterogeneity using hedonic 
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regressions or restricting product items when researchers collect the price information are 
two commonly used methods in previous literatures. However, authors still find price 
dispersion after taking care of these possible sources from product heterogeneity. So 
some unmeasured features of product might be the reason behind them.  
Early work analyzed the role of product heterogeneity in explaining price dispersion 
(e.g., Griliches 1961, Chow 1967). A number of researchers control for product 
heterogeneity and choose products that are apparently homogeneous such as Books, 
Software, and CDs with the identical ISBN codes for books and the title and main 
features for Software and CDs (Ancarani and Shankar 2004). Clemons, Hann and Hitt 
(2002) control for observable product differences for prices of airline tickets offered by 
online travel agencies (OTAs), considering that different OTAs specialize by 
systematically offering different trade-offs between ticket price and ticket quality 
(minimizing the number of connections, matching requested departure and return time). 
They still find significant price dispersions across OTAs possibly since other aspects of 
product heterogeneity are not be included such as meal offerings and refund policy which 
could potentially drive price dispersion (Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2004). Similarly, 
when investigating the influence of information and market efficiency on price 
dispersion, Grover, Lim and Ayyagar (2006) implicitly control for product heterogeneity 
by ensuring that selected products are homogeneous and guarantee that the 154 
observations in their data set are for 154 different products.  
Therefore, we expect lower price dispersion in the literature with consideration of 
product heterogeneity when collecting the data for calculating price dispersion.  
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H13: Price dispersion is lower when product heterogeneity is controlled in the 
study.  
Country. When price information is collected and examined in different regions, price 
dispersion might perform differently due to several reasons, such as currency difference, 
customers’ purchasing level, which stage the product is at its life-circle, and the 
popularity of products in a certain region.  
Three main regions are discussed in most previous studies, which are North America, 
Europe, and Asia. We expect to see lower price variation in a more mature market, such 
as markets in the North America area. Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2002) first 
examine the impact of the Euro on prices charged by online retailers within the EU. They 
find the Euro changeover neither mitigates price differences nor results in purchasing 
power parity. In addition, they find significant differences in the prices charged by firms 
both within and across countries. Further, Gatti and Kattuman (2003) explore a large 
range of product categories across seven European countries through the dominant 
European price comparison site and find significant differences in the degree of price 
dispersion between and across product categories.  Lu, Zhou, Bin (2007) focus on China, 
a fast growing e-commerce market. The study finds that the price dispersion online is 
larger than that of the traditional market in China for books, while the opposite is true for 
CDs. Authors think the results can be explained by the characteristics of the Chinese 
online marketplace, such as immaturity, unbalanced development and diversity. 
Ancarani, Jacob and Jallat (2009) compare price levels and dispersion online versus 
offline across the two largest Continental European CD markets (in France and Germany) 
and find statistically significant differences between the two sample countries. Hu and 
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Wang (2010) learn how country of origin (COO) affects price dispersions of 
homogeneous products (completely identical) respectively for products from eBay U.S. 
and U.K. They find that sellers from the United States enjoy a price premium, compared 
to U.K. and global markets. 
H14: Price dispersion is smaller when product items are examined in the markets 
of the North American area and larger when the study put the context in other 
areas such as Europe and Asia. 
Manuscript Status (-).  Whether the paper has appeared in an academic publication, is an 
institutional technical report, or is an unpublished working paper is considered as one of 
the research characteristic that will affect study conclusions. Publication bias can arise 
when researchers do not submit or fail to publish papers with statistically insignificant or 
implausible findings. A Meta-Analysis reflects only what is published if only academic 
publications are included. Since statistically significant effects with better designed 
studies are more likely to get published, published effects are biased high in that case. 
Accordingly, we hypothesize that price dispersion is higher in studies from unpublished 
papers due to its large discrepancy among products without considering heterogeneity of 
products, and so on. 
H15: Price dispersion derived from studies in published papers are lower than 
those derived from studies in unpublished papers. 
Price Comparison Website (Search Engines) (-).  It is relatively easier to obtain price 
quotes from online price comparison sites such as BizRate.com, Alexa.com, 
Shopper.com, Mysimon.com, PriceScan.com, Ebay.com or Kelkoo (an Internet Price 
88 
 
 
 
comparison site in EU) etc. than traditional physical retailers (Sorenson, 2000). The top 
price comparison website BizRate.com slogan “Never Pay More Than You Have To” is 
telling customers that huge price dispersion exists in the market and it is not worthy 
buying if a lower price can be found easily. The price quotes are gathered at the same 
time across retailers/E-tailers without a large time gap. Since products sold by different 
firms in online markets are homogeneous, a majority of consumers use price comparison 
sites to compare price offers and choose the minimum listed price (Baye and Morgan, 
2001) and thereby search cost is reduced to the minimum level.  
To examine price dispersion, a great deal of researchers use a price comparison website 
to obtain accurate and easily updated price information for single or multiple product 
items they examine in their studies
30
, while some other researchers collect product prices 
from single or multiple websites that carry those products
31
. Whether to choose price 
comparison website or retailer’s website also varies across studies due to the 
heterogeneity of product category, year of the data, website development, convenience of 
data collection, and so on, resulting in different degrees of price variations.  
We propose that price dispersions of price quotes obtained from a single price 
comparison website is smaller than those from multiple E-tailer websites by more data 
collection efforts and time. 
                                                 
30
 e.g., Pan, Ratchford, Shankar 2001, 2002, 2007, Pan, Shankar, Ratchford 2002, 2003, Ratchford, Pan, 
Shankar 2003, Baye, Morgan,  Scholten 2003, 2004a, 2004b, Baye and Morgan 2004, JohnLindsey-
Mullikin, Grewal 2006, Grover, Lim, Ayyagari 2006, Venkatesan, Mehta, Bapna 2006, Hong, Shum 2006 
31
 e.g., Bailey 1998, Cohen 1998, Brynjolfsson, Smith 2000, Clay, Krishnan, Wolff 2000, Lee, Gosain 2001, 
Baylis, Perloff 2002,  Clay, Krishnan, Wolff, Fernandes 2002, Walter, Gupta, and Su 2006, Yang, Gan, 
Tang 2010,  Arnold, Saliba 2002 
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H16: Price dispersions calculated from price quotes that are obtained from a 
single price comparison website are smaller than those from multiple E-tailer 
websites. 
3.4 Data Coding 
Table 2 is the coding scheme for the dependent variable and 17 independent variables 
used in our Meta-Analytic study. The selection of these variables is based on previous 
summary papers and our theoretical hypothesis settings. The current model includes 
independent variables that are summarized into three categories, including market, 
channel and research characteristics. Most variables from market and channel 
characteristics are hypothesized based on previous theory and empirical findings, while 
some variables of research and study characteristics are considered as covariates that 
might affect magnitude and direction of price dispersion.  
-------------------Insert Table 2 about here------------------- 
4. Model and Procedure 
We apply a hierarchical linear model to estimate the effects of each independent variable 
on price dispersion, as suggested by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) and Raudenbush and 
Bryk (2002) and similar to some other Meta-Analysis studies (e.g., Albers, Mantrala and 
Sridhar 2010, Bijmolt, Van Heerde and Pieters 2005, Van Den Bultle and Stremersch 
2004). In the current study, there are two levels in the model. The 790 price dispersions 
are at the first individual level. These observations are nested in 34 papers which we set 
as the second group level. Price dispersion observations within the same paper share 
several research and study characteristics. Therefore, we allow random effect in both 
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intercept and slopes across each independent papers and control for the within-literature 
error correlation between price dispersions.  
Using subscript i to denote individual price dispersion observation, j to denote an 
independent paper, k to denote a covariate, the model structure we use to explain the 
variations in the observed Log(PD) has two levels. 
0
Level 1: 
Level 2: ,   
K
ij 0j kj k,ij ij
k=1
0j 0 0j kj k0 kj
Y = + X +e
= +u = +u
Applying Level 2 model into Level 1 model, we have the mixed model shown
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If we combine the random error, and take log transformation for dependent variable, we 
have the mixed model rewrite as: 
Applying all indedent variables into the model, we have the full mode shown 
 
 
There are two types of price dispersion (relative and absolute) commonly examined in the 
previous empirical studies, which are relative measure of price dispersion (including 
coefficient of price variation and percentage of price difference) and absolute measure of 
price dispersion (including price standard deviation and price range). Since these two 
measures are not comparable and they have different metrics, we do model estimation 
twice for two groups of data, of which we have 432 observations for relative data group 
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and 358 observations for absolute data group. Moreover, covariates common to each 
paper at the second level include search effort, product popularity, heterogeneity of 
customer, heterogeneity of competition, data geo scope, price definition, country,  data 
source and manuscript status. All other covariates that vary across papers are at the first 
level, such as mean price, product category, number of sellers and so on. 
There are several issues done regarding the model assumption checks. First, we check the 
normality of both dependent and independent variables. Since distributions of price 
dispersion, mean price, number of sellers, and sample size are strongly right skewed, we 
take log transformation for these continuous variables in our model to satisfy the model 
assumption of normality. By log transformation for both dependent variable and 
continuous independent variables, characteristics lead to a percentage increase in the 
price dispersion rather than an absolute increment (Clemons, Hann and Hitt 2002). 
Previous studies also use log form of price dispersion with either absolute or relative 
measures
32
, and some studies take log transformation for some independent variables
33
 . 
This appears to be more consistent with actual pricing behavior in the market (e.g., 
permitting a connection on a $1,000 flight could reduce the price by $200, while 
permitting a connection to a $150 flight may save only $30). Second, we assess the 
collinearity of variables by several traditional measures, such as correlation, Variance 
Inflation Factor (VIF), and condition index. Third, after using a hierarchical linear model 
we run the residual analysis. Normal probability plot of the standardized residual against 
predicted price dispersions indicates support for most model assumptions. 
                                                 
32
 e.g., Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan (2002), Gatti, Kattuman (2003), and Baye and Morgan (2009) 
33
 e.g., Lehmann 2003, Ellison and Ellison 2004) and number of competitors (e.g., Venkatesan, Mehta, 
Bapna 2007) 
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5. Results 
5.1 Overall Magnitude of Price Dispersion 
We present the frequency distribution of the observed price dispersion for two measures 
in Figure 2. There are 432 relative measures and 358 absolute measures of price 
dispersion. The overall magnitude of price dispersion for relative measure (M= 21.2, 
SD=24.6) is significantly lower (p <.001, t-test) than that of absolute measure (M=73.9, 
SD= 153.7). The “raw” mean from the database indicates that 21.2% relative dispersion 
exists in one sample data with 432 observations, and $73.9 absolute dispersion exists in 
the other sample data with 358 observations. Only 6 of 790 observations show no price 
dispersion, with magnitude of zero. These are retained in the data base to reveal whether 
independent variables will result in such zero variation in prices. 
-------------------Insert Figure 2 about here------------------- 
5.2 Effects of Determinants 
For both relative and absolute measures of price dispersion, we first estimate a full model 
with main effects of each determinant and a set of relevant interactions effects by adding 
one interaction at a time. Next we apply likelihood ratio test and check the significance of 
each newly added interaction to determine the combination of variables. Last we finalize 
the model by including main effects and the significant interactions in the previous step. 
In the following sections, we respectively discuss for relative and absolute measures of 
price dispersion the effects of 1) market characteristic (e.g. mean price, product category, 
search effort, number of sellers), 2) retailer/E-tailer characteristic (e.g. multi channel, 
service) and 3) research characteristic (price dispersion type, price definition, year of 
data). 
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When Price Dispersion is measured by Relative numbers 
Regarding the extent of collinearity of variables, we inspect several measures. 
Correlation matrix of continuous variables after log transformation is reported in Table 3. 
The highest bivariate correlation is .38, which indicates low correlation among 
continuous variables. Moreover, we find the highest VIF of all variables is 6.3, and all 
condition indexes are lower than 30. Therefore we delete variable with VIF greater than 5 
and obtain robust model estimation results. Finally, after using a hierarchical linear model 
we run the residual analysis. Normal probability plot of the standardized residual against 
predicted price dispersions indicates support for most model assumptions. 
-------------------Insert Table 3 about here------------------- 
We now report the fixed mean effects (k) estimated from the hierarchical model for each 
determinant in Table 4. In summary, we find 17 out of 26 independent variables 
including two quadratic form and five post hoc interaction effects to be statistically 
significant at least at p < .10. The overall model fit (Pseudo R
2
) is satisfactory, indicating 
that predictors explained 93.2% of the between-paper variation of price dispersion and 
13.7% of the within-paper variation of price dispersion. 
-------------------Insert Table 4 about here------------------- 
Market Characteristic 
We find several significant market factors in accordance with H1, H2, H3 and H4: mean 
price, product category, number of categories and number of sellers in the market.  
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Mean Price. We observe a “U-shaped” non-linear relationship between mean price 
(expressed in logs) and level of price dispersion by both significant main factor and 
squared term of mean price. Previous studies such as Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2001, 
2002), Baylis and Perloff (2002), Lindsey-Mullikin and Grewal (2006) have only 
proposed two possible directions. There is yet no study that has even examined the 
nonlinear relationship. In our Meta-Analysis result, we first observe a decrease in relative 
price dispersion as average price goes higher (which is consistent with previous findings 
of negative relationship), however when prices continue increases and reaches a critical 
point, price dispersion tends to increase (showing a positive relationship).  
Product Category and Number of Categories. We find that price dispersion for 
electronic/computer is significantly lower than that of fast-moving consumer goods, with 
the univariate means respectively, and the price dispersion of service product is at 
moderate level however the difference is not significant. The result is similar to the 
findings of Pan, Ratchford, Shankar (2007) that fast-consuming products such as food, 
books have the largest relative price dispersion after controlling for the average price. 
High-financial outlay categories with low differentiation potentially increase price search 
(Peterson et al. 1997) and thus results in low price dispersion, since we find laptop and 
desktop computers as well as electronic product have the lowest intrinsic price 
dispersion.  
Consistent with proposal of price dispersion due to category differences, we also find that 
one more percent increase in category number examined in the study, .leading to a 6 
percent increase in the relative price dispersion.  
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Number of sellers. Different from some studies (e.g., Baye, Gatti, Kattuman, and Morgan 
2002, Gatti, Kattuman 2003) using number of firm dummies to examine its effect, in the 
current meta analysis we use number of sellers (expressed in logs) in the model. We find 
that market structure represented by the number of sellers has a positive impact on price 
dispersion, that one more percent increase in number of competitors in the market, 
leading to a .47 percent increase in relative price dispersion.  The result is consistent with 
findings in the extant literature from Baye, Morgan, Scholten (2003), Ruppert and 
Kattuman (2003), suggesting that even when competition is getting more fierce, more 
information and alternatives in the market results in broadened search cost and higher 
variations in prices. However, we do not find significant squared term in the model as 
Baye and Morgan (2009), implying that there is no non-linear relationship between the 
number of sellers and the magnitude of price dispersion. We could understand it since we 
are looking at the averages of previous findings and the overall effect of the number of 
market competitors shows a linear trend with a single direction. 
Non-Significant Variable. Two factors in market characteristic category are not 
significant, including whether the study has accounted for product popularity and whether 
the study has accounted for search cost.  We do not observe significant effect of whether 
items are selected from both popular and random product or not, and whether considering 
consumers’ search costs when selecting items or not, suggesting that price dispersion 
exists widely in the market no matter whether it is a popular or random item, and no 
matter whether the study is selecting prices with possible higher or lower search cost. 
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E-tailer Characteristic 
Channel Type. We find that the (log) price dispersion for multichannel type of E-tailer is 
significantly lower than for pure-play type of E-tailer by 1.52, which supports our 
hypothesis H7. The significant difference in price dispersion between multi-channel and 
pure-play retailer shows much smaller level for multi-channel retailers. The result is 
consistent with Pan, Shankar and Ratchford 2003b, Ancarani and Shankar 2004. The 
differences in the nature of different types of online distribution channels can be reasons 
for variations in prices charged digitally.  
First, online branch of multichannel retailer is derived from its conventional channel and 
it is designed to coordinate prices across online and offline to avoid price competition 
from itself, so it charges higher prices than its competing rival, the pure-play online 
retailers with smaller dispersion. Second, services of multichannel retailer have more 
patterns and flexibility with some bundling with its offline channel. The service price 
from online branch of multichannel retailer might be higher than those of pure-play E-
tailers. In addition, operation cost and efforts for firms to change price labels, efforts and 
cost for consumers to search price information vary across online and offline, 
multichannel and pure E-tailers. Third, tax-free strategy, free-shipping fee strategy for 
some chosen customers from pioneering pure-play Internet retailers such as Amazon.com 
make it advantageous over traditional retailers and leave some more space for its price 
dispersion magnitude. Fourth, the mixed findings from previous studies may also be a 
result of immaturity of Internet marketing and the lack of stable market equilibrium (Pan, 
Ratchford and Shankar 2004); high competiveness and efficiency might be exhibited as it 
matures.  
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Interactions. We also find three interactions between channel type and other variables are 
significant, including Multi Channel × (log) number of Re/Etailers, Multi Channel × Year 
of Data (2001 – 2003), Multi Channel × Sample Size. First, interaction of Multi Channel 
× (log) number of Re/Etailers is positively significant, implying that the number of 
competitors in the market from a multichannel type of retailer affect (log) price 
dispersion significantly more than that from a pure-play type of retailer. Second, 
interaction of Multi Channel × Year of Data Dummy (2001 – 2003) is positively 
significant, showing that the declining (log) price dispersion from boom period of 
Internet (before year 2000) to shakeout and reconstruction period (year 2001-2003) is 
more prominent for multichannel retailer than pure-play retailer. Third, we find 
significantly positive interaction of Multi Channel × Sample Size and conclude that the 
(log) sample size in data obtained from a multichannel type of retailer affect (log) price 
dispersion significantly more than that from a pure-play type of retailer. 
Non-Significant Variable. We do not find support for H8 with respect to shipping and 
handling fee accounted for in the study, which is consistent with studies (Brynjolfsson 
and Smith 2000, Scholten and Smith 2002) that find even after controlling for shipping 
and handling fee, the price dispersion does not change too much. We can understand it 
since the shipping and handling fee is a small amount of item price with mean level at 
$434.3 in our Meta-Analysis. As Venkatesan, Mehta and Bapna (2007) have explained, 
not including shipping and handling in prices is more reasonable. Examining on multiple 
product categories in the study, shipping and handling fee take up only a small 
percentage of prices. Then different charges by retailers make comparison difficult, and 
in some cases, shipping and handling information is not available. Similarly, Pan, 
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Ratchford, and Shankar (2007) suggest using posted price rather than price with shipping 
charge to be the basis for price dispersion measures. Our results provide evidence to 
support the finding that there is no need to include shipping and handling fee in prices 
when testing price variations, since it makes no significant difference. 
Research Characteristic 
PD Measure. In accordance with H9, the results show significant difference between two 
relative measures of price dispersion. On the contrary to our expectations, the (log) price 
dispersion calculated from coefficient of variation is significantly higher than that from 
percentage of difference by .42, indicating that the magnitude coefficient of variation is 
higher than the other one by 2.65%. Of 432 relative price dispersions, 350 observations 
are coefficient of variation which shows variability of prices and 82 are percentage of 
difference which reflects extremes of prices. Therefore we can understand it by 
concluding that variability of prices has higher magnitude than the difference between 
price extremes, even after controlling for the average price of product by using relative 
measures.  
In addition, two interactions are significant including PD Measure × # of Re/Etailers and 
PD Measure. First, interaction of PD Measure × (log) number of Re/Etailers is negatively 
significant, implying that the affect of number of competitors in the market on (log) 
coefficient of variation is significantly less than for (log) percentage of difference. 
Second, interaction of PD Measure × Multi Channel is negatively significant, showing 
that the declining (log) price dispersion from pure-play retailer to multichannel retailer is 
less prominent for (log) coefficient of variation than for (log) percentage of difference. 
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Year of Data. Consistent with our hypothesis H11, overall  (log) price dispersion declines 
significantly from boom (before 2000) denoting 179 observations to shakeout and 
reconstruction period (2001-2003) denoting 226 observations by  .16, indicating that 
relative measure has declined by 1.45%. This finding is consistent with several studies 
(Brown and Goolsbee 202, Chen and Hitt 2003, Ancarani and Shankar 2004) capturing 
decreased price dispersion data collected around year 2001 to 2003 (See Table 1). 
Moreover, (log) price dispersion increases during the mature period (2004 -2008) than 
boom period by .46; however it is not significant, probably due to a small sample size for 
the mature period with about 37 price dispersions.  
Figure 3 provides a time-series distribution of price dispersion across 12 years of the data 
collection from literatures. In accordance to our hypothesis testing result, we can observe 
more fluctuation of price dispersion in the early stage of Internet development (before 
2000) with relatively higher level, and a smooth trend of low level of price dispersion 
during the shakeout and reconstruction period (2001-2003), as well as a less fluctuated 
distribution after year 2004, as Internet goes mature, while there is some extremely high 
magnitude of price variation. 
-------------------Insert Figure 3 about here------------------- 
Product Heterogeneity. We find significant decrease in (log) price dispersion for studies 
taking care of product heterogeneity by .47, with corresponding 2.95% decrease in 
overall magnitude of price dispersion, supporting our hypothesis H13.  
Country. We use a dummy variable to specify price dispersion data collected from North 
America area (US and Canada) with 367 observations and other areas such as Asia, 
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Europe covering 66 price dispersions. Result shows significant evidence to support H14, 
that (log) price dispersion from North America is significantly higher than that from other 
areas by .67, indicating that the magnitude of relative measure from US and Canada is 
4.68% higher than that from Asia and Europe. The finding is significant but is contrary to 
our expectation that prices are less dispersed in the more mature market such as the US 
market. We can understand such a result if we think that although the market goes mature, 
the Internet technology is also at maturity stage in US area leading higher price 
dispersions as proved previously. Therefore, the combined result shows that consumers in 
the highly development digital market actually face more price variations and price 
options.  
Manuscript Status. In accordance to our hypothesis H9, we find significantly lower (log) 
price dispersion from published papers than those unpublished ones by .24, with the 
magnitude in relative price dispersion to be 1.95%. As we expect, published literature 
have better control in study design and data collection, such as product and consumer 
heterogeneity, resulting in less variation in prices.  
Price Comparison Site. In contrast to the proposed lower price dispersions from a single 
price comparison website in H16, we find that price dispersion calculated by prices 
obtained from price comparison website to be higher than those from multiple E-tailer 
websites 
Non-significant Variables. We find three non-significant research-related variables that 
do not support our hypotheses: customer heterogeneity (H12), price definition (H10) and 
(log) sample size (H17). Even if customer heterogeneity is controlled in the study, we do 
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not find significant change in the level of price variation due to customers’ knowledge 
about the product features and prices, indicating that price variation exists widely across 
customers who obtain price information in different ways. In addition, weighting price by 
the brand sales, using price perception as a proxy of price information, choosing price 
information from large or small sample also do not significantly affect price dispersion. 
This implies for future research on price dispersion, we can select a proper sample to 
investigate price variation without too much consideration about price format or size of 
the sample. 
When Price Dispersion is measured by Absolute numbers 
Different from the unit-free measure of price dispersion, absolute measures of price 
dispersion directly show the price change in terms of price range and price standard 
deviation. We expect to find some different results from those of relative measures.  
First, regarding the extent of collinearity of variables, we report the correlation matrix of 
continuous variables after log transformation in Table 5. The highest bivariate correlation 
is .26, which indicates low correlation among continuous independent variables. 
Moreover, we find the highest VIF of all variables is 5.4, and all condition indexes are 
lower than 30. Therefore we delete the variable with VIF greater than 5 and also obtain 
robust model estimation results. Similarly, we apply hierarchical linear model and run the 
residual analysis, showing that the standardized residual against predicted price 
dispersions indicates support for most model assumptions. 
-------------------Insert Table 5 about here------------------- 
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The fixed mean effects (k) estimated for absolute measure group of data are reported in 
Table 6. In summary, out of 25 independent variables including two quadratic forms and 
four post hoc interaction effects, 18 are statistically significant at least at p < .10. The 
overall model fit (Pseudo R
2
) is also satisfactory, indicating that predictors explained 
86.3% of the between-paper variation of price dispersion and 16.2% of the within-paper 
variation of price dispersion. 
-------------------Insert Table 6 about here------------------- 
Consistent Results with Relative Measures 
For absolute measures of price dispersion, we find several significantly consistent results 
with those of relative measures, including 1) product category, showing that absolute 
price dispersion for electronic/computer product is significantly lower than that of fast-
moving consumer goods; 2) number of categories, that for one more percent increase in 
category number included in the study, there is a  .66 percent increase in the absolute 
price dispersion; 3) non-linear effect of the number of sellers in the market, that one more 
percent increase in the number of sellers competing in the market, leading to a.54 percent 
increase in absolute price dispersion, while there is no significant effect of the quadratic 
form; 4) (log) price standard deviation is significantly higher than (log) price range by 
.53, and its interaction with both (log) number of sellers and Multi Channel is negatively 
significant, indicating that the effect of number of competitors in the market on (log) 
price standard deviation is significantly less than (log) price range, and the declining (log) 
price dispersion from pure-play retailer to multichannel retailer is less prominent for (log) 
price standard deviation than (log) price range; 5) product heterogeneity accounted for in 
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the study is also a significant factor that affects price dispersion ; 6) Absolute price 
dispersion is significantly lower in North American that that in other areas such as Asia 
and Europe; 7) price dispersion from published paper  is lower than that form 
unpublished works; and 8) whether the price information is collected from price 
comparison site has a significant effect on price variation. 
Different Findings from Relative Measures 
Meanwhile, absolute measures of price dispersion still have some differences in nature 
from relative measures. Relative measures of price dispersion are price range or standard 
deviated weighted by the average price, while absolute measures are not weighted but the 
absolute value of price and standard deviation. They also explain similar information 
about price variation, that price range and percentage of price difference both reflect two 
extremes (the highest and the lowest) of prices, while price standard deviation and 
coefficient of variation both show variability of prices. Therefore, in addition to 
consistent results from two types of measures, we also find some different pattern from 
them, which might shed some light for future research.  
First, although we find a non-linear relationship between mean price and price dispersion 
for both absolute and relative measures, the shape is different. Results show that there is a 
concave “U-shaped” relationship between price dispersion for both absolute and relative 
measures, since the quadratic terms are both positively significant for two groups of data. 
The difference is that for absolute measure, as mean price increases, price dispersion is 
always increasing with a positive and increasing marginal effect of mean price. For 
relative measure, as mean price increases, price dispersion declines at the beginning and 
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increases as price becomes even larger. It is understandable that absolute measure is not 
weighted by the average price, therefore resulting in the positive change in price standard 
deviation or range as price increases, while relative measure is weighted by the average 
price and it will decrease at the beginning. Second, we find that multichannel type of 
retailer has significantly higher absolute price dispersion than pure play E-tailers; this is 
the opposite result of what we have got for relative measure. In addition, its significantly 
positive interaction with mean price shows that the increase in absolute price dispersion 
due to the increase of product price is more prominent for multichannel retailer than that 
for pure-play E-tailer. Third, in addition to the significant lower price dispersion during 
the year of shakeout and reconstruction of the Internet (2001-2003), as the Internet 
becomes mature, the absolute price dispersion has significantly increased; while the 
increase for relative measure is not statistically significant. Fourth, customer 
heterogeneity considered in the study will result in significant higher price dispersion, 
which is different from the result for relative measure; while the effect for relative 
measure is not statistically significant. 
6.  Conclusion 
In sum, we meta-analyzed 790 price dispersions reported or estimated in 34 research 
papers ranging from 1998 to 2010, covering price and price dispersion information with 
large geographic and category scope. We obtain several useful generalizations in online 
price dispersion, which we list in the following section. Then, we present the limitation 
and future research direction. 
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Key Empirical Generalizations 
The average of relative price dispersions is 21.2%, with coefficient of variation and 
percentage of price difference to be relative measures; and the average of absolute price 
dispersions is $73.9, with price range and standard deviation to be absolute measures. 
Overall, from the boom of E-commerce in 1998 to the maturity of the Internet 
development in digital marketing since year of 2004 till now, online price dispersions 
exist ubiquitously and persistently across product categories, countries, and channels in 
various studies, no matter which measurements and scales we use to describe variations 
in prices. Price dispersions are overall increasing over time, although there is a decline 
when the Internet experiences a shakeout and construction period during 2001 to 2003. 
Specifically, on average, for both relative and absolute measures, we generalize that price 
dispersions are smaller for electronic and computer product than those for fast-moving 
consumer goods. If the study includes multiple product categories, higher price 
dispersions are expected than those of study covering only one product category. And if 
more categories are covered, even higher price dispersions are expected. These two 
results suggest that when researchers choose different products to examine price 
dispersions, there will be significant differences in results based on categories and the 
number of categories we decide to include.  
There is a non-linear relationship between price dispersions and mean price of products. 
For absolute measure, price dispersions increase with increasing average price and the 
marginal increase will be even larger for more expensive products; and for relative 
measure, price dispersions first decrease and then increase as average price of products 
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rises from low to high. Market structure represented by the number of sellers in the 
market also results in different levels of price dispersion, indicating that more 
competitors in the market, higher price dispersions expected.  
Price standard deviation is significantly higher than price range, and similarly, coefficient 
of variation is also significantly higher than percentage of difference. This finding 
supports our initial hypothesis that measurements and scales of price dispersion play 
important roles in the magnitude of price dispersions and it helps to explain why 
discrepancy exists in previous literatures which use quite different measures to describe 
price variations. Further, pure-play E-tailer has significant higher price dispersions than 
multichannel retailer, and the difference is especially more prominent for price standard 
deviation than price range. This result supports the idea that if we focus on pure-play E-
tailer using price standard deviation as measure of price dispersions, we expect to obtain 
the highest price dispersions. In addition, we find if the study controls for product 
heterogeneity, lower price dispersions are expected, since researchers have better selected 
and controlled for the dissimilarity of products that may make price dispersions higher. 
This also supports the idea that for future research, controlling for product heterogeneity 
is an essential way to avoid bias in the results. 
In general, price dispersions in the North America is higher than those in Asia and 
Europe, indicating that although the market is mature in the U.S. and Canada, rich 
information in the market and asymmetry in the information search between seller and 
buyer results in even wider variations in prices. Finally, dispersions of prices obtained 
from price comparison sites are even higher than those from multiple E-tailer websites. 
This result suggests in practice, price comparison sites such as BizRate.com, Alexa.com 
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have integrated large price information in the market with large price variations and they 
are good sources for consumers to obtain as much information on prices as possible. 
Managerial Implications 
According to the model estimation results and hypotheses we’ve established earlier in 
this study, we also provide some managerial implications for price competition and 
pricing strategy. Price levels across three types of retailers reflect the competition across 
different channels, whereas price dispersions reflect the competition within each channel. 
Higher or lower levels might imply how these factors drive prices variations to different 
directions.  Channels can effectively differentiate themselves from one another on price 
(non-price) dimension, or through the combined benefits of convenient access to 
information, physical inspection, pickup and return of merchandise. Results show that 
pure-play E-tailers have higher price dispersions, reflecting higher variability in prices, 
suggesting that there are more opportunities for them to be differentiated from 
multichannel retailers in the price dimension. Multichannel retailers can then better 
compete by focusing on some non-price dimensions, such as in-store and online 
personalization and customization, trust in physical stores, branding strategy, as well as 
shipping and return convenience they can provide to customers.  
Future research  
Our study has some limitations that are typical of most meta-analytic research. First, 
while we have tried to be exhaustive in our literature review, we may have overlooked 
some publications that estimate price dispersion. Second, in identifying the factors that 
influence price dispersion, we are limited by the variables that are available in the 
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original studies. For example, we could not collect data on sales, advertising, or other 
industry index, so we could not estimate influences of these variables on price dispersion. 
Third, we limit our meta-analysis on online price dispersion due to the interest in E-
commerce context, and we could further include both physical store and online price data 
and make comparisons. 
These limitations provide potential directions for further research. On a more substantive 
level, researchers in the future should try to analyze effect of sales and advertising on 
price dispersion. They can analyze durable goods, industrial goods, and more service 
goods that are not examined too much in previous studies. In addition, future research 
could also perform a meta-analysis of comparison between online and offline price 
dispersions, which covers more information from both physical stores and digital 
markets. 
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Figure 1. Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Frequency Distribution of Price Dispersion 
 
  
Price 
Dispersion 
Market Characteristics 
•Mean price  
•Product category 
•Number of categories 
•Number of competitors 
•Product rank/popularity 
•Search effort 
Retailer/E-tailer 
Characteristics 
•Multi channel 
•Channel service 
(shipping & handling) 
 
Research Characteristics 
•Price Dispersion Measure 
•Price definition 
•Year of data 
•Data source 
•Customer heterogeneity 
•Product heterogeneity 
•Sample size 
•Country 
•Manuscript Status 
110 
 
 
 
20052004200220012001200020002000199919991992
500
400
300
200
100
0
Year
P
ri
c
e
 D
is
p
e
rs
io
n
Time Series Plot of Price Dispersion
 
Figure 3. Time Series Plot of Price Dispersion 
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Table 1．34 literatures included in Meta-Analysis on price dispersion 
Paper Title Authors Year Product 
1 
Intermediation and electronic markets: 
Aggregation and pricing in Internet commerce 
Bailey 1998 Books, CDs, Software 
2 
Modeling price dispersion as an outcome of 
competition in the Irish grocery market 
Walsh, Whelan 1999 
Chocolate Counts, Carbonate- Cans, 
Carbonate-Standard, Crisps/Snacks, 
Mineral Water, Chocolate Multi-Packs, 
Carbonate-Large, Soup, Sausages, Bacon, 
Sugar, RTE Cereals-Small, RTE Cereals-
Standard, RTE Cereals-Large, Coffee, Cat 
Food, Dog Food, Tea 
3 
Frictionless commerce? A comparison of 
Internet and conventional retailers 
Brynjolfsson, 
Smith 
2000 Books, CDs 
4 
Equilibrium Price Dispersion in Retail Markets 
for Prescription Drugs 
Sorensen 2000 Prescription Drugs 
5 
Prices and Price Dispersion on the Web: 
Evidence from the Online Book Industry 
Clay, Krishnan, 
Wolff 
2001 Books 
6 
Will the growth of multi-channel retailing 
diminish the pricing efficiency of the Web 
Tang, Xing 2001 DVDs 
7 
Why Aren't the Prices of the Same Item the 
Same at Me.com and You.com?: Drivers of Price 
Dispersion Among E-tailers 
Pan, Ratchford , 
Shankar  
2002 
Books, CDs, DVDs, Desktop, Laptop, PDAs, 
Software, Electronics 
8 
Price Dispersion and Differentiation in Online 
Travel: An empirical Investigation 
Clemons, Hann, 
Hitt 
2002 
airline ticket offerings of Online Travel 
Agents (OTA) 
9 
Price Dispersion on the Internet: Good Firms 
and Bad Firms 
Baylis, Perloff 2002 Digital Camera, Scanner 
10 
Online Pricing and the Euro Changeover: Cross-
Country Comparisons 
Baye, Gatti, 
Kattuman, 
Morgan 
2002 
Games, Games Consoles, Music CDs, PDAs, 
Printers, Scanners 
11 
Retail Strategies on the Web: Price and Non–
price Competition in the Online Book Industry 
Clay, Krishnan, 
Wolff, 
Fernandes 
2002 Books 
12 
Price dispersion then and now: Evidence from 
retail and e-tail markets 
Sholten, Smith 2002 
1-pound-Potatoes, Lettuce, Stalk Celery, 
Tea, Deodorant, Dozen Lemons, Batteries, 
Hair Spray, Antacids, Auto Polish, Film, 
Aspirin, Hand cream, Razor Blades, Male 
contraceptives, Contact, Thermometer, 
Inexpensive camera, Dozen, Expensive 
camera, Deodorant, Hair, Batteries, 
Antacids, Aspirin, Hand Cream, Male 
Contraceptives, Razor Blades, 
Thermometer, Dozen Roses, Expensive 
camera 
13 
Can price dispersion in online markets be 
explained by differences in E-tailer service 
quality?  
Pan, Ratchford , 
Shankar 
2002 
Book, CD, DVD, Desktop, Laptop, PDA, 
Software, Electronics 
14 
Price Competition Between Pure Play vs. 
Bricks-and-Clicks E-tailers: Analytical model 
and empirical analysis 
Pan, Shankar, 
Ratchford 
2002 
Apparel, Gifts and Flowers, Health and 
Beauty, Home and Garden, Sports and 
Outdoors, Computer Hardware, 
Consumer Electronics, Office Supply 
15 
Price Dispersion in Online Markets: The case of 
College textbooks 
Arnold, Saliba 2002 Textbook 
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Paper Title Authors Year Product 
16 
Pricing Behavior on the WEB: Evidence from 
Online Travel Agencies 
Lehmann 2003 
airline ticket offerings of Online Travel 
Agents (OTA) 
17 
The evolution of price dispersion in Internet 
retail markets 
Pan, Shankar, 
Ratchford 
2003
b 
Book, CD, DVD, Desktop, Laptop, PDA, 
Software, Consumer Electronics 
18 
On the Efficiency of Internet Markets for 
Consumer Goods 
Ratchford, Pan, 
Shankar 
2003 
Book, CD, DVD, Desktop, Laptop, PDA, 
Software, Consumer Electronics 
19 
Price Levels and Price Dispersion Within and 
Across Multiple Retailer Types: Further 
Evidence and Extension 
Ancarani, 
Shankar 
2004 Books, CDs 
20 
Temporal price dispersion: Evidence from an 
online consumer electronics market 
Baye, Morgan, 
Scholten 
2004
b 
software, peripherals, accessories 
21 
Price dispersion in the lab and on the Internet: 
theory and evidence 
Baye, Morgan 2004 
Electronics such as camera, CD player, 
MP3, etc. 
22 
Price dispersion in the small and in the large: 
Evidence from an internet price comparison 
site 
Baye, Morgan, 
Scholten 
2004
(a) 
electronics products 
23 
Using Price Distribution to estimate search 
costs 
Hong, Shum 2006 Textbook 
124 Persistent price dispersion in online markets 
Baye, Morgan, 
Scholten 
2006 software, peripherals,  accessories 
25 
The Sources of On-Line Price Dispersion Across 
Product Types: An Integrative View of On-Line 
Search Costs and Price Premiums 
 Walter, Gupta, 
Su 
2006 
PDA, grocery, hotel rooms, airline, 
flowers, Book, Music CD, toys, videotapes, 
shoes, furniture, online trading services, 
fragrances, wine 
26 
Imperfect Information: The Persistence of Price 
Dispersion on the Web 
Lindsey-
Mullikin, 
Grewal 
2006 VCR, TV, PDA, Laptop, MP3 
27 
Consumer Search, Price Dispersion, and 
Asymmetric Pricing 
Tappata 2006 gas price from gas station 
28 
The Dark Side of Information and Market 
Efficiency in E-Markets 
Grover, Lim, 
Ayyagari  
2006 
DC, Camcorder, Camera, TV, DVD Player, 
PDA, MP3 Player, CD Player, Printer, 
Monitor, Hard Drives, DVD/VCR Combo, 
Bridge and Routers, NIC, Graphic Cards 
29 
Do market characteristics impact the 
relationship between retailer characteristics 
and online prices?  
Venkatesan, 
Mehta, Bapna 
2007 
Books, Camcorder, DVD, DVD Player, PDA, 
Printer, Scanner, Video 
30 
A Comparison of Prices in Electronic Markets 
and Traditional Markets of China 
Lu, Zhou, Wang 2007 Books, CDs 
31 
Drivers of Price Dispersion among E-tailers 
during the Boom, Shakeout, Restructuring, and 
Mature Periods of e-Commerce 
Pan, Ratchford, 
Shankar 
2007 
Books, CDs, DVDs, Electronics, Desktop, 
Laptop, PDAs, Software 
32 
Cross-country analysis of price levels and 
dispersion in online and offline environments: 
an empirical analysis in France and Germany 
Ancarani, Jacob, 
Jallat 
2009 CD 
33 
A Study of Price Evolution in Online Toy 
Market 
Yang, Gan, Tang 2010 Toy 
34 
Country-of-Origin Premiums for Retailers in 
International Trades: Evidence from eBay’ s 
International Markets 
Hu, Wang 2010 
SONY Memory stick, iPod Nano, WoW, 
Phone Unlocking 
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Table 2 Coding scheme of meta-analysis 
  Variables Description Coding Scheme 
Dependent Variable     
Price Dispersion  
(relative) 
Include two relative measures of price dispersion 
Continuous 1.       % of diff. b/w prices (range/mean) 
2.       Coefficient of price variation (std/mean) 
Price Dispersion  
(absolute) 
Include two absolute measures of price dispersion 
  
Continuous 
  
3.       Price Range 
4.       Price std. 
Market Characteristics     
Mean Price 
Capture the average price level of the market 
examined in a certain study 
Continuous 
Product Category Capture which category the product belongs to  
0 Fast-moving Consumer Goods; 
1 Durable; 
2 Electronic/Computer; 
3 Services; 
# of categories Capture how many categories is examined Continuous 
Product Rank 
/Popularity 
Capture whether product rank/popularity is 
involved in the study (e.g.,bestsellers) 
1 Product Rank Used 
0 otherwise 
Geo Scope 
The geographic scope covered by the products 
examined in the study 
0 wider than 1 country 
1 country wide 
2 several cities 
3 1 city 
Search Effort 
Capture whether search effort is involved in the 
study 
1  Search Effort involved 
0 otherwise 
Change Over Time 
Capture whether lagged effects are considered in the 
study 
1 Product price change over time 
0 otherwise 
Year of Data 
Capture the effect of when the data is collected in the 
study 
0 Before 2000 Dec (Boom) 
1 2001 -2003 (Shakeout, 
Reconstruction) 
2 2004 till now (Mature) 
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Variables Description Coding Scheme 
Country 
Capture the effect of where the data originates from 
in the study 
1 US (US, Canada) 
0 Other area including Europe (UK, 
France, Germany, Italy, etc.) and Asia 
(China, Singapore) 
# of Re/E-tailers 
How many Retailers and E-tailers are examined in 
the study (total #) 
Continuous 
Retailer Characteristics     
Multi Channel 
Capture whether multi channel effect is examined in 
the study 
1 Multi channels are considered 
0 Otherwise  
Service (shipping, 
handling) 
Capture whether service effect is examined in the 
study 
1 Services are considered 
0 Otherwise 
Research Characteristics 
Price Dispersion 
Measure 
Capture effect of measure of price dispersion 
For relative measure 
group:  
For absolute 
measure 
group:  
1 Coefficient of price 
variation (std/mean) 
1 Price 
standard 
deviation 
0 % of diff. b/w prices 
(range/mean) 
0 Price range 
Price Definition Capture the effect of price definition options 
1 Average unit/posted/quoted 
price/listed/store price/price quotes 
0 Other prices(e.g., normalized price, 
weighted price, price perception, price 
discount) 
Customer Heterogeneity 
Capture the effect of whether taking care of 
heterogeneity or not in the study 
1 considered 
0 otherwise 
Sample Size Capture the effect of sample size used in the study Continuous (# of observations) 
Manuscript Status 
Capture whether the paper has appeared in an 
academic publications, or is an unpublished working 
paper 
1 Published Academic Paper 
0 Unpublished Paper 
Price Data Source 
Capture whether the data is obtained from price 
comparison website (such as Bizrate.com) or from 
multiple e-tailer website 
1 From Price Comparison Website 
0 Otherwise 
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Table 3 Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (DV: relative measures, N = 432) 
 
Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 
1. LNPD 1.15 0.37 0.23 2.18 
    
2. LNMEAN 2.15 0.75 0.24 3.40 -0.19 
   
3. LNCATEGORY 0.09 0.25 0 1.30 0.04 0.07 
  
4. LNNOALL 1.17 0.68 2 2.29 0.23 0.13 -0.27 
 
5. LNSAMPLEN 2.46 1.03 0 5.81 0.49 -0.21 0.38 0.01 
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Table 4 Effects of Determinants on Price Dispersion (DV: relative measures, 432 obs.) 
Number Determinant Level 
Mean(SD) 
/Frequency 
Hierarchical Linear 
Model 
Estimate 
0 Intercept - - .04(.35) 
Market Characteristics 
1 
Mean Price Continuous 434.3(613.6) -.34(.15)** 
Mean Price Squared .07(.03)** 
2 Product Category 
0 Fast-moving Consumer Goods; 155  
1 Electronic/Computer; 235 -.08(.05) 
2 Services; 10 .83(.18)*** 
3 # of categories Continuous 1.6(1.9) .60(.30)* 
4 
Product 
Popularity 
1 Product Popularity Considered 155 -.02(.07) 
0 otherwise 277 
5 Search Effort 
1  Search Effort involved 201 
.02(.07) 
0 otherwise 231 
Retailer/E-tailer Characteristics 
 6 
# of Re/E-tailers Continuous 53.3(160.5) .47(.09)*** 
# of Re/E-tailers Squared .16(.12) 
7 
Multi Channel 
1 multi channels are considered 66 
-1.52(.62)** 
0 otherwise  366 
Multi Channel × # of Re/E-tailers .56(.19)*** 
Multi Channel × Year of Data (2001 – 2003) .87(.31)** 
Multi Channel ×  Sample Size .46(.16)*** 
8 
Service 
(shipping, 
handling) 
1 services are considered 258 
-.02(.04) 
0 otherwise 174 
Research/Study Characteristics 
9 
PD Type 
1 Coefficient of price variation 350 
.42(.14)*** 
0 Percentage of price difference 82 
PD Type  × # of Re/E-tailers -.46(.08)*** 
PD Type  × Multi Channel -.43(.11)*** 
10 Price Definition 
1 Average unit/posted/quoted price/listed/store 
price/price quotes 
 
253 
-.11(.18) 
0 Other price (e.g.,  Normalized price, Price 
perception, Weighted price, Price discount, average 
of mean) 
75 
11 Year of Data 
0 Before 2000 Dec (Boom) 179  
1 2001 -2003 (Shakeout, Reconstruction) 226 -.16(.05)*** 
2 2004 till now (Mature) 37 .46(.36) 
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Number Determinant Level 
Mean(SD) 
/Frequency 
Hierarchical Linear 
Model 
Estimate 
12 
Customer 
Heterogeneity 
1 considered 40 
-.09(.32) 
0 otherwise 392 
13 
Product 
Heterogeneity 
1 considered 74 
-.47(.10)*** 
0 otherwise 358 
14 Sample Size Continuous (# of observations) 2,255(6209) -.02(.03) 
15 Country 
1 US (US, Canada) 367 
.67(.28)** 
0 Otherwise. Europe  (UK, France, Germany, Italy, 
etc.) or Asia (China, Singapore) 
66 
16 
Manuscript 
Status 
1 Published Academic Paper 314 
-.19(.09)* 
0 Unpublished Paper 118 
17 
Price 
Comparison Site 
1 Data from price-comparison website 278 
.24(.07)** 
0 otherwise 154 
*** <.01 
         ** < .05 
         * <.1 
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Table 5 Descriptive statistics of continuous variables (DV: absolute measures, N = 358) 
 
Mean SD Min Max 1 2 3 4 
1. LNPD 1.25 0.76 -0.75 3.03 
    
2. LNMEAN 2.07 0.76 0.09 3.40 0.87 
   
3. LNCATEGORY 0.01 0.58 0 0.85 0.15 0.08 
  
4. LNNOALL 1.25 0.08 0 3.29 0.24 0.14 0.09 
 
5. LNSAMPLEN 2.46 1.10 0 4.81 0.05 -0.26 0.18 0.19 
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Table 6 Effects of Determinants on Price Dispersion (DV: absolute measures, 358 obs.) 
Number Determinant Level 
Mean(SD) 
/Frequency 
Hierarchical Linear 
Model 
Estimate 
0 Intercept - - -2.12(.33)*** 
Market Characteristics 
1 
Mean Price Continuous 395.3(594.6) .97(.03)*** 
Mean Price Squared .10(.04)*** 
2 
Product 
Category 
0 Fast-moving Consumer Goods; 156  
1 Electronic/Computer; 188 -.04(.06) 
2 Services; 8 1.32(.60)** 
3 # of categories Continuous 
1.1(.5) 
.66(.30)** 
 
4 
Product 
Popularity 
1 Product Popularity Considered 177 
-.05(.08) 
0 otherwise 181 
5 Search Effort 
1  Search Effort involved 198 
-.04(.07) 
0 otherwise 160 
Retailer/E-tailer Characteristics 
6 
# of Re/E-tailers Continuous 40.0(112.8) .54 (.10)*** 
# of Re/E-tailers squared .13(.13) 
7 
Multi Channel 
1 multi channels are considered 80 
.63(.22)*** 
0 otherwise  278 
Multi Channel × Mean Price -.18(.09)* 
Multi Channel × Year of Data (2001-2003) 1.37(.08)*** 
8 
Service 
(shipping, 
handling) 
1 services are considered 248 
-.001(.04) 
0 otherwise 109 
Research Characteristics 
9 
PD Type 
1 Price Standard Deviation 283 
.53(.15)*** 
0 Price Range 75 
PD Type × # of Re/E-tailers -.5(.08)*** 
PD Type × Multi Channel -.57(.09)*** 
10 Price Definition 
1 Average unit/posted/quoted price/listed/store 
price/price quotes 
 
350 
-.58(.34) 
0 Other price (e.g.,  Normalized price, Price 
perception, Weighted price, Price discount, average 
of mean) 
8 
11 Year of Data 
0 Before 2000 Dec (Boom) 135  
1 2001 -2003 (Shakeout, Reconstruction) 188 -.16(.05)*** 
2 2004 till now (Mature) 35 1.08(.28)*** 
12 
Customer 
Heterogeneity 
1 considered 23 
-.63(.29)* 
0 otherwise 335 
13 
Product 
Heterogeneity 
1 considered 53 
-.54(.10)*** 
0 otherwise 305 
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Number Determinant Level 
Mean(SD) 
/Frequency 
Hierarchical Linear 
Model 
Estimate 
14 Sample Size Continuous (# of observations) 3324(8942) -.01(.03) 
15 Country 
1 US (US, Canada) 326 
.88(.27)** 
0 Otherwise. Europe  (UK, France, Germany, Italy, 
etc.) or Asia (China, Singapore) 
30 
16 
Manuscript 
Status 
1 Published Academic Paper 291 
-.23(.09)** 
0 Unpublished Paper 67 
17 
Price 
Comparison Site 
1 Data from price-comparison website 236 
.24(.08)** 
0 otherwise 121 
*** < 01 
         ** < .05 
         * <.1 
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ESSAY III 
HOW CUSTOMERS MANAGE PURCHASE WHEN THEY LOSE OR GAIN? 
EFFECTS OF PRICE SURCHARGES AND SAVINGS ON EXPENDITURES 
 
Digitization allows firms to set product prices with more flexibility and apply a multi-
dimensional price strategy (e.g., shipping costs shown separately in partitioned prices, 
price discounts and savings in promotions). It also allows consumers to learn different 
components of price offers and helps them make purchase decisions. Although previous 
research works have examined the effects of shipping and handling fees (as a form of 
price partitioning) on consumer’s expenditures and shopping pattern (e.g., Xia and 
Monroe 2004, Lewis, Singh and Fay 2006), and some studies investigate how price based 
promotion strategies influence customers’ decisions (e.g., Lam, Vandenbosch, Hulland 
and Pearce 2001), little work has empirically applied price surcharges and discounts from 
the real-business panel data jointly to investigate purchase decisions or has associated 
them with gains and losses judgments (Inman, Dyer and Jia 1997, Russell and Carroll 
1999).  
To fill this gap, we employ a Gain-and-Loss Utility model incorporating different levels 
of price gains and losses presented to customers in the transactions to model online 
purchase behaviors in a strategic pricing framework. The current study incorporates both 
positive and negative price differences between product prices (how much customers 
spend on products, without considering any type of surcharges or discounts) and basket 
prices (how much customers pay at the end of transaction) simultaneously to capture the 
effects of the price gaps, either price surcharges or price savings. Using a hierarchical 
piecewise linear model, we find significant asymmetry in the effects of price surcharges 
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and price discounts on purchase quantity as well as on how customers organize their 
shopping baskets. We conclude that when customers lose by paying extra surcharge, it 
will not hurt the purchase but will encourage customers to buy more, select products with 
more variations in both prices and categories in the basket.  
1. Introduction 
Pricing is one of the most difficult decisions for retailers. Prices vary in different 
situations due to the variances in demand, competition, seasonality, costs of operations, 
and so forth (Grewal, Levy 2007). Retailers increase adoption of mixed pricing strategy 
and provide proliferation of differentiated online services, as well as frequent 
markups/markdowns. Consumers also encounter product prices presented in different 
forms and structures. Sometimes, there is a large base price and a small surcharge (e,g., a 
$238.64 base price for a Fuji 3.2MP digital camera and a $7.94 shipping and handling 
fee, at Walmart.com), or a small base price with a large surcharge (e.g., a $4.99 Hello 
Kitty Hand Fan and a $12.41 shipping fee, at Amazon.com). Sometimes, customers 
encounter a bundled price with some amount of price discount. For example, a $178.94 
Canon PowerShot A75 3.2MP digital camera bundled with a $5.95 camera case at 
Ebay.com. The e-tailer offers a $150 saving and charges eventually $34.89 in the basket 
when customers check out. How would buyers respond to these price offers and 
presentations? 
Digitization allows firms to set product prices with more flexibility and apply multi-
dimensional price strategy (e.g., shipping costs showed separately in partitioned prices, 
price discount and savings after promotions). It also allows consumers to learn different 
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components of price offers with extensive online search efforts and helps them make 
better purchase decisions. Such search efforts are limited since customers need to balance 
the money they save from the searching with the potential search costs in time and search 
efforts (Ratchford 2009). 
Although previous research works have examined the effects of shipping and handling 
fees on consumer’s expenditures (e.g., Lewis 2006, Lewis, Singh and Fay 2006, Koukova, 
Srivastava and Steul-Fischer 2012) or price partitioning (e.g., Morwitz, Greenleaf and 
Johnson 1998, Xia and Monroe 2004, Burman and Biswas 2007), and some studies 
investigate how price based promotion strategies influence customers’ decisions (e.g., 
Lam, Vandenbosch, Hulland and Pearce 2001), little work has empirically applied price 
surcharges and discounts from the real-business panel data jointly to investigate purchase 
decisions and patterns or has associated them with gains and losses judgments (Inman, 
Dyer and Jia 1997, Russell and Carroll 1999). 
To fill this gap, we employ a Gain-and-Loss Utility model incorporating different levels 
of price gains and losses presented to customers in the transactions to model online 
purchase behaviors in a strategic pricing framework. The current study incorporates both 
positive and negative price differences between product prices (how much customers 
spend on products, without considering any type of surcharges or discounts) and basket 
prices (how much customers pay at the end of transaction) simultaneously to capture the 
effects of the gaps, either price surcharges or price savings. In addition, types of retailers, 
contexts of purchasing and transaction, and the demographic characteristics of customers 
are considered in the model. Using a hierarchical piecewise linear model, we find 
significant asymmetries in the effects of price surcharges and price discounts on purchase 
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quantity as well as how customers organize their shopping basket. We conclude that 
when customers lose by paying extra surcharge, it will not hurt the purchase but will 
encourage customers to buy more, and select products with more variations in both prices 
and categories in the basket. 
In the following elaboration, we begin by discussing the concept and framework of 
Multi-dimensional prices with both price partitioning and price promotion, as well as the 
literature reviews on Shipping & Handling fees and the price dispersion. Then, we use a 
Gain-and-Loss Utility Model to explain factors that influence consumers’ purchasing 
behaviors. Finally, we discuss the results and implications from the study. 
2. Literature Review 
Multi-dimensional prices 
According to Bolton and Shankar (2003), prior research has focused exclusively on a 
single dimension - price variation (i.e., ELDP vs. Hi-Lo pricing) - implying a single 
pricing continuum. By examining a broader set of measures, this study shows that the 
retailer pricing strategy reﬂects a richer set of dimensions that underlie retail 
pricing/promotion decisions - including relative price, deal intensity, and deal support. 
Each of these dimensions is continuous, and can be combined with any level of another 
dimension. Depending on the combination of the levels of these dimensions, retailers can 
utilize diverse pricing strategies at the brand-store level - i.e., an undifferentiated strategy 
such as Moderately Promotional pricing, niche strategies such as Exclusive or Aggressive 
pricing, or mass-customized strategies such as Hi-Lo and EDLP pricing.  
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Conceptually, Kim and Kachersky (2006) propose that the attention paid to a component 
of a multi-dimensional price, such as a surcharge, is affected by that component’s 
salience relative to other price components. They proposed that semantic factors, such as 
describing the surcharge using particular language, for example “tax,” “fee,” “additional 
charges”, will influence a price component’s relative salience. Computational factors, 
where the salience of the price component decreases as it becomes more complex to 
calculate total cost (both calculation for a percentage surcharge and a dollar surcharge) is 
also discussed.  In addition, the surcharge’s magnitude relative to the base price is 
considered as another important factor. These studies provide us conceptual foundations 
for the current study and the possible empirical evidence we can explore. 
Price Partitioning 
An important pricing decision that many firms face is whether to use a partitioned price, 
which divides a product’s price into two or more parts, or to charge one all-inclusive 
price. Several research studies have examined the trends of applying partitioned pricing 
strategy in the marketplace. Results show that the widespread use of partitioned pricing 
by marketers may be the result of perceptions that it enhances the perceived value of the 
offer.   
First, such partitioned prices are ubiquitous in catalogs (Morwitz, Greenleaf, and Johnson 
1998) and on the Internet (Xia and Monroe 2004), because products have to be delivered 
to the buyer, and the price of this type of transportation service is added as a surcharge to 
the purchase price. 
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Second, the presentations of the price partitioning matter. The study by Morwitz et al.’s 
(1998) investigate how consumers process surcharges presented as a dollar amount (e.g., 
$5.00) or as a percentage of the base price (e.g., 10% of $50.00). The latter presentation, 
being more effortful to process, influences purchase likelihood less than the former. The 
authors speculate that surcharges affect purchase less than the base price because buyers 
fail to process the surcharge, or anchor on the base price and adjust insufficiently for the 
surcharge. Therefore, sellers who divide the total price into a base price and a surcharge 
could prosper when buyers ignore the surcharge. 
However, recent research suggests that consumers may pay more attention to surcharges 
than was previously thought. Chakravarti et al. (2002) experimentally study the effects of 
partitioned prices within a bundle of products that is offered to buyers as a whole (e.g., a 
refrigerator, an ice maker, and a warranty). In this setting, buyers considering a surcharge 
for the warranty tend more to product reliability, while those considering a surcharge for 
the ice maker tend more to the benefits of the ice maker. Thus, buyers pay more attention 
to the surcharge (and its implications) than to the base price. Consistent with this 
conclusion, Smith and Brynjolfsson (2001) find the magnitude of the effect of surcharges 
(e.g., shipping costs, taxes) on clickthrough rates to be twice that of the base price. This 
analysis uses customer clickstream data from a book retailing website. The authors label 
higher sensitivity to surcharges “puzzling” and call for confirmatory studies of consumer 
sensitivity to partitioned prices. 
Burman and Biswas (2007) identifies boundary conditions for the effectiveness of 
partitioned pricing by examining the role of the reasonableness of a surcharge and the 
individual characteristics such as the need for cognition (NFC, “the tendency of 
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individuals to engage in and enjoy thinking”) in consumers’ processing of pricing 
information. They find that for high need-for-cognition consumers, partitioned pricing 
has a more favorable effect than combined pricing when the surcharges are reasonable 
(effects reverse for unreasonable surcharges). No differences for low need-for-cognition 
consumers. 
Morwitz, Greenleaf, Shalev, and Johnson (2009) review these findings on partitioned 
pricing and propose the psychological explanations for why partitioned pricing affect 
consumers. They explain that in some cases, partitioned price does not affect demand or 
reduce it and they propose factors including consumers’ attitude toward the firm, search 
behavior, and the attention or importance consumers give to different product 
components and attributes. 
Types of surcharges 
What the surcharge is for is also a key driver of purchase decisions. Taxes, Shipping & 
Handling services, and gift certificates or wrapping services are common types of 
surcharges (Morwitz, Greenleaf, Shalev, and Johnson 2009). Researchers have examined 
surcharges for taxes (e.g., Ott and Andrus 2000), and shipping & handling fee (e.g., 
Dinlersoz and Li 2006, Burman and Biswas 2007, Bolton, Grewal and Levy 2007, Sheng, 
Bao and Pan 2007, etc.). 
Tax.  Usually, tax includes national and regional taxes, product-based taxes, customer-
based (e.g. wholesale) taxes and firms can set Include/Exclude tax on products in the 
online channel. Ott and Andrus (2000) examined how consumers react to personal 
property taxes on vehicles (VPPT). Some states impose these taxes on real property such 
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as automobiles and real estate. VPPTs are typically assessed annually, based on a 
vehicle’s fair market value, and paid when registering the vehicle. Authors test the 
hypothesis that consumers will not consider VPPT when making vehicle purchase 
decisions by analyzing survey data from over 200 consumers in states in the condition of  
either high or low VPPTs. The results show that although consumers, especially those in 
high VPPT states, consider that the VPPT is too high, its magnitude has little impact on 
their vehicle purchase decisions. Neither consumers in high or low VPPT situation state 
that VPPT is important in their purchasing decision. The authors conclude that 
“consumers are not including VPPT in their total vehicle purchase price,” and speculate 
that this occurs because consumers view VPPT to be a “customary expense.”  
Shipping and Handling Services.    The growth of the e-commerce has highlighted the 
importance of shipping fees, as one type of price surcharges. Lewis (2006) considers 
shipping fees as a spatial separation between customers and retailers in the business 
models. This physical separation creates order assembly and transportation costs that are 
not available in traditional offline markets.  
Managing customers’ perceptions of the service value proposition is considered as one of 
the key service strategies in an editorial by Bolton, Grewal and Levy (2007). Grewal and 
Levy (2007) propose that the role of self-service technology and Websites in shaping 
every aspect of the consumer decision process, from need recognition to post-purchase. 
Burman and Biswas (2007) consider customers’ perceived reasonableness of shipping 
and handling surcharge as: 1) percentage of base price, 2) function of weight/size, 3) 
function of delivery time.  
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Some researchers investigate multiple types of surcharge in one study. For example, Xia 
and Monroe (2004) examine how consumers’ self-reported sensitivity to shipping and 
handling charges, and to sales tax, influenced their purchase intentions. They examine a 
combined price condition and two conditions where the surcharge for a desktop computer 
was either for shipping or tax. While the authors do not find a main effect for type of 
surcharge, they do find that participants’ shipping and handling sensitivity influence their 
purchase intentions, but their sales tax sensitivity does not. They propose that since taxes 
are controlled by government, and retailers cannot control and do not profit from them, 
they do not prevent consumers from purchasing. 
Measure and Magnitude of Surcharge 
From previous discussions, we so far conclude that shipping and handling fees prove to 
influence purchase mainly instead of taxes since the latter is found to be not affective on 
purchasing (Ott and Andrus 2000, Xia and Monroe 2004). By investigating how the 
magnitude of the surcharge, especially shipping and handling fee and its effect on 
consumers’ purchase behaviors, several researchers have reached to further understanding 
of price surcharges.  
For instance, Xia and Monroe (2004) take the interaction of the surcharge’s magnitude 
with its format into consideration. The surcharge was measured by both absolute (dollar) 
and relative value (percent). Authors find the purchase intention is higher in all 
partitioned prices than the combined all-inclusive price, while the highest is the situation 
when surcharge magnitude is low and presented as a percentage. 
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Similarly, when Sheng, Bao and Pan (2007) examine the perceived fairness of the 
surcharge, they investigate the impacts of both absolute and relative measures of 
surcharge on customers’ purchase decision. In one study, they set the context in buying a 
CD player with base price $49.95, three levels of absolute shipping and handling fee, 
which are low ($5), moderate ($15) and high ($25). In the other study, authors set 
constant $9 surcharge for both low base price ($7.9 digital watch) and high base price 
($49.90 digital watch), resulting 114% and 18% of the base price as the surcharges. In 
both studies, respondents are asked to show their purchase intentions and the relative 
surcharge measures indicate significantly lower intention.  
Price Discount and Promotions 
There are various price discounts and promotion in the marketplace, such as Trackable 
coupon codes (obtained online and offline), Time-limited promotional campaigns, Multi-
tiered pricing with bulk discount with quantity purchase, Discount prices for a certain 
customer groups (e.g., subscribed members), Rule-based promotions like buy 2, get 1 
free. 
The benefit of sales promotions is that they induce choice and purchase. However, 
DelVecchio, Henard, and Freling (2006) argue that this benefit may be offset by 
undermining preference for the brand when it is no longer promoted. Authors examine 
the effects of sales promotions on brand preference by integrating results from 51 studies 
on the subject. Their meta-analysis suggests that, on average, sales promotions do not 
affect post-promotion brand preference. However, depending upon characteristic of the 
sales promotion and the promoted product, promotions can either increase or decrease 
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preference for a brand. Kim and Kramer (2006) propose that final purchase prices 
following discounts are sometimes explicitly stated, requiring little or no cognitive effort 
from consumers to arrive at the net final purchase price. Often, however, firms state the 
regular price and the discount separately, either in absolute or relative terms. Processing 
both absolute discounts requires more cognitive effort to calculate final prices. In 
particular, to arrive at the final purchase price, consumers need to do subtractive 
arithmetic operations following absolute discounts and sub-multiplicative arithmetic 
operations following relative discounts (Estelami, 2003). Estelami demonstrates that 
subtractive operations require less cognitive effort than sub-multiplicative ones. 
Furthermore, consumers make more accurate choices in the former than the latter case, 
suggesting that accurate processing of discount information is a key to the effectiveness 
of price discounts. 
Joint effects of Surcharge and Discount: Loss and Gain 
Previous studies have reported that partitioned (vs. consolidated) pricing of bundle 
components can influence evaluations and choices (Chakravarti, Krish, Paul and 
Srivastava 2002). Reference price concepts central to the prospect theory value function 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979) and mental accounting propositions on segregating gains 
and integrating losses (Thaler 1985, Thaler and Johnson 1990) have been used to theorize 
these effects. However, empirical studies have often observed conflicting results and the 
findings suggest that consumers code the presented prices and benefits quite flexibly and 
often edit the frames that are presented (Thaler and Johnson 1990). Moreover, the effort 
and accuracy characteristics of the judgmental heuristic used (e.g., anchoring and 
adjustment) (Chakravarti, Krish, Paul and Srivastava 2002) may influence decision 
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outcomes (Morwitz, Greenleaf and Johnson 1998). There, a more complex setting of both 
price surcharges and discounts representing gains and losses would capture the price 
judgments of customers, and how they evaluate and choose among partitioned or 
consolidated presentations of alternative bundles. Asymmetry of gains and losses are also 
expected to be captured. 
Shipping & Handling Fee and Price Dispersion 
Previous researches mostly focus on the basket order size as the result of price strategies. 
Less work has done on examining the effects of price formats with both surcharges and 
discounts on the variations of product item prices, described by price dispersion. Prices 
with and without shipping and handling costs across online and offline types of retailers 
might result in various price dispersions based on full prices and this is also managerially 
important. Previous empirical analyses have examined prices both with and without 
adjustments for retailer services. It is possible that E-tailers offer more of the service if it 
could obtain a large enough price increase to cover its cost. Therefore service 
differentiation is considered as one reason for price dispersion. 
Empirical studies define a set of measures for E-tailer services and examine effects of 
those components on price dispersions, such as ease of ordering, product selection, online 
delivery, tracking, shipping and handling (Pan, Ratchford , Shankar 2002), E-tailer 
website’s reliability, shopping convenience, and certification (Ratchford, Pan, and 
Shankar 2003). They find that the proportion of online price dispersion for both pure-play 
E-tailers and bricks-and-clicks does can be explained by the E-tailer characteristic 
(service quality); however the effect is small. Baylis, Perloff (2002) take E-tailers’ 
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rankings into account and find high priced stores remained high-priced with superior 
service and low-priced ones remained low priced with poor service. They examine 
whether firms charge a higher price to consumers who desire services or to those who are 
ignorant. Their service premium model gets empirical evidence from digital camera and 
scanner market.  
Empirical studies on Shipping and Handling strategy 
In additional to conducting experiments on Shipping and Handling strategy to evaluate 
consumers reactions (e.g., Xia and Monroe 2004, Schindler, Morrin and Bechwati 2005, 
Bertini and Wathieu 2008, etc.), several researchers investigate the marketplace by 
empirical studies involving surcharge such as shipping & handling fee, and taxes (e.g., 
Dinlersoz, Li 2006, Lewis 2006, Lewis, Singh and Fay 2006, Yao and Zhang 2012).  
Dinlersoz and Li (2006) conduct both theoretical and empirical analysis, in the context of 
online book industry. Considering the use of shipping policies to create or enhance 
differentiation for homogeneous products, authors propose a plausible scenario for 
Internet retail markets, that firms choose different levels of quality, as measured by 
average delivery time, by serving different consumer segments with different level of 
sensitivities for delay. They argue that theoretically, as base price increases, keeping 
service quality constant, the surcharge of shipping and handling fee would decrease, since 
firms must compensate their customers by offering lower surcharges. From the empirical 
data, they observe the opposite result, that low base-price sellers offer higher shipping 
quality in the form of lower average delivery time, and they tend to charge low shipping 
fee, controlling for shipping quality and other seller characteristics. When observing 
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positive relationship between base price and shipping fees, Dinlersoz, Li (2006) propose 
two reasons. The first reason is the imperfect consumer information. Second, the 
navigation and purchase process designed by website. Consumers do not learn about 
shipping options until they complete the purchase selection and account settings. They 
think such strategies aim at price sensitivity of consumers by hiding or delaying valuable 
but important information during shipping sessions, or to fight against the increased price 
transparency in the online channel. Overall speaking, extra search costs are considered as 
one of the main reason why large price dispersions widely exist in the digital marketplace 
(Bay and Morgan 2001, Baye, Morgan and Scholten 2004, Ellison and Ellison 2009). 
Lewis (2006) empirically studies the effects of shipping fees and marketing activities on 
customer acquisition, customer retention, and average expenditures using data from an 
online grocery store. Using a three-stage squares (3SLS) empirical model, the author 
finds that shipping fee greatly affects order incidence rates and the graduated shipping fee 
significantly affects average expenditures. The analysis indicates that customer 
acquisition is more sensitive to order size incentives while retention is more influenced 
by base shipping fee levels. Furthermore, a profitability analysis suggests that shipping 
policies that provide incentives for larger order sizes may outperform free shipping 
promotions and standard increasing fees structures.  
Yao and Zhang (2012) find that Internet retailers will increase base prices when they offer 
free shipping. Similarly, Lewis, Singh and Fay (2006) conduct an empirical study of the 
impact of nonlinear shipping and handling fees on purchase incidence and expenditure 
decisions, such as order size, using a database from an online retailer which has greatly 
experienced a wide variety of shipping fee schedules. Results show that consumers are 
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very sensitive to shipping charges and that shipping fees influence average basket size, 
especially free shipping for orders that exceed some size threshold. Furthermore, they 
conclude that the lost revenues from shipping and the lack of response of several 
segments are significantly large and thus render such promotions unprofitable to the 
retailer. 
3. Theoretical Framework and Hypothesis 
In summary, we have reviewed literatures on shipping and handling fees as price 
surcharges, on price dispersion, and multi-dimensional prices. However, there is a lack of 
empirical study on consumers’ behavioral responses (e.g., purchase quantity or item 
variation in the basket) to both price surcharge and discount, based on the panel data from 
market. We expect to discover the joint effects of surcharge pricing and discount pricing 
strategies across different online retailers and different transactional and demographic 
background. 
To contribute to further understanding in the current topic, we associate price surcharge 
with “Loss” and price discount with “Gain” and show that price surcharges and price 
discounts in an online purchase session have significant effects on consumers’ purchase 
behaviors. We expect to find the asymmetry in the effects of “Gain” and “Loss”. In this 
way, we introduce a new way of looking at multi-dimensional prices that combines the 
literature on price partitioning, loss and gain in prospect theory, as well as works in 
numerical representations of prices. We contribute to this topic by jointly examining the 
effects of Loss and Gain on consumers’ purchase decisions, which include total basket 
size and expenditure, as well as how purchased items disperse across product category 
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and base price levels. The following are hypotheses we establish from discussions upon 
previous theoretical and empirical works for our study. 
As Kopalle et al. (2009) have stated, from consumers’ perspective, sensitivity to the 
surcharge such as shipping fee varies across purchase scenarios. For instance, Lewis, 
Singh, and Fay (2006) find consumers are very sensitive to shipping charges and the 
surcharge affect order incidence and basket size. Promotions such as free shipping for 
orders that exceed some size threshold are found to be very effective in generating 
additional sales. However, the lost revenues from shipping and the lack of response by 
several segments are substantial enough to render such promotions unprofitable to the 
retailer. 
Shipping fees can also impact order size by providing incentives or penalties for different 
order quantities. For example, a common practice is to waive shipping fees for orders that 
reach some dollar amount threshold. These policies can induce larger orders by creating 
circumstances where the marginal cost of an incremental item to a basket can be low or 
negative. Another common practice is graduated fee schedules that discontinuously 
increase fees as order size increases. These schedules can lead to reduced order quantities 
by penalizing larger baskets 
When explaining effects of shipping fees on order size, Lewis (2006) states that, by 
imposing extra fees for shipping based on order size thresholds, shipping fees can change 
the marginal price of incremental units of merchandise. Furthermore, while non-linear 
pricing plays as a common practice and has been extensively studied, their study 
emphasizes the implication that, shipping fee schedules which provides penalties (or 
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benefits) for larger order will cause consumers to shift from smaller (larger) order sizes. 
The study empirically shows that shipping fee greatly affects order incidence rates and 
graduated shipping fee significantly affects average expenditures.  
In addition, a study by Manning and Sprott (2007) finds that the effect of multiple unit 
price promotion on purchase intentions is moderated by consumption volume (positive 
effect for high and no effect for low). The firm would offer a discount for quantity 
purchase, where consumers buy a large quantity of goods at one time in an online 
purchase session. 
H1. Purchase Decisions of Basket size. We propose that both price surcharge and 
price discount simultaneously affect purchase decisions in basket size. Due to the 
differences in the nature of measures of basket size, effects will be different 
among Basket Price (total product expenditure), Product Total Price (order size), 
and Purchase Quantity. In addition, effects of price surcharge and price discount 
will be asymmetric. 
As we’ve stated, Shipping and handling fee is one important characteristic that a 
traditional retailer does not have as a form of price partitioning. Some studies get 
consistent price presentations by examining the prices including or excluding shipping 
fee. For example, Ancarani, Jacob and Jallat (2009) find higher degree of online price 
dispersion than offline, with or without shipping costs. Similarly, Baye, Morgan, 
Scholten (2004a) find that after controlling for shipping costs and firm heterogeneities, 
the prices do not converge, although the average range in prices falls when the number of 
competing firms decreases. To further evaluate its effect, some studies focus on shipping 
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and handling fee as representative of retailer service quality and take it into account to 
compare price dispersion with and without it. Ancarani and Shankar (2004) find the 
absolute price dispersion (range) from Internet retailer to be  higher than the traditional 
retailer, while it becomes lower after accounting for shipping fees in two formats (single 
shipping fee, and shipping fee divided among 3 items).  
H2. Purchase Decisions of Basket composition.  Following Ancarani and Shankar 
(2004), we consider shipping and handling fee as the representative of channel 
service provided, and propose that including or not including it in product prices 
will have an effect on the magnitude of price dispersion, which measures the 
composition of customer basket items. We hypothesize that the surcharge of 
shipping and handling fee will increase the tendency of price dispersion in the 
basket than price discount situations. 
Free shipping or other type of surcharge online is considered as an effective incentive for 
consumers to buy products without paying extra fees, while saving transportation charges 
to the physical store. When retailers charge nothing by subsidizing the shipping cost, they 
might share some of the costs with customers by charging higher base price. Many well-
known e-tailers have been practicing a free-shipping policy with a minimum order 
amount (such as Amazon.com, BN.com, Macys.com), while there is a trend of free-
shipping policy for any order without any threshold value (e.g., Nordstrom.com, 
NeimanMarcus.com) or for a limited group of buyers (e,g, Prime membership subscribers 
in Amazon.com). When firms subsidize this cost by themselves, consumers would 
consider free shipping as gaining some benefits, if they consider transportation service as 
a separate charge, and they save this amount of fees in this situation.  
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If consumers take service fees as part of the product costs for online channel, since 
compared with physical stores, e-tailers have saved cost of physical stores, sales force 
labor fees, and so on. In this situation, buyers might think free shipping or any type of 
surcharges as no gain, no loss. Given this option, customers tend to purchase more and do 
not consider how to save the transportation fees. This would probably encourage them to 
mix different products in a basket or purchase more frequently without considering 
maximizing the purchase quantity. 
Therefore, the relevance of shipping fees is also highlighted by the frequent use of “free 
shipping” and other shipping related promotions. However, reports are mixed regarding 
the profitability of shipping promotions (Lewis, Singh and Fay 2006). Authors state that 
the shipping-free schedule design is a relatively complex task that requires balancing the 
desire to recover shipping costs with the need to attract and retain a substantial customer 
base. In their empirical study, authors use a database from an online grocer that includes 
transaction histories for individual customers and information on marketing activity 
related to pricing and promotions. They find shipping fee surcharge significantly affect 
both order-incidence rates and expenditure levels, and the customers are more responsive 
to shipping fees than to merchandise prices. 
H3. Free-shipping, No discount. In the No Loss, No gain situation, companys do 
not charge the transportation costs on customers. Consumers tend to maximize the 
utility of marketing mix and will buy more items, with larger basket size. 
However, more items in the basket tend to decrease price dispersion among 
purchased items. 
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In the digital world, because competition can meet price offers so easily, any price 
advantage can quickly evaporate, and margins can deteriorate into a price war. However, 
retailers such as Wal-Mart, Amazon and others successfully have developed low price 
strategies (Grewal, Levy 2007), while taking a tactical perspective to pricing, by using 
practices such as reasonable surcharge and temporary price reductions. 
Lewis (2006) also emphasizes on the relative or percentage impact of shipping fees on 
consumer expenditures. In contract to the notion that consumers optimize by minimizing 
the percentage impact, there is research that suggests consumers often behave sub-
optimally in this type of situation. Specifically, Capon and Kuhn (1982) has proved that 
consumers have difficulty with proportionality calculations, especially when they are 
dealing with nonlinear pricing schedules (Nunes 2000). We expect to find moderate 
impact of relative shipping fee to the base total expenditures on order amount and 
purchase quantity. 
A special case is when the firms seek different margins on specific items that exploit 
these differences among consumers, where loss-leader promotion might be an example 
(Kopalle et al. 2009). Loss leaders are products temporarily priced at or below retailer 
cost. Selling such deeply discounted items can be effective because the losses are made 
up on the sale of complementary items to current customers or because they bring 
incremental traffic to the website or the store. When it is in the context of online channel, 
firms set a significantly higher S&H fee on the deeply discounted product price, leading 
relative percentage of surcharge to the base price extremely large.  
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For example, Amazon.com reduced the product price at very low level (e.g., a 1$ Italy-
design Moleskine Notebook) while setting the surcharge at $9.0 which is 9 times of the 
base price. Customers would accept the unreasonable surcharge since they observe a deep 
discount and combined price ($10) is acceptable, compared with $12.5 base price with 
free-shipping in a another retailer’s website.  
 H4. Absolute vs. Relative Measures of Surcharge and Discount. Two types of 
measures will result in different effects on purchase decisions. Without 
considering special cases such as loss-leader promotion tactic, relative measure 
would provide more helpful information to customers, resulting significant effects 
on purchase decisions. 
The pricing task differs for fashion (e.g., brand apparel) and staple goods (perishables and 
packaged, e.g., food, home supplies). Ideally, fashion merchandise holds zero inventory 
at the end of a fashion season. To accomplish this objective, retailers use markdowns and 
promotions to stimulate demand. But the size and timing of markdowns is critical—too 
small a markdown too late in the season, and the retailer has leftover merchandise; too 
high a markdown too early in the season, and the retailer sacriﬁces gross margins. For 
retailers pricing staple goods, the challenge changes, because they do not have to worry 
about a zero end-of-season inventory position. Instead, they must determine how to 
employ the frequent extra discounts and deals provided by vendors (Grewal, Levy 2007). 
Internet Book and CD retailing is a popular research area in the current studies, due to the 
ease of data access and product homogeneity. Several studies (e.g., Dinlersoz, Li 2006) 
have examined the shipping strategies from the evidence from this industry. In addition, 
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previous studies cover a single product category (e.g., perishable grocery and drugstore 
items in Lewis, Singh and Fay, 2006; Lewis 2006; digital cameras and video games in 
Yao and Zhang 2012). 
H5. Product Category.    Different Product category will have different base prices 
and purchase quantity, as well as price dispersions, which would moderate the 
effects of price surcharge and discount on decisions. For example, Fast-moving 
consumer goods have the smaller basket size and price dispersion with larger 
order size, and electronic/Computer have larger basket size and price dispersion, 
but smaller order size, while the service product has a moderate level of purchase 
results. 
While consumers’ heightened perceived risks in online markets and their aversions to 
dealing with unknown sellers have resulted in the dominance of well-known sellers, there 
are potentially other factors behind this phenomenon (Biswas and Biswas 2004). 
As (Kopalle et al. 2009) mention, empirical evidence on price elasticity in online markets 
shows that online markets are far from being perfectly competitive, and different firms 
are adopting various pricing strategies. For example, Chevalier and Goolsbee (2003) find 
that the online price elasticity of demand for books is about -3.5 for BarnesandNoble.com 
and -.45 for Amazon.com. The result for Amazon implies negative marginal revenue, 
indicating that Amazon prices are below the short-run profit-maximization level, with a 
penetration pricing strategy. Besides, Singh, Hansen and Blattberg (2006) conduct 
analysis on market entry and consumer behavior from Wal-Mart Supercenter. 
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With the emergence of Internet as a significant channel, more traditional brick-and-
mortar retailers go beyond their traditional channel and establish an on-line branch 
channel. Therefore, types of channel examined in the current study include 1) 
multichannel with both online and offline branches, 2) physical store which is called 
bricks-and-clicks retailer, and 3) the pure play E-tailer. 
One question is that whether multichannel retailers with both online and offline channels 
charge price differently from pure-play E-tailers with a single online channel, and 
whether the type of transaction channel is the reason for the price dispersion. By 
comparing basket price and price dispersion among retailers with multichannel and single 
Internet channel, we could examine a strong empirical confirmation or disconfirmation 
for the frictionless commerce and price convergence hypothesis; this would signal that it 
might be possible to design and implement consumer value-based pricing strategy by 
different types of retailers (Ancarani and Shankar, 2004). Multichannel retailers combine 
online and offline channels, with prices likely reflecting the variability in prices of all the 
retailers in both channels, and therefore will likely have greater basket price and price 
dispersions than other types of retailers (Ancarani and Shankar, 2004). If the brick-and-
click channel has a wide geographic scope, those retailers can provide value added 
services such as the ability to order products online and pick up or return offline, or 
return by mail at no charge. This kind of offer helps customers save time and provides 
ease of using the online channel to check product attributes and reviews without going to 
the store. For pure-play E-tailers, a lower price dispersion is predicted to be lower due to 
the lower inventory costs of the single distribution (Venkatesan, Mehta, Bapna 2007).   
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H6. Retailer differences.    Pure-play E-tailers and Retailers with multichannel 
differ in the cost strategy and pricing strategy. Different types of retailer will have 
different base prices and purchase quantity, as well as price dispersions, which 
would moderate the effects of price surcharge and discount on decisions. For 
example, retailers without physical store have smaller basket size and price 
dispersion with larger order size, and retailers with physical store have larger 
basket size and price dispersion, but smaller order size. 
4. Empirical Study and Results 
Data and Observed Expenditure Pattern 
Our data is from a random sample of multiple major online retailers, with detailed 
transaction information within one year in the United States. Since it is from online 
channel of brick-and-mortar retailer or pure-play e-tailer, there is no geographic limit to 
the purchase. All transactions made are from the websites and recorded in the website 
server of each retailer.  
When a consumer makes transaction online, she/he could complete the whole session, 
which starts when the customer enters the website, and ends when the consumer 
completes the transaction and closes the web page. The whole transaction process is 
called “purchase session” in the digital marketplace. The data in our current empirical 
study includes 18715 unique purchase sessions, and covers totally 43556 different items 
purchased by 7696 unique customers (identified by household machine ID), from 8 well-
known online retailers (Amazon, Ebay, Walmart, Yahoo, BN, Office Depot, GAP and 
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VS). The time of the observed transaction is one year long, starting on January 1 to 
December 31.  
A sample of the original data is shown in Table 1.  
-------------------Insert Table 1 about here------------------- 
For each purchase session, the data records details about customers’ each expenditure, 
including retailer domain name, customer machine ID, duration time (by minutes), pages 
viewed in the session, purchase date and time, names and categories of each items 
purchased in the session, purchase quantity of each item, price of each item, and total 
basket price (how much consumers pay at the end of session). 
To empirically study the effects of price surcharges and discounts on purchase decision, 
we also develop a few variables based on the original data shown in Table 1. The new 
variables we have developed include Product total price, Gap between total basket price 
and total product price, Total number of items purchased, Average expenditure per item 
(Unit price), Total number of unique items purchased, Prices of all items in one purchase 
and its price variation, Mode of category distribution (the most commonly purchased 
category in one session) and Total number of unique categories purchased. 
Given original transaction data and the variables we develop from the sample, we have 
determined the main variables used in our empirical study. Main price information related 
variable are described in Table 2.  
-------------------Insert Table 2 about here------------------- 
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In addition to price related purchase decision variables, our data has captured purchase 
situational information and consumer’s demographic information, such as session 
duration, consumer’s education level, and so on. These are considered as covariate 
variables in the current study, and detailed descriptions are shown in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Most demographic variables are recoded into dichotomous variables, including 
Household size (dummy 1: larger household size; dummy 0: smaller household size), 
Education level (dummy 1: higher level; dummy 0: lower level), Family Oldest Age 
(dummy 1: older; dummy 0: younger), Household income (dummy 1: higher income; 
dummy 0: lower income). 
-------------------Insert Table 3 about here------------------- 
-------------------Insert Table 4 about here------------------- 
The summary statistics of main variables is described by Table 5. Of all 18715 purchase 
sessions, we find significant gap between total purchased product price and basket price, 
resulting three possible situations. First, if the total product price is equal to basket price, 
consumers do not pay extra money or gain any discount upon the product price for the 
items they’ve purchased. With zero gaps between basket price and total product price, 
what customers pay finally is exactly the same amount of money of what they buy. We 
consider it as “No Gain No Loss” situation. In our data, we have 4408 sessions with zero 
gaps. Second, if the total product price is smaller than basket price, consumers pay extra 
money beyond the product price. There at 13100 purchase sessions with the negative 
gaps GAP
-
 (M=11.56, SD = 34.88), meaning a certain amount of surcharge consumers 
have paid in this purchase situation, and they “Loss”. Third, we find 1207 purchase 
sessions with positive gaps GAP
+
 (M=-20.55, SD = 30.30) between total product price 
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and the basket price, meaning that consumers gain some discounts and savings at the 
checkout point in their basket. In this “Gain” situation, what buyers pay finally is less 
than the sum of product item prices. 
-------------------Insert Table 5 about here------------------- 
In addition, given positive and negative gap value, we have obtained relative positive gap 
(M=0.39, SD = 0.38) and negative gap (M=-2.74, SD = 29.31) to the total product price. 
By looking at the mean value, we could confirm that average relative GAP
+
 is smaller 
than 1, representing price discounts and savings could not exceed the total product price, 
while average relative GAP
-
 is -2.74, meaning that the price surcharges could be even 
higher than the product price itself. 
Further, from our data summary statistics results, we observe that 18715 unique purchase 
sessions made by 7696 unique customers on these 8 websites from January 1 to 
December 31 result in average expenditure $57.58 (Basket Size M=2.53, SD=4.32), with 
3 items purchased on average from 2 unique categories (Number of Unique Category 
M=1.21, SD=0.54). On average, consumers have browsed in the website for about 33 
minutes (M = 32.45, SD = 31.40) and have viewed about 44 web pages (M=44.19, 
SD=49.48). 
Considering price surcharges as losses and price discounts as gains in our study, how to 
measure gains and losses is an important step. We use both categorical measures and 
quantitative measures to explicitly examine their effects on purchase decisions. When 
there is any discount, promotion, benefit and so on in the purchase session, we call it 
“Gain” situation, with positive gap between Product Total Price and Basket Price. If the 
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positive gap value is higher than its average level, we categorize the situation into “High 
Gain” case, and if the positive gap value is lower than its average level, we categorize the 
situation into “Low Gain” case. Continuous value of the positive gap (GAP+) is used as 
the quantitative measure. Similarly, when there is any surcharge fees such as Tax, 
shipping and handling fee charged in the purchase session, we call it “Loss”, with 
negative gap between Product Total Price and Basket Price. If the negative gap value is 
lower than its average level, we categorize the situation into “High Loss” case, and if the 
negative gap value is higher than its average level, we categorize the situation into “Low 
Loss” case. Continuous value of the negative gap (GAP-) is used as the quantitative 
measure. See Table 6. The distribution of four Gain and Loss categories is shown in 
Table 7.  
-------------------Insert Table 6 about here------------------- 
-------------------Insert Table 7 about here-------------------    
The distribution of purchase sessions across eight websites is described by Table 8. We 
observe that Amazon purchase sessions take up 65.44% of sample data with 12248 out of 
18715 purchase sessions. The average total basket price is the highest for Office Depot, 
with the average $135.66 total dollar amount. Ebay carries wide range of products, 
resulting in the lowest average total basket price (M=16.77) and lowest average 
expenditure per item (M=8.52). The average GAP is as high as $10 for Walmart and $12 
for VictoriasSecret website, indicating that these two retailers charge a significant amount 
of shipping and handling fee, even after considering possible price promotions and price 
discounts simultaneously. 
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-------------------Insert Table 8 about here------------------- 
In the original data, each transaction is categorized into a sub-category of purchase goods, 
ranging from Apparel, home furniture, Books, music, to consumer electronic product and 
services such as tickets, photo printing, and so on. There are in total 60 sub-categories 
and among these categories, Books & Magazines, Movies & Videos, Apparel, Music, 
Toys and Games are top five most popular sub-categories. For the convenience of 
analysis, we re-categorized them into six main domains. See Table 9 for details of 
categorization and relevant summary statistics. 
-------------------Insert Table 9 about here------------------- 
Model and Estimation Results 
Dependent measures.  Following several empirical studies (e.g., Dinlersoz and Li 2006, 
Chintagunta, Chu and Cebollada 2012) on price partitioning and transaction cost, we use 
multiple measures to explain consumers’ purchase decisions and shopping pattern, which 
includes: 
1) Total Product Price 
2) Number of Unique Items (Purchase Quantity) 
3) Unit Price (Average Expenditure per Item) 
4) Purchase Item Price Dispersion measure 1: Coefficient of Price Variation 
5) Purchase Item Price Dispersion measure 2: Percentage of Price Difference 
6) Purchase Category Dispersion: Number of Unique Product Category 
See Table 2 for detailed explanation of these six variables.  Each of these six measures of 
purchase decision can imply some information about customers’ purchase behavior and 
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shopping pattern. Total Product Price
34
, Number of Unique Items and Unit Price (Average 
Expenditure per Item) indicate the size of the order, which will directly affect firms’ 
profitability. Price dispersion is important in explaining customers’ search costs, selection 
of products as well as the perception of price variations in the digital marketplace. More 
researchers examine formats of price dispersion and its effects on customers’ satisfaction, 
purchase intention, market competition, and so on (e.g., Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 
2003, 2007, Baye, Morgan, Scholten 2004). We use two popularly used relative measures 
of price dispersion to investigate how price surcharge and price discount affect the 
components in customers’ baskets within one purchase session.   
Basket Size     Of all six dependent measures of purchase decision, three variables 
indicate information about the basket size, such as how much product price do customers 
put in their basket explained by Total Product Price, how many unique items do 
customers put in the basket described by Purchase Quantity, and how much money do 
they pay for each item, which is the Unit price.  
Variations in the Basket   Other three dependent measures describe more about how 
customers organize their basket, when offering a certain amount of extra surcharge or 
price savings. The coefficient of variation of the price distribution, defined as price 
standard deviation divided by mean price of the price distribution, and the percentage 
difference of the highest and lowest price, defined as price range divided by mean price 
are two popularly used relative measurements of price dispersion (e.g., Baye, Gatti, 
Kattuman, and Morgan 2002), Pan, Ratchford and Shankar 2002).  
                                                 
34
 When considering surcharges or discounts, the total basket price is highly correlated with the total 
product price (r = .94). Therefore, we retain total product price as one of the dependent variables. 
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Previous researches also find differences in absolute and relative measures in describing 
price variations. Pan, Ratchford and Shankar (2001) find increase in absolute price 
dispersion (price range and standard deviation) with price level or involvement while 
relative price dispersion (percentage of price difference and the coefficient of variation of 
price) declines with price and high involvement products exhibit less relative price 
dispersion. Baylis, Perloff (2002) find high priced stores remained high priced and 
superior service, while low-priced remained low priced and poor service. 
These measures are not only indicating purchase decision independently, but are also 
jointly explaining customers’ online purchase behavior and are also correlated with each 
other. For example, if the price surcharge is a proportion of the base price of product, 
Total Product Price is closely related with Basket Price, which will be (1+proportion) 
times of Total Product Price. If customer buys more variety of products, which results in 
larger number of unique items and number of unique product category, as well as the 
order size. See Table 10 for correlation between these measures in our data. 
-------------------Insert Table 10 about here------------------- 
Following Inman, Dyer and Jia (1997)’s generalized utility model, which incorporates 
intuitively appealing notions of disappointment and regret jointly, we model consumers’ 
losses and gains on price when they observe the differences between product total price 
(the total dollar amount of all items they purchase in a session) and basket price (the total 
expenditure they need to pay in a session). Both positive and negative gaps are captured 
in the panel data, and thus we apply a simple linear model and a piecewise linear model 
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to incorporate the effects of losses and gains, operationalized by the positive and negative 
gaps.  
Model1 is a simple Linear Model, with categorical measure of Gain and Loss. We first 
decompose the outcomes into two to reflect the asymmetric of people’s happiness and 
unhappiness from gains and losses. When the gap is positive, i.e., when the customer pay 
lower than the total product prices with a certain level of savings, it results in positive 
emotion such as happiness. When the gap is negative, i.e., when the customer pay extra 
charge in addition to the total product prices with a certain level of surcharges, it results 
in negative emotion such as unhappiness.  
We then incorporate four dummy variables to describe the nature of the gap (See Table 2 
for detailed information). Some customers may not accurately evaluate the magnitude of 
the gaps, however they make decisions based on their precious shopping experience, 
knowledge about the product and price, and so on. Then they judge where the surcharge 
or saving is fair or not fair, which will immediately help them make purchase decisions. 
Thus, we develop four dummy variables to describe when it is a Gain with larger (High 
Gain) or smaller benefit (Low Gain), and when it is a Loss with larger (High Loss) or 
smaller loss (Low loss). These four dummy variables are introduced in Model1, see 
formula (1).  
Purchase Decisioni = 0 + 1-8Websitei + 9 Purchase Quantityi +10 (Purchase Quantityi)2  
+ 11 Unit Pricei +  12 (Unit Pricei)2 + 13 High Gaini + 14 Low Gaini + 15 High Lossi + 16 
Low Lossi + 17-21 Product Categoryi + 22 Seasonalityi + 23 Duration Timei + 24 Pages 
Viewedi+ 25 Educationi + 26-28 Regioni + 29 Household Sizei + 30 Oldest Agei + 
31Household Incomei + 32 Childi + Connection Speedi + 34 Country of Origini + i           
(1) 
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Using subscript i to denote each purchase session observation, the model structure we use 
to explain the variations in the purchase decisions at individual transaction level. This 
applies to Model1, Model2 and Model3. 
We now report the coefficient estimates () from the model 1 for each determinant and 
covariates in Table 11. In summary, we find 24 (DV1: Total Product Price), 28 (DV2: 
Purchase Quantity), 22 (DV3: Unit Price) and 26 (DV4: Coefficient of Variation, DV5: 
Percentage of Difference, DV6: Number of unique Category) out of 34 independent 
variables including two quadratic terms are statistically significant at least p<.10. The 
overall model fit (R
2
) ranges from 15.69% to 79.65% for six dependent variables, 
indicating that predictors explained about 15.69% to 79.65% of the variation of purchase 
decisions, covering information such as transaction order size, average unit price and 
variations of item prices in the basket. 
-------------------Insert Table 11 about here------------------- 
Retailer.    We observe that two multi-channel retailers selling products with large variety 
obtain the largest basket size (Office Depot 6 = .069, p<.01 and Walmart 3 = .049, 
p<.01), while pure-play e-tailer obtains smaller basket size (Ebay 2 = -.051, p<.01, 
Amazon 1 = -.108, p<.01) however Amazon and Walmart have higher average unit price. 
Customers tend to choose various unique categories at Walmart (3 = .239, p<.01,), 
BarnesandNoble.com (5 = .222, p<.01,), as well as Amazon.com (Amazon 1 = .175, 
p<.01). Yao and Zhang (2012) also examined the characteristics of retailer and conclude 
that retailers with physical channel tend to charge less surcharge and the public firms 
have higher base price settings. 
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Empirical evidences show contradictory results to the theoretical prediction of price 
convergence. A few studies find larger price difference for pure-play E-tailers (pure 
click) than multichannel
 
while some findings point in the opposite direction. Xing, Tang 
and Tang (2006) find that multichannel retailer has much higher price dispersion 
measured by price standard deviation than that among pure-play one, however as time 
elapses, the price dispersion among pure-play becomes larger. Yang, Gan and Tang 
(2010) studies evolution of toy price dispersion over two periods of time  and find price 
dispersion of multichannel is higher than that of pure-play ones at the beginning and does 
not change much over time.  
Similar results and explanation apply to other three models explained in the following 
part of the study. 
Related Marketing Mix Decisions.     When examining effects on a certain purchase 
decision measure, we also include two other related decision variables and its quadratic 
terms. For example, when we use Total Product Price as dependent variable, we also 
include Purchase quantity and Unit price as its predictors, to account for variations in the 
components of items purchased. Similarly, when we use Purchase quantity as dependent 
variable, we also include Total Product Price and Unit price as its predictors, and when 
we predict Unit Price, Total Product Price and Purchase quantity are included. As 
expected, we find “U-shaped” relationships between Purchase quantity and other two 
purchase variables, and between Unit Price and other two purchase variables. We also 
find “inverted U-shaped” relationships between Total Product Price / Number of Unique 
Category and other two purchase decision related variables.  For example, as unit price 
increases, we first observe an increase in the basket size (measured by Product Total Price 
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with estimated 12 = .861, p<.01), however when unit price continues increasing and 
reaches a critical point, basket size tends to decrease (Product Total Price with estimated 
 = -.069, p<.01). This is consistent with previous empirical studies (e.g., Lewis, Singh 
and Fay 2006), which examine various segments given different shipping structures and 
find their effects on basket size and average order size preferences. 
In terms of basket variations, we observed “inverted U-shaped” relationships with basket 
size and number of unique items. For example, as number of unique items increases, we 
first observe an increase in the price variation (measured by Coefficient of Variation with 
estimated  = .846, p<.01, Percentage of Difference with estimated  = .923, p<.01), 
however when purchase quantity continues increasing and reaches a critical point, price 
variation tends to decrease (Coefficient of Variation with estimated = .846, p<.01, 
Percentage of Difference with estimated = .923, p<.01). We could understand it since 
Coefficient of Variation and Percentage of Difference are two relative measures of price 
dispersion, which is the percentage of standard deviation and price range out of the 
average unit price. Therefore, as basket size increases, the variation get larger than the 
purchase session with single items purchased, indicating zero variation. However, when 
basket size increases to a critical size, prices are getting closer among purchased items, 
even though there are more unique items purchases, the price variation will be smaller 
than the situation with less unique items. 
Similar results and explanation apply to other three models explained in the following 
part of the study. 
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Gain and Loss Dummy.   In Model1, we use four levels of gain and less to predict 
purchase outcomes and have reached interesting results. The four levels of gain and loss 
represent a relatively gradual change in customers’ fairness evaluations and emotional 
outcomes on purchases (Campbell 1999, Xia, Monroe and Cox 2004). Consumers will 
feel very happy when there is High Gain, being happy to see there is Low Gain, a little 
disappointed seeing Low Loss, and finally very disappointed finding High Loss. 
Commonly, we expect to see gradual effects on purchase decision from these four 
situations, however, the result is consistent with our previous hypotheses that, even loss 
would encourage customers to buy more and even gain will result in smaller purchase 
size.  
From the estimation result, we find that High Gain is positively related with all purchase 
outcomes, that people who obtained price discount higher than the average level, tend to 
make more expenditures for their total purchase products (13 = .088, p<.01), tend to buy 
more items (13= .059, p<.01), spend on more expensive product with higher unit price 
(13 = .032, p<.01), with larger price dispersions (Coefficient of Variation 13= .062, 
p<.01, Percentage of Difference 13 = .063, p<.01 ) and more variations in the category 
(13 = .054, p<.01). The estimate for the effect on the whole basket including the possible 
surcharge and discount is positive but not significant (13 = .001, p>.5). 
Opposite result occurs when customer face Low Loss situation, where they pay a certain 
amount of extra surcharge (such as shipping and handling fee, taxes) and the dollar 
amount of the surcharge is lower than the average level. In this situation, customers loss 
some money but not too high, which results negative outcomes in all seven purchase 
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decisions. Specifically, people who pay the surcharge lower than the average level, tend 
to make less expenditures for their total purchase products (16 = -.159, p<.01), tend to 
buy less items (16= -.133, p<.01), spend on less expensive product with lower unit price 
(16 = -.090, p<.01), with smaller price dispersions (Coefficient of Variation 16= -.063, 
p<.01, Percentage of Difference 16 = -.059, p<.01 ) and less variations in the category 
(16 = -.083, p<.01).  
More interestingly, in Low Gain situation, customers obtain a price saving but lower than 
the average saving level, result in less expenditures for their total purchase products (14 
= -.016, p<.5), spend on less expensive product with lower unit price (14 = -.028, p<.01), 
However, they tend to buy more items (14 = .042, p<.01), with larger price dispersions 
(Coefficient of Variation 14= .070, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 14 = .077, p<.01 ) 
and more variations in the category (14 = .054, p<.01). 
On the contrary to the common sense, High Loss situation with extra surcharge that 
customers have paid, which is even larger than the average level, results show positive 
effect on all purchase decisions. Customers who face High Loss situation, tend to make 
more expenditures for their total purchase products (15 = .061, p<.01), tend to buy more 
items (15= .101, p<.01), buy products with larger price dispersions (Coefficient of 
Variation 15= .128, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 15 = .167, p<.01) and more 
variations in the category (15 = .058, p<.01). The estimate for the effect on the average 
expenditure per item is positive but not significant (15 = .017, p>.5). 
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The results are consistent with previous findings by Lewis, Singh and Fay (2006) but also 
provide some extensions. We conclude that charging extra surcharge encourage 
customers to buy more to meet the requirement of the threshold to get free-shipping 
promotion, while given smaller surcharge for smaller order ($0 to $50), customers favor 
small baskets and order relatively infrequently. As observed by the results, the “free-large” 
policy has a smaller impact on order incidence (Lewis, Singh and Fay, 2006) but leads to 
the largest average expenditure.  
Product Category purchased.    Different from previous studies covering a single product 
category (e.g., perishable grocery and drugstore items in Lewis, Singh and Fay, 2006; 
Lewis 2006; books in Dinlersoz and Li 2006; digital cameras and video games in Yao and 
Zhang 2012), we incorporate six main product categories in our model, including 
1)Apparel, Shoes, Jewelry; 2)Home & Food; 3) Books, Music, Videos; 4) Computers, 
Electronics; 5) Business and Office Supplies and 6)Services. We observe higher Basket 
size for category of Computers and Electronics (Product Total Price 20 = .438, p<.01) 
and more expensive product with higher unit price (20 = .411, p<.01). Customer tend to 
buy more in category of Books, Music, Videos (19= .275, p<.01), and Large price 
dispersion exist in Computers and Electronics category (Coefficient of Variation 
20= .286, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 20 = .279, p<.01), while customers choose 
more sub-categories in Apparel, Shoes and Jewelry product (17 = .329, p<.01).  
Purchase Situational Variables.    We observe a significant effect of seasonality only on 
number of items purchased during holidays (22 = .014, p<.5), indicating that on average 
customers spend similar amount of money across the eight retailer websites in one year. 
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By looking into the detailed search efforts on the website, we find significant effects of 
both time duration and number of web pages viewed during the transaction. For example, 
one more minute customers spend on the website, they will buy more in the basket (23 
= .061, p<.01) with larger variations in product categories (23 = .052, p<.01). Similarly, 
one more page they viewed, they will buy more in the basket (24 = .059, p<.01) with 
larger variations in product categories (24 = .102, p<.01), however they may buy less 
expensive items (24 = -.64, p<.01), with more search efforts and costs. In addition, 
network connection speed at which customers make transactions does not have 
significant impact on purchase decisions. 
Demographic Background.    Education level, Census Region, Family Size, Income, 
Country of Origin are significant factors on purchase decisions. Specifically, Education 
level  has significantly positive effect on purchase decision making, that customers with 
higher education level tend to spend on products of higher price dispersions (Coefficient 
of Variation 25= .022, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 25 = .017, p<.01). This is 
understandable since we also observe a significant positive effect from income on all 
measures of price decision, that buyers who have higher income, tend to make bigger size 
transactions (31= .034, p<.01), buy more items (31= .033, p<.01), spend on more 
expensive product with higher unit price (31 = .024, p<.01), with larger price dispersions 
(Coefficient of Variation 31= .028, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 31 = .038, p<.01 ) 
and more variations in the category (31 = .024, p<.01). In addition, we find slightly 
different pattern for customers from different census regions, that customers from South 
tend to put more items in the basket (28 = .030, p<.01), which results higher price 
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variations (Coefficient of Variation 28= .029, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 28 = .027, 
p<.01), and people from East have more variety in product category (28 = .032, p<.01). 
However, age, child being present in the family or not do not significantly influence 
buyers’ purchase patterns and decisions. 
How large is the magnitude of the gap, purchase situation, marketplace characteristics, 
etc. will also play a moderate role and affects consumers’ expenditure patterns. We 
incorporate the continuous measure of gap in Model 2, which is a Piece-wise Linear 
Model, with continuous absolute measure of Gain and Loss, see formula (2). 
Purchase Decisioni = 0 + 1-8Websitei + 9 Purchase Quantityi +10 (Purchase Quantityi)2  
+ 11 Unit Pricei +  12 (Unit Pricei)2 + 13 GAPi • I (GAPi>0) +14 GAPi • I (GAPi<0)  + 
15 I(GAPi=0) + 16-20 Product Categoryi + 21 Seasonalityi + 22 Duration Timei+ 23 Pages 
Viewedi + 24Educationi + 25-27 Regioni + 28 Household Sizei + 29 Oldest Agei + 
Household Incomei + 31 Childi + 32 Connection Speedi + 33 Country of Origini + i             
(2) 
Where Indicator Variables are:  
I (GAP>0) =  
       
       
  
I (GAP=0) =   
       
        
  
We now report the coefficient estimates () from the model2 for each determinant and 
covariates in Table 12. 
-------------------Insert Table 12 about here------------------- 
Effects of Magnitude of Gain and Loss.     By incorporating continuous measures of gains 
and losses, while taking free shipping cases with no gains, no losses value, Model 2 
provides more information about purchase pattern given price surcharge and discounts. 
As expected, we find significant positive effect of positive gap representing price savings 
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in the basket on all measures of price decisions. Specifically, given one dollar amount 
customers save in the basket, they tend to make more expenditures for their total 
purchase products (8 = .134, p<.01),  tend to buy more items (8= .081, p<.01), spend 
more on the average expenditure per item (8 =.059, p<.01), buy products with larger 
price dispersions (Coefficient of Variation 8= .128, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 8 
= .050, p<.01) and more variations in the category (8 = .062, p<.01). 
On the contrary, the dollar amount customers lose in the basket results in smaller basket 
size, however the components of product items in the basket show more variations. 
Specifically, given one extra dollar amount customers pay in the basket, they tend to 
make less expenditures for their total purchase products (9 = -.072, p<.01), spend on less 
average expenditure per item (9 =-.083, p<.01), however, they tend to buy more unique 
items (9= .081, p<.01), buy products with larger price dispersions (Coefficient of 
Variation 9= .015, p<.01, Percentage of Difference  = .010, p<.01) and more variations 
in the category (9 = .018, p<.01).  
The results provide insights that customers tend to maximize the benefits they’ve gained 
from the price savings in the basket, while they try to minimize the loss they face given a 
certain level of price surcharge at the check out by putting more dissimilar product with 
larger variations in prices and categories. 
We also observe interesting pattern given there is neither price surcharge nor price 
savings. In the situation of No gains, no losses, customers tend to spend more in their 
total purchase products (10 = .101, p<.01), spend on higher average expenditure per item 
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(9 =.053, p<.01), buy more unique items (10= .028, p<.01), however, they will buy 
products with more similarity in prices with smaller percentage of price differences (10 = 
-.016, p<.01). 
Further, the absolute gap plays differently from the relative gap (where the gap is 
presented as a percentage of total product prices, indicating how much is the surcharge or 
saving relative to the total spending on the merchandise). We also use percentage of the 
gap to the base product total price, as a measure of the level of surcharge and savings 
relatively in Model 3 which is a Piece-wise Linear Model, with continuous relative 
measure of Gain and Loss. See Model 3 in formula (3). 
Purchase Behaviori = 0 + 1-8Websitei + 9 Purchase Quantityi +10 (Purchase Quantityi)2  
+ 11 Unit Pricei +  12 (Unit Pricei)2 + 3 RelativeGAPi • I (GAPi>0) +14 RelativeGAPi • I 
(GAPi<0)  + 15 I(Relative GAPi=0) + 16-20 Product Categoryi + 21 Seasonalityi + 22 
Duration Timei + 23 Pages Viewedi + 24Educationi + 25-27 Census Regioni + 28 Household 
Sizei + 29 Oldest Agei + Household Incomei+ Child Presenti + 32 Connection Speedi 
+ 3 Country of Origini + i                  (3) 
Where Indicator Variables are:  
I (GAP>0) =  
       
       
  
I (GAP=0) =   
       
        
  
We now report the coefficient estimates () from the model3 for each determinant and 
covariates in Table 13.  
-------------------Insert Table 13 about here------------------- 
After taking percentage of gains and losses over its total product price in the model, the 
effects of relative measures of gaps are different from these of absolute value reported in 
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Model2 results. Given one more percent of product price as savings, customers 
significantly decrease the total spending on the products (8 = -.006, p<.01) and basket 
(8 = -.094, p<.01), but they favor more variety of product categories in the basket (8 = 
.024, p<.01). Given one more percent of product price as surcharges, customers 
significantly increase the total spending on the products (9 = .024, p<.01) and they buy 
more product (9 = .029, p<.01) and favor more variety of product prices (Coefficient of 
Variation 9= .034, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 9 = .035, p<.01) as well as 
categories in the basket (9 = .024, p<.01). 
Xia and Monroe (2004) state that, in the case of partitioned prices (e.g., shipping costs 
showed separated), consumers tend to make price-related judgments that do not 
adequately adjust for the add-on pricing component in a transaction.  
Inconsistent with Morwitz et al.’s (1998) results, relative measures of surcharge and 
discount do not prove to be more effortful to process, affected purchase likelihood less 
than the former. On the contrary, they show strong relationship with purchase decisions, 
given the empirical study results. As argued by Sheng, Bao and Pan (2007), when the 
surcharge is relatively small compared to the base price, partitioned pricing can increase 
demand. However, as the relative magnitude of the surcharge to the base price increases, 
consumers will likely pay more attention to the surcharge and the effect of partitioned 
pricing on demand diminishes. If the surcharge is too large relative to the base price, 
partitioned pricing can reduce demand compared to combined pricing. Compared to 
absolute measure, percentage measure of price surcharge is more valuable, since the 
percentage number is a more reasonable measure. For example, given different 
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merchandise, it is hard to evaluate whether $5 or $9 is a more reasonable S&H surcharge. 
Given the base price, $5 with the base price $7.9 would be less reasonable than $9 with 
the base price $49.90.Thus, relative measure of surcharge is expected to affect purchase 
decision differently and more effectively. When Bolton and Shankar (2003) identify four 
pricing dimensions that underlie retail pricing/promotion decisions, they use relative 
price instead of absolute price. 
Model 4 is a Hierarchical piecewise linear development based on the results of Model3, 
using relative gap in the model, as suggested by Bijmolt and Pieters (2001) and 
Raudenbush and Bryk (2002). Since we have observed multiple purchase sessions from 
the same consumers in our data, we need to control for the dependence of multiple 
purchases within one customer. 7696 customers with the unique machine ID have made 
18715 transactions, and each customer has bought 2.43 times on average. Therefore, we 
apply a hierarchical structure in the piecewise linear model. To account for the lack of 
independence across purchase sessions for the same customer, we allow random effects 
in both intercept and slopes across each independent customer and control for the within-
subject error correlation between purchase decisions. In model 4 with hierarchy, there are 
two levels: the collected 18715 purchase sessions are at the first level. These observations 
are nested in 7696 customers that we set as the second level, who share demographic 
information such as household size, education level, and so on. See Model 4 in Formula 
(4). 
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Purchase Behaviorij= 0 + 1-8Websiteij + 9 Purchase Quantityij +10 (Purchase Quantityij)2  + 
11 Unit Priceij +  12 (Unit Priceij)2 + 13 RelativeGAPij • I (GAPij>0) +14 RelativeGAPij • I 
(GAPij<0)  + 15 I(Relative GAPij=0) + 16-20 Product Categoryij + 21 Seasonalityij + 22 
Duration Timeij + 23 Pages Viewedij +  24Educationij + 5-27 Census Regionij + 28 Household 
Sizeij + 29 Oldest Ageij + Household Incomeij + 31 Child Presentij + 32 Connection Speedij + 
33 Country of Originij + ej + ij                (4) 
Where Indicator Variables are:  
I (GAP>0) =  
       
       
  
I (GAP=0) =   
       
        
  
Using subscript i to denote each purchase session observation, j to denote an independent 
customer with unique Machine Id, the model structure we use to explain the variations in 
the purchase decisions at two levels. 
We now report the coefficient estimates () from the model4 for each determinant and 
covariates in Table 14. 
-------------------Insert Table 14 about here------------------- 
After controlling for dependence within customer purchase, we observe similar results for 
relative gains, however given relative loss situation, customers’ purchase decision are 
more positive. Given one more percent of product price as surcharges, after controlling 
for the correlations of purchase sessions made by the same person, customers 
significantly increase the total spending on the products (9 = .155, p<.01), they spend on 
more expensive product with higher unit price (9 = .015, p<.01), and they buy more 
product (9 = .032, p<.01) and favor more variety of product prices (Coefficient of 
Variation 9= .043, p<.01, Percentage of Difference 9 = .041, p<.01). 
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4. Discussion and Implications 
In sum, we propose a Gain-and-Loss Utility model incorporating both price surcharges 
and price savings developed from price partitioning, price promotion as well as prospect 
theory. By decomposing positive and negative gap between purchased product total 
prices and transaction basket price, we include both positive and negative gaps and 
examine “Gain” and “Loss” simultaneously in the price strategy framework. Our 
theoretical framework includes price partitioning, promotion strategy, price presentation, 
loss and gain theory, as well as price surcharges and price savings as the key stimuli of 
customers’ expenditure behaviors. We have derived three sets of hypotheses from 
reviewed previous research and theory and we provide substantial evidence to support 
our hypotheses. Empirical results show asymmetry in the effects of (both absolute and 
relative) price surcharge and price discount, which implies that customers are managing 
their purchases differently when they lose or gain. Specifically, we discover that when 
customers lose by paying extra surcharges, it does not necessarily hurt the purchase 
however it encourages customers to buy more, buy products in the basket with more 
variations in both prices and category selections. 
First, hypotheses regarding consumers’ purchase behavior and expenditure pattern 
affected by price surcharges and discounts are supported. From model estimation results 
predicting basket size and basket items price dispersion, we find significant evidence to 
support hypotheses H1 and H2. Four situations of “High Gain”, “Low Gain”, “High Loss” 
and “Low Loss” induce consumers’ significantly different responses in the basket price, 
purchase quantity, unit price and price dispersion measured by coefficient of variation 
and percentage of difference. Specifically (see Table 11), customers tend to spend more 
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on the total expenditure when they encounter “High Gain”, following by “High Loss”, 
“Low Gain” and “Low Loss” situations.  Only “Low Loss” situation will result in smaller 
purchase quantity, while in “High Loss”, “High Gain” and “Low Gain” cases, customers 
put more items in the basket from more different categories. In addition, the continuously 
measured “Gain” significantly has a positive effect on purchase decision, while one 
dollar amount “Loss” significantly negatively impacts customers’ total expenditures 
however customers look for the opportunity to maximize their benefits by putting 
products with more variety in prices and categories in the basket (see Table 12, Table 13, 
Table 14). 
As Kopalle et al. (2009) have summarized, a key component of the output of retailing is a 
set of services, such as location, information, assortment, delivery, and ambience. 
Because these services lower transportation and search costs, and possibly provide other 
benefits, customers are willing to pay for them. Retailers normally do not charge 
separately for the services such as location and ambience, however since transportation 
and other costs of shopping that consumer incur are specific to the trip and independent 
of the items bought, consumers seek to minimize the cost of obtaining product items. 
Further, retail pricing is a matter of setting prices on individual items to recover the cost 
of providing various services. As stated by Venkatesan, Mehta and Bapna (2007), high 
service quality retailers charge significantly more than the low service quality retailer 
when the level of competition and scope for differentiation are high and when both level 
of competition and scope for service differentiation are low. Therefore, our study 
provides managerial suggestions that, customer do not refuse and reject the potentially 
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higher surcharge fees, since they’ve obtained benefits of faster delivery and better service, 
given proliferation of differentiated online services offered by retailers. 
The second group of hypotheses (H3 and H4) is regarding zero gaps in the “No Gain, No 
Loss” situation with free shipping and no discounts in the purchase sessions, as well as 
absolute or relative gap measures of the magnitude of the surcharges and discounts. We 
also find significant evidence to support our expectations that free shipping and no 
discounts is a trend that firms adopt in the pricing strategy and they subsidize the 
shipping cost by offering the benefits to customers to encourage them buy more. Since 
trust in online seller and whether people can obtain enough information on the website 
influence consumer’s judgment on prices. The more trust people have in E-tailer given 
free shipping benefits, or the more information provided by E-tailer, the higher 
expenditure they will make in the transactions (see Table 12). In addition, in the free 
shipping situation, customers do not take risks in paying any extra fee, therefore they do 
put product items with lower price variations (see Table 12). 
Moreover, when we use relative measure of price surcharges and discounts to the base 
total product price, different results regarding effects on the total basket size are obtained 
(see Table 13) compared with absolute measures reported in Table 12, indicating that the 
“Loss” does not always hurt customers however it encourage them to spend more in the 
product expenditure and buy different items. The hypotheses are supported even after 
controlling for the correlation of purchases within the same customer, by a hierarchical 
model (see Table 14). Consistent with Morwitz et al.’s (1998),  Kim and Kachersky 
(2006)’s conclusion, computational factors, where the salience of the price component 
decreases as it becomes more complex to calculate total cost (both calculation for a 
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percentage surcharge and a dollar surcharge) affects purchase decisions.  Compared with 
absolute measure of the surcharges and discounts, relative measure to the base price is 
more reasonable and helpful in explaining customers’ responses in different price 
components in the basket. 
The third group of hypotheses focuses on the purchase situational (H5) and retailer 
characteristics (H6). We contribute in the area by capturing significant effects across 
different product categories and retailers. We hypothesize that different product 
categories will have different base prices and purchase quantity, as well as price 
dispersions, which would moderate the effects of price surcharge and discount on 
decisions. As an extension to previous studies covering a single product category (e.g., 
Lewis, Singh and Fay, 2006; Lewis 2006; Dinlersoz and Li 2006; Yao and Zhang 2012), 
we find differences in six main product categories in our model, that higher Basket size 
for category of Computers and Electronics and more expensive product with higher unit 
price; customer tend to buy more in category of Books, Music, Videos and large price 
dispersion exist in Computers and Electronics category, while customers choose more 
sub-categories in Apparel, Shoes and Jewelry product. In addition, two situational factors 
including time duration and web pages viewed show significant effects on purchase 
decisions, indicating that search costs representing customers’ involvement in purchasing 
are ubiquitous on the Internet (Walter, Gupta, Su 2006, Ellison and Ellison 2009, 
Ratchford 2009).  
Moreover, Research studies take E-tailers’ characteristics such as firm ranking, type of 
distribution channel, and service quality into account (e.g., Brynjolfsson and Smith 2000, 
Baylis and Perloff 2002, Ancarani and Shankar 2004) to investigate their effects on 
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online price presentations. We also find substantial evidence that two multi-channel 
retailers selling products with large variety obtain the largest basket size (Office Depot 
and Walmart, while pure-play e-tailer obtains smaller basket size (Ebay, Amazon), 
however Amazon and Walmart have higher average unit price. Customers tend to choose 
various unique categories at Walmart, BarnesandNoble.com, as well as Amazon.com. 
While providing support to our theoretical framework, our results have some limitations. 
First, given price surcharges and price discounts, base unit price and purchase quantity 
still play important roles in predicting the total expenditures. If we have access to the cost 
information, we could predict firms’ profitability by incorporating both price surcharges 
and discounts after controlling for costs. Second, we use price dispersion and category 
information to capture the variations in the basket items, however if we could look into 
detailed products information, we can capture the effects of the attention or importance 
consumers give to specific product components and attributes on purchase decisions. 
Third, we could not distract types of surcharges and discounts in the data, leaving some 
future research opportunities to decompose the components of both surcharge and 
discounts in empirical studies. 
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Table 1. Sample of the original purchase session data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Main Price Variable Descriptions 
Variables Description 
Basket Price 
(total expenditure) 
Total price in the basket; total dollar amount that customer has 
paid for a certain purchase session (including any price surcharge 
or saving); also referred to Order Size. 
Total Product Price 
Sum of prices of all product items in the shopping cart (without 
considering price surcharges or savings). 
Purchase Quantity 
The total number of items in the shopping cart; it is also referred to 
Basket Size or Consumption volume. 
Number of Unique items The total number of unique items in the shopping cart. 
Average Unit Price 
(expenditure per Item) 
Average dollar amount (total expenditure) consumers spend on 
each item in a order, measured by 
     Basket Price_____               
Purchase Quantity 
GAP 
The difference between Total Product Price and Basket Price:  
Total Product Price – Basket Price 
GAP+ Positive difference between Total Product Price and Basket Price 
GAP- Negative difference between Total Product Price and Basket Price 
GAP0 
Dummy Variable: 1 if there is no difference between Total Product 
Price and Basket Price, 0 otherwise 
Relative GAP+ 
The relative positive difference between Total Product Price and 
Basket Price: 
________GAP+_________ 
Product Total Price 
Relative GAP- 
The relative negative difference between Total Product Price and 
Basket Price:  
_________GAP-________ 
Product Total Price 
Purchase Item Price Dispersion 
(Similarity of product prices) 
Variation of item prices in a certain purchase session, measured by  
1) Coefficient of Variation 
2) Percentage of Price Difference 
Purchase Category Dispersion 
(Similarity of product category) 
Variation of item categories in a certain purchase session, 
measured by 
1) Mode of category distribution 
2) number of unique product categories 
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Table 3. Covariate Variable Descriptions  
Variables Description 
Purchase Timing Timeslot of purchase event 
(midnight-4:00am; 4:00am-8:00am; 8:00am-12:00pm; 12:00pm-
4:00pm; 4:00pm-8:00pm; 8:00pm-12:00am) 
Duration Time Time spent in a certain purchase session at site 
Pages Viewed Number of pages viewed in a certain purchase session at site 
Holiday Dummy Variable: 1 if the purchase is made in any nation holiday 
day, 0 otherwise 
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    Table 4. Demographic Variable Descriptions  
Census Region Census Region 
1 North East 
2 North Central 
3 South 
4 West 
Household Size Household size 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6+ 
Oldest Age 1    18-20 
2    21-24 
3    25-29 
4    30-34 
5    35-39 
6    40-44 
7    45-49 
8    50-54 
9    55-59 
10   60-64  
11    65 and older 
Household Income 1    Less than 15k 
2    15k-24.999k 
3    25k-34.999k 
4    35k-49.999k 
5    50k-74.999k 
6    75k-99.999k 
7    100k+ 
Household Education 0   Less than a high school diploma 
1    High School diploma or equivalent 
2    Some college but no degree 
3    Associate degree 
4   Bachelor’s degree 
5   Graduate degree 
6    Missing 
Connection Speed 0    Not broadband 
1    Broadbrand 
Country of Origin 1     Hispanic 
0    Non Hispanic 
Child Present 1     Yes 
0    No 
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                        Table 5. Summary Statistics 
Variables Mean SD 
GAP 6.77 31.40 
GAP+ 20.55 34.88 
GAP- -11.56 30.30 
Relative GAP+ 0.39 0.38 
Relative GAP- -2.74 29.31 
Basket Price (dollar) 57.58 90.75 
Total Product Price (dollar) 50.82 82.80 
Basket Size (Purchase Quantity) 2.63 4.32 
Number of Unique Items 2.33 2.40 
Average Unit Price (dollar) 26.47 56.17 
Number of Unique Category 1.21 0.54 
Duration Time (minute) 32.45 31.40 
Pages Viewed 44.19 49.48 
Coefficient of Variation (%) 20.60 31.81 
Percentage of Difference (%) 40.72 68.70 
 
 
Table 6. Magnitudes of surcharges and discount/savings represent Loss and Gain 
Variable Situations 
Categorical 
Measure 
Quantitative Measure 
Gain (GAP+) 
Discount, 
Promotion, 
Membership benefit. 
 
High Gain 
Low Gain 
When Product Total Price > Basket Price, 
GAP between Product Total Price and 
Basket Price is positive. 
Loss (GAP-) 
Tax, 
Shipping and Handling, 
Service Surcharge (such 
as Airflight, Gift 
wrapping). 
 
High Loss 
Low Loss 
When Product Total Price < Basket Price, 
GAP b/w Total product price and Basket 
price is negative. 
No Loss, No Gain 
(GAP0) 
Free S&H, 
No Discount, 
Offset of surcharge and 
discount savings. 
No Loss, No Gain 
Otherwise 
When Product Total Price = Basket Price, 
GAP between Product Total Price and 
Basket Price is zero. 
 
 
Table 7. Distribution of situations 
Category Descriptions 
Number of Sessions 
when the dummy 
value is 1 
High Gain 
Dummy variable: 1 if the GAP+ is higher than its average level 
(20.55), 0 otherwise (if GAP is lower than its average, and if GAP 
is negative, and if GAP is zero) 
421 
Low Gain 
Dummy variable: 1 if the GAP+ is lower than its average level 
(20.55), 0 otherwise (if GAP is higher than its average, and if GAP 
is negative, and if GAP is zero) 
786 
High Loss 
Dummy variable: 1 if the GAP- is lower than its average level (-
11.56), 0 otherwise (if GAP is higher than its average, and if GAP 
is negative, and if GAP is zero) 
3042 
Low Loss 
Dummy variable: 1 if the GAP- is higher than its average level (-
11.56), 0 otherwise (if GAP is lower than its average, and if GAP is 
negative, and if GAP is zero) 
10058 
No Gain No Loss Dummy variable: 1 if the GAP is zero, 0 otherwise 4408 
Total All categories 18715 
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Table 8. Purchases across 8 retailers 
Website 
Number of 
Purchase sessions 
(Percentage) 
Total 
Basket 
Price 
Average 
Purchase 
Quantity 
Average 
Unit Price 
Average 
GAP 
Average 
Relative 
GAP 
Amazon 12248     (65.44%) $50.04 2.2 $24.82 -$6.11 -0.401 
Ebay 333          (1.78%) $16.77 1.6 $8.52 -$4.10 -0.805 
Walmart 1767       (9.44%) $77.02 3.4 $44.53 -$10.04 -0.548 
Yahoo 808          (4.32) $68.90 3.2 $41.30 -$6.67 -0.243 
BN 1675       (8.95%) $43.46 2.9 $17.89 -$3.92 -0.440 
Office Depot 116          (0.62%) $135.66 9.0 $20.13 -$6.81 -2.3601 
GAP 372          (1.99%) $87.41 3.7 $25.80 -$8.17 -0.174 
VS 1396       (7.46%) $104.88 4.1 $24.72 -$12.13 -0.369 
Total 18715    (100%) $57.58 2.6 $26.47 -$6.77 -0.424 
1. At Office Depot website, of its 116 purchase sessions, we observe several observations with large gap and very small total 
product price. For example, one purchase session data shows the total product price is $1, however the total basket price is 
$102, which means the price surcharge is as high as $101, resulting relative GAP to be a large number. 
 
 
 
Table 9 Product categorization and summary statistics 
Categories Sub-categories 
Purchase 
sessions 
Total 
Basket 
Price 
Average 
Purchase 
Quantity 
Avg. Unit 
Price 
Average 
GAP 
Apparel, 
Shoes, 
Jewelry 
Apparel, shoes, accessories, jewelry, watches  2147 101.78 3.8 28.65 13.73 
Home & Food 
Home furniture, home appliances, pet supplies, 
food & beverage, health & beauty, home & living 
items, toy and game items, gifts 
1805 82.12 2.2 49.84 7.93 
Books, Music, 
Videos 
Books, magazines, music, movies & videos 11680 38.94 2.4 16.57 5.41 
Computers, 
Electronics 
Desktop computers, laptop computers, mobile 
phones, portable devices, printers, monitors, 
computer software, audio & video equipment, 
cameras, console video games, Tvs,  
2234 98.22 2.2 61.11 6.60 
Business and 
Office 
Supplies 
Business machines, office furniture, office 
supplies 
110 122.54 9.0 19.75 9.06 
Services 
Movie tickets, event tickets, air travel, hotel 
reservations, car rental, travel packages, photo 
printings 
534 15.15 5.8 6.67 4.86 
missing Missing value 205 73.8 2.2 39.37 6.69 
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Table10. Correlation between Dependent Variables 
Variable 
BASKET 
SIZE 
TOTAL 
PRICE 
NO. OF 
ITEMS 
UNIT 
PRICE CoeffVar. PerDiff. 
NO. OF 
CATE 
Mean 57.58 50.82 2.33 26.47 20.60 40.72 1.21 
Std. 90.75 82.80 2.40 56.17 31.81 68.90 0.54 
N 18715 18715 18715 18715 18536 18536 18715 
BASKET SIZE 1.00 
      TOTAL PRICE 0.94 1.00 
     NO. OF ITEMS 0.31 0.33 1.00 
    UNIT PRICE 0.61 0.65 0.16 1.00 
   CoeffVar 0.26 0.28 0.53 -0.03 1.00 
  PerDiff 0.30 0.31 0.69 -0.05 0.94 1.00 
 NO. OF CATE. 0.21 0.23 0.40 -0.02 0.40 0.43 1.00 
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Table 11. Model 1 (Linear Model with Categorical Gap measures) Estimation Results 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Intercept 
0** 
(2.48) 
0*** 
(10.91) 
0*** 
(5.42) 
0 
(0.60) 
0 
(0.38) 
0*** 
(10.54) 
Amazon 
-0.108*** 
(4.28) 
-0.331*** 
(13.46) 
0.121*** 
(4.63) 
-0.136*** 
5.18 () 
-0.179*** 
(6.98) 
0.175*** 
(6.63) 
Ebay 
-0.051*** 
(4.67) 
-0.116*** 
(10.93) 
0.023** 
(2.00) 
-0.062*** 
(5.42) 
-0.073*** 
(6.61) 
0.050*** 
(4.43) 
Walmart 
0.049*** 
(2.80) 
0.213*** 
(12.39) 
0.184*** 
(10.13) 
-0.097*** 
(5.28) 
-0.125*** 
(6.95) 
0.239*** 
(13.00) 
Yahoo 
0.0002 
(.01) 
-0.108*** 
(8.93) 
0.074*** 
(5.82) 
-0.043*** 
(3.39) 
-0.056*** 
(4.45) 
0.158*** 
(12.31) 
BN 
-0.064*** 
(3.60) 
-0.167 
(9.72) 
0.079*** 
(4.35) 
-0.042** 
(2.27) 
-0.068*** 
(3.77) 
0.222*** 
(12.06) 
Office 
0.069*** 
(4.03) 
0.014 
(0.84) 
-0.007 
(0.39) 
0.051*** 
(2.91) 
0.061*** 
(3.57) 
0.110*** 
(6.24) 
Gap 
-0.032*** 
(3.53) 
-0.058*** 
(6.48) 
-0.001 
(0.04) 
0.006 
(0.60) 
0.001 
(0.09) 
0.028*** 
(2.95) 
UniItem1 
0.565*** 
(68.53) 
1.192*** 
(89.44) 
0.831*** 
(107.65) 
0.846*** 
(57.41) 
0.923*** 
(72.73) 
0.802*** 
(46.90) 
UniItem Squared 
Term 
-0.210*** 
(77.57) 
-0.489*** 
(36.98) 
0.09*** 
(13.53) 
-0.460*** 
(34.59) 
-0.341*** 
(29.55) 
-0.287*** 
(16.98) 
Unit Price2 
0.861*** 
(127.46) 
-1.024*** 
(75.98) 
-0.543*** 
(60.13) 
0.141*** 
(10.95) 
0.127*** 
(11.54) 
-0.674*** 
(39.14) 
Unit Price Squared 
Term 
-0.069*** 
(10.89) 
0.463*** 
(35.44) 
0.213*** 
(26.31) 
-0.039*** 
(3.43) 
-0.046*** 
(4.70) 
0.265*** 
(15.99) 
HighGain 
0.088*** 
(10.18) 
0.059*** 
(6.98) 
0.032*** 
(3.59) 
0.062*** 
(6.92) 
0.063*** 
7.26 () 
0.054*** 
(6.08) 
LowGain 
-0.016 
(1.82)* 
0.042*** 
(4.93) 
-0.028*** 
(3.11) 
0.070*** 
(7.69) 
0.077*** 
(8.67) 
0.054*** 
(5.86) 
HighLoss 
0.061*** 
(6.01) 
0.101*** 
(10.24) 
0.017 
(1.64) 
0.128*** 
(12.27) 
0.167*** 
(16.40) 
0.058*** 
(5.51) 
LowLoss3 
-0.159*** 
(15.43) 
-0.133*** 
(13.23) 
-0.090*** 
(8.49) 
-0.063*** 
(5.89) 
-0.059*** 
(5.70) 
-0.083*** 
(7.76) 
MAIN1 
0.380*** 
(17.55) 
0.144*** 
(6.84) 
0.308*** 
(13.79) 
0.195*** 
(8.97) 
0.161*** 
(7.59) 
0.327*** 
(14.54) 
MAIN2 
0.336*** 
(19.42) 
0.063*** 
(3.74) 
0.323*** 
(18.00) 
0.132*** 
(7.37) 
0.111*** 
6.36 () 
0.234*** 
(13.02) 
MAIN3 
0.408*** 
(15.06) 
0.275*** 
(10.44) 
0.275*** 
(9.86) 
0.286*** 
(10.28) 
0.279*** 
(10.26) 
0.346*** 
(12.29) 
MAIN4 
0.438*** 
(23.83) 
0.118*** 
(6.61) 
0.411*** 
(21.67) 
0.151*** 
(7.91) 
0.143*** 
(7.68) 
0.220*** 
(11.51) 
MAIN5 
0.063*** 
(3.71) 
0.055*** 
(3.35) 
0.060*** 
(3.44) 
0.056*** 
(3.22) 
0.067*** 
(3.98) 
0.024 
(1.36) 
HOLIDAY 
0.009 
(1.04) 
0.014* 
(1.72) 
0.007 
(0.82) 
-0.009 
(1.05) 
-0.004 
(0.49) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
DURATION 
0.055*** 
(4.51) 
0.039*** 
(3.33) 
0.028** 
(2.21) 
0.063*** 
(5.02) 
0.059*** 
(4.86) 
0.052*** 
(4.14) 
PAGES 
0.013 
(1.06) 
0.211*** 
(17.61) 
-0.064*** 
(5.03) 
0.103*** 
(8.06) 
0.151*** 
(12.17) 
0.102*** 
(7.96) 
EDU01 
0.018** 
(2.16) 
0.010 
(1.23) 
0.012 
(1.39) 
0.022** 
(2.57) 
0.017** 
(2.01) 
0.009 
(0.98) 
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Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
East 
0.013 
(1.25) 
0.025*** 
(2.56) 
-0.001 
(0.02) 
0.023** 
(2.22) 
0.022** 
(2.14) 
0.032*** 
(3.04) 
Central 
0.004 
(0.40) 
0.020** 
(2.08) 
-0.002 
(0.15) 
0.017* 
(1.66) 
0.019* 
(1.86) 
0.016 
(1.53) 
South 
0.028*** 
(2.76) 
0.030*** 
(2.98) 
0.010 
(0.15) 
0.029*** 
(2.70) 
0.027*** 
(2.61) 
0.005 
(0.43) 
FSIZE01 
-0.008 
(0.83) 
0.024** 
(2.56) 
-0.017* 
(1.65) 
0.013 
(1.21) 
0.014 
(1.39) 
0.035*** 
(3.33) 
AGE01 
-0.013 
(1.59) 
-0.002 
(0.24) 
-0.008 
(0.95) 
0.005 
(0.61) 
0.004 
(0.43) 
-0.003 
(0.32) 
INCOME01 
0.034*** 
(3.93) 
0.033*** 
(3.94) 
0.024*** 
(2.67) 
0.028*** 
(3.15) 
0.038*** 
(4.45) 
0.024*** 
(2.72) 
CHILDREN 
0.006 
(0.55) 
0.018* 
(1.82) 
-0.001 
(0.09) 
0.013 
(1.29) 
0.014 
(1.36) 
0.004 
(0.39) 
SPEED 
0.003 
(0.32) 
0.005 
(0.63) 
0.006 
(0.62) 
-0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.001 
(0.07) 
COUNTRY 
0.027*** 
(3.23) 
0.021** 
(2.53) 
0.019** 
(2.26) 
0.007 
(0.83) 
0.009 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
Observations 12444 12444 12444 12339 12339 12444 
R 2 79.65% 53.80% 77.06% 36.98% 15.69% 24.63% 
1. The independent variable is Product Total Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Purchase Quantity, 
Unit Price, Number of Category. 
2. The independent variable is Unit Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Coefficient of variation, 
Percentage of Difference. 
3. No Loss No Gain is the base level for four Loss and Gain dummy variables 
4. West is the base level for Census Region variable 
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Table 12. Model 2 (Linear Piecewise Model with Continuous Gap measures) Estimation Results 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Intercept 
0*** 
(3.52) 
0*** 
(10.32) 
0*** 
(6.24) 
0 
(0.82) 
0 
(1.21) 
0*** 
(8.88) 
Amazon 
-0.160*** 
(6.03) 
-0.388*** 
() 
0.099*** 
(3.64) 
-0.143*** 
(5.14) 
-0.196*** 
(7.15) 
0.193*** 
(6.99) 
Ebay 
-0.073*** 
(6.50) 
-0.145*** 
(13.15) 
0.015 
(1.31) 
-0.076*** 
(6.45) 
-0.092*** 
(7.94) 
0.046*** 
(3.97) 
Walmart 
0.023 
(1.26) 
-0.246*** 
(13.60) 
0.175*** 
(9.30) 
-0.102*** 
(5.26) 
-0.133*** 
(7.02) 
0.248*** 
(12.99) 
Yahoo 
-0.029** 
(2.28) 
-0.144*** 
(11.39) 
0.063*** 
(4.81) 
-0.059*** 
(4.35) 
-0.076*** 
(5.75) 
0.157*** 
(11.75) 
BN 
-0.089*** 
(4.86) 
-0.189*** 
(10.52) 
0.068*** 
(3.62) 
-0.034* 
(1.78) 
-0.065*** 
(3.44) 
0.244*** 
(12.80) 
Office 
0.060*** 
(3.50) 
0.008*** 
(0.46) 
-0.011 
(0.63) 
0.053*** 
(3.00) 
0.062*** 
(3.53) 
0.117*** 
(6.55) 
Gap 
-0.036*** 
(3.93) 
-0.061*** 
(6.71) 
-0.002 
(0.26) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
-0.004*** 
(0.40) 
0.027*** 
(2.80) 
UniItem1 
0.570*** 
(71.09) 
1.229*** 
(91.65) 
0.835*** 
(108.36) 
0.151*** 
(11.75) 
0.137*** 
(12.44) 
0.826*** 
(48.99) 
UniItem Squared 
Term 
-0.212*** 
(28.33) 
-0.506*** 
(38.07) 
0.090*** 
(13.20) 
-0.045*** 
(3.90) 
-0.051*** 
(5.22) 
-0.298*** 
(17.64) 
Unit Price2 
0.861*** 
(127.99) 
-1.037*** 
(76.25) 
-0.537*** 
(60.19) 
0.857*** 
(58.66) 
0.932*** 
(74,57) 
-0.681*** 
(39.46) 
Unit Price Squared 
Term 
-0.069*** 
(10.88) 
0.466*** 
(35.43) 
0.209*** 
(25.99) 
-0.465*** 
(35.05) 
-0.346*** 
(30.51) 
0.267*** 
(15.97) 
Gain 
0.134*** 
(15.75) 
0.081*** 
(9.69) 
0.059*** 
(6.83) 
0.050*** 
(5.71) 
0.052*** 
(6.03) 
0.062*** 
(7.04) 
Loss 
-0.072*** 
(8.32) 
0.016*** 
(1.91) 
-0.083*** 
(9.36) 
0.015* 
(1.70) 
0.010*** 
(1.18) 
0.018** 
(2.04) 
No Gain 
No Loss 
0.101*** 
(11.55) 
0.053*** 
(6.19) 
0.069*** 
(7.78) 
-0.004 
(0.48) 
-0.016*** 
(1.74) 
0.028*** 
(3.04) 
MAIN1 
0.371*** 
(16.92) 
0.149*** 
6.92 () 
0.295*** 
(13.20) 
0.199*** 
(8.96) 
0.165*** 
7.54 () 
0.329*** 
(14.49) 
MAIN2 
0.336*** 
(19.22) 
0.070*** 
(4.08) 
0.317*** 
(17.79) 
0.138*** 
(7.58) 
0.117*** 
(6.58) 
0.238*** 
()13.14 
MAIN3 
0.379*** 
(13.89) 
0.247*** 
(9.19) 
0.259*** 
9.30 () 
0.259*** 
(9.14) 
0.246*** 
(8.86) 
0.326*** 
(11.48) 
MAIN4 
0.429*** 
(23.07) 
0.114*** 
(6.23) 
0.404*** 
(21.30) 
0.146*** 
(7.55) 
0.138*** 
(7.23) 
0.216*** 
(11.20) 
MAIN5 
0.065*** 
3.79 () 
0.059*** 
(3.50) 
0.059*** 
3.42 () 
0.058*** 
(3.31) 
0.071*** 
(4.08) 
0.025 
(1.41) 
HOLIDAY 
0.006 
(0.69) 
0.010 
(1.20) 
0.006 
(0.75) 
-0.011 
(1.32) 
-0.007*** 
(0.84) 
-0.003 
(0.29) 
DURATION 
0.066*** 
5.42 () 
0.057*** 
(4.78) 
0.030** 
(2.41) 
0.077*** 
(6.00) 
0.075*** 
(6.02) 
0.061*** 
(4.76) 
PAGES 
0.019*** 
(1.49) 
0.237*** 
(19.30) 
-0.069*** 
(5.40) 
0.132*** 
10.12 () 
0.184*** 
(14.38) 
0.125*** 
(9.66) 
EDU01 
0.023*** 
(2.70) 
0.017** 
(2.03) 
0.014 
(1.57) 
0.028*** 
(3.15) 
0.024*** 
(2.72) 
0.012 
(1.37) 
East 
0.007 
(0.70) 
0.022** 
(2.18) 
-0.004 
(0.42) 
0.020** 
(1.91) 
0.018*** 
(1.71) 
0.030*** 
(2.85) 
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Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Central 
-0.004 
(0.40) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
-0.005 
(0.50) 
0.012 
(1.12) 
0.012*** 
(1.16) 
0.013 
(1.21) 
South 
0.022** 
(2.11) 
0.025** 
(2.49) 
0.006 
(0.55) 
0.026** 
(2.41) 
0.023*** 
(2.19) 
0.004 
(0.36) 
FSIZE01 
-0.006 
(0.61) 
0.024** 
(2.42) 
-0.015 
(1.49) 
0.012 
(1.13) 
0.013*** 
(1.27) 
0.034*** 
(3.23) 
AGE01 
-0.017** 
(1.96) 
-0.008 
(0.93) 
-0.009 
(1.03) 
0.001 
(0.14) 
-0.002*** 
(0.21) 
-0.004 
(0.42) 
INCOME01 
0.033*** 
(3.80) 
0.034*** 
(4.03) 
0.022** 
(2.52) 
0.029*** 
(3.16) 
0.039*** 
(4.42) 
0.024*** 
(2.68) 
CHILDREN 
0.00 
(0.71) 
0.020** 
(2.01) 
0.000 
(0.03) 
0.015 
(1.40) 
0.016*** 
(1.52) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
SPEED 
0.006 
(0.67) 
0.012 
(1.43) 
-0.006 
(0.67) 
0.004 
(0.48) 
0.003*** 
(0.39) 
0.003 
(0.33) 
COUNTRY 
0.021** 
(2.50) 
0.017** 
(2.00) 
0.016* 
(1.80) 
0.005 
(0.58) 
0.007*** 
(0.77) 
-0.002 
(0.21) 
Observations 12444 12444 12444 12339 12339 12444 
R 2 79.70% 53.08% 77.06% 36.89% 53.77% 24.27% 
1. The independent variable is Product Total Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Purchase Quantity, 
Unit Price, Number of Category. 
2. The independent variable is Unit Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Coefficient of variation, 
Percentage of Difference. 
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Table 13. Model 3 (Linear Piecewise Model with Relative Gap measures) Estimation Results 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Intercept 
0*** 
(3.52) 
0*** 
(10.72) 
0*** 
(6.46) 
0 
(1.23) 
0 
(1.59) 
0*** 
(9.21) 
Amazon 
-0.134*** 
(5.00) 
-0.383*** 
(14.63) 
0.121*** 
(4.45) 
-0.141*** 
(5.07) 
-0.191*** 
(6.98) 
0.190*** 
(6.89) 
Ebay 
-0.072*** 
(6.35) 
-0.146*** 
(13.18) 
0.017 
(1.44) 
-0.077*** 
(6.52) 
-0.092*** 
(8.00) 
0.045*** 
(3.86) 
Walmart 
0.024*** 
(1.29) 
-0.251*** 
(13.89) 
0.181*** 
(9.59) 
-0.106*** 
(5.50) 
-0.138*** 
(7.23) 
0.242*** 
(12.69) 
Yahoo 
-0.028*** 
(2.13) 
-0.146*** 
(11.56) 
0.067*** 
(5.11) 
-0.061*** 
(4.53) 
-0.078*** 
(5.91) 
0.154*** 
(11.56) 
BN 
-0.078*** 
(4.18) 
-0.188*** 
(10.41) 
0.078*** 
(4.16) 
-0.034* 
(1.77) 
-0.064*** 
(3.37) 
0.242*** 
(12.68) 
Office 
0.068*** 
(3.89) 
0.010 
(0.58) 
-0.005 
(0.31) 
0.055*** 
(3.06) 
0.064*** 
(3.63) 
0.118*** 
(6.58) 
Gap 
-0.036*** 
(3.88) 
-0.061*** 
(6.68) 
-0.002 
(0.24) 
0.002 
(0.23) 
-0.003 
(0.36) 
0.026*** 
(2.72) 
UniItem1 
0.578*** 
(71.95) 
1.224*** 
(93.48) 
-0.539*** 
(60.43) 
0.857*** 
(58.74) 
0.129*** 
(11.94) 
0.824*** 
(49.53) 
UniItem Squared 
Term 
-0.216** 
(28.59) 
-0.503*** 
(38.01) 
0.210*** 
(26.13) 
-0.465*** 
(35.07) 
-0.047*** 
(4.82) 
-0.297*** 
(17.66) 
Unit Price2 
0.870*** 
(129.57) 
-1.037*** 
(76.51) 
0.830*** 
(108.91) 
0.146*** 
(11.45) 
0.931*** 
(74.59) 
-0.683*** 
(39.69) 
Unit Price Squared 
Term 
-0.075*** 
(11.77) 
0.467*** 
(35.53) 
0.094*** 
(13.78) 
-0.041 
***(3.64) 
-0.346*** 
(30.49) 
0.268*** 
(16.08) 
Relative Gain 
-0.006*** 
(0.70) 
0.005 
(0.61) 
-0.015 
(1.76) 
0.002 
(0.19) 
-0.007 
(0.77) 
0.024*** 
(2.77) 
Relative Loss 
0.024*** 
(2.88) 
0.029*** 
(3.53) 
0.014 
(1.62) 
0.034*** 
(3.92) 
0.035*** 
(4.03) 
0.021** 
(2.37) 
No Gain 
No Loss 
0.076*** 
(8.65) 
0.046*** 
(5.39) 
0.050*** 
(5.60) 
-0.009 
(1.00) 
-0.022** 
(2.49) 
0.026*** 
(2.82) 
MAIN1 
0.379*** 
(17.05) 
0.139*** 
(6.43) 
0.307*** 
(13.63) 
0.190*** 
(8.52) 
0.156*** 
(7.14) 
0.322*** 
(14.08) 
MAIN2 
0.340*** 
(19.19) 
0.065*** 
()3.74 
0.323*** 
(17.95) 
0.132*** 
(7.22) 
0.112*** 
(6.23) 
0.234*** 
(12.84) 
MAIN3 
0.364*** 
(13.11) 
0.228*** 
(8.43) 
0.254*** 
(9.02) 
0.244*** 
8.58 () 
0.231*** 
()8.27 
0.314*** 
(10.98) 
MAIN4 
0.430*** 
(22.74) 
0.107*** 
(5.82) 
0.407*** 
(21.21) 
0.139*** 
(7.16) 
0.131*** 
(6.85) 
0.211*** 
(10.87) 
MAIN5 
0.063*** 
(3.67) 
0.055*** 
(3.27) 
0.060*** 
(3.46) 
0.055*** 
(3.13) 
0.068*** 
(3.90) 
0.022 
(1.26) 
HOLIDAY 
0.006*** 
(0.71) 
0.011 
(1.30) 
0.006 
(0.68) 
-0.011 
(1.26) 
-0.007 
(0.77) 
-0.002 
(0.24) 
DURATION 
0.074*** 
(5.98) 
0.059*** 
(4.92) 
0.036*** 
(2.87) 
0.077*** 
(6.04) 
0.076*** 
(6.09) 
0.062*** 
(4.85) 
PAGES 
0.040*** 
(3.20) 
0.240*** 
(19.60) 
-0.050*** 
(3.93) 
0.133*** 
(10.31) 
0.187*** 
(14.71) 
0.125*** 
(9.70) 
EDU01 
0.026*** 
(2.97) 
0.018** 
(2.19) 
0.015* 
(1.73) 
0.029*** 
(3.31) 
0.025*** 
(2.89) 
0.013 
(1.47) 
East 
0.010*** 
(1.01) 
0.021** 
(2.15) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
0.019* 
(1.85) 
0.017* 
(1.68) 
0.029*** 
(2.79) 
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Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Central 
-0.002*** 
(0.20) 
0.012 
(1.22) 
-0.004 
(0.35) 
0.011 
(1.08) 
0.012 
(1.14) 
0.013 
(1.22) 
South 
0.025*** 
(2.36) 
0.025** 
(2.45) 
0.009 
(0.83) 
0.026** 
(2.40) 
0.023** 
(2.21) 
0.003 
(0.30) 
FSIZE01 
-0.004*** 
(0.41) 
0.027*** 
(2.68) 
-0.01* 
(1.51) 
0.014 
(1.35) 
0.016 
(1.50) 
0.036*** 
(3.39) 
AGE01 
-0.020*** 
(2.35) 
-0.009 
(1.08) 
-0.012 
(1.35) 
0.001 
(0.07) 
-0.002 
(0.28) 
-0.005 
(0.57) 
INCOME01 
0.035*** 
(4.02) 
0.035*** 
(4.13) 
0.024*** 
2.69 () 
0.029*** 
(3.21) 
0.040*** 
(4.45) 
0.025*** 
(2.81) 
CHILDREN 
0.006*** 
(0.56) 
0.020** 
(1.94) 
-0.001 
(0.10) 
0.014 
(1.32) 
0.015 
(1.45) 
0.003*** 
(0.30) 
SPEED 
0.008*** 
(0.88) 
0.011 
(1.35) 
-0.004 
(0.43) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
0.003 
(0.37) 
0.001 
(0.16) 
COUNTRY 
0.022*** 
(2.52) 
0.015* 
(1.79) 
0.017** 
(1.99) 
0.004 
(0.47) 
0.006 
(0.65) 
-0.003 
(0.33) 
Observations 12444 12444 12444 12339 12339 12444 
R 2 79.47% 53.08% 77.01% 36.88% 53.74% 24.31% 
1. The independent variable is Product Total Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Purchase Quantity, 
Unit Price, Number of Category. 
2. The independent variable is Unit Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Coefficient of variation, 
Percentage of Difference. 
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Table 14. Model 4 (Hierarchical Linear Piecewise Model with Relative Gap measures)Estimation Results 
Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 
1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Intercept 
-0.275*** 
(8.00) 
0.258*** 
(2.86) 
-0.911*** 
(17.02) 
-0.265*** 
(2.85) 
-0.090 
(0.98) 
-1.136*** 
(12.29) 
Amazon 
-0.498*** 
(4.55) 
-0.667*** 
(9.49) 
0.246*** 
(5.64) 
-0.242*** 
(3.64) 
-0.338*** 
(5.27) 
0.372*** 
(5.56) 
Ebay 
0.004*** 
(6.58) 
-0.883*** 
(9.09) 
0.133** 
(2.56) 
-0.476*** 
(4.75) 
-0.570*** 
(5.81) 
0.304*** 
(3.10) 
Walmart 
-0.113 
(0.06) 
-0.706*** 
(9.59) 
0.509*** 
(10.96) 
-0.288*** 
(4.03) 
-0.389*** 
(5.64) 
0.824*** 
(11.43) 
Yahoo 
-0.259 
(1.62) 
-0.521*** 
(6.78) 
0.284*** 
(5.53) 
-0.224*** 
(3.00) 
-0.277*** 
(3.85) 
0.855*** 
(11.21) 
BN 
1.486*** 
(4.05) 
-0.574*** 
(7.61) 
0.256*** 
(5.56) 
-0.097 
(1.32) 
-0.197*** 
(2.78) 
0.761*** 
(10.39) 
Office 
-0.217*** 
(4.20) 
0.199 
82 (0.) 
0.111 
(0.69) 
0.604** 
(1.99) 
0.551* 
(1.86) 
1.570*** 
(4.84) 
Gap 
0.003*** 
(3.01) 
-0.492*** 
(5.40) 
0.017 
(0.32) 
0.043*** 
(0.52) 
-0.024 
(0.29) 
0.211** 
(2.56) 
UniItem1 
0.476*** 
(80.28) 
0.012*** 
(90.78) 
-0.307*** 
(57.94) 
0.154*** 
(12.56) 
0.912*** 
(81.28) 
0.864*** 
(50.16) 
UniItem Squared 
Term 
-0.026*** 
(27.91) 
-0.029*** 
(40.74) 
0.016*** 
(22.43) 
-0.003*** 
(3.78) 
-0.057*** 
(31.46) 
-0.021*** 
(18.18) 
Unit Price2 
0.919*** 
(127.81) 
-0.961*** 
(75.44) 
0.560*** 
(86.79) 
0.784*** 
(60.24) 
0.132*** 
(12.56) 
-0.717*** 
(39.29) 
Unit Price Squared 
Term 
-0.005*** 
(16.43) 
0.020*** 
(33.96) 
0.016*** 
(34.17) 
-0.072*** 
(34.55) 
-0.003*** 
(4.40) 
0.014*** 
(15.48) 
Relative Gain 
0.022 
(0.42) 
0.009 
(1.20) 
-0.005 
(1.08) 
0.003*** 
(0.38) 
-0.001 
(0.11) 
0.029*** 
(3.33) 
Relative Loss 
0.155*** 
(3.36) 
0.032*** 
(3.90) 
0.015*** 
(3.38) 
0.043*** 
(3.96) 
0.041*** 
(3.90) 
0.012 
(1.54) 
No Gain 
No Loss 
1.004*** 
(8.36) 
0.073*** 
(4.04) 
0.102*** 
(3.47) 
-0.015*** 
(0.71) 
-0.054*** 
(2.68) 
0.059*** 
(2.77) 
MAIN1 
1.044*** 
(15.04) 
0.350*** 
(4.41) 
0.873*** 
(18.67) 
0.547*** 
()6.85 
0.401*** 
(5.08) 
0.963*** 
(12.01) 
MAIN2 
0.642*** 
(14.36) 
0.101*** 
(1.82) 
1.071*** 
(17.17) 
0.336*** 
(5.13) 
0.244*** 
(3.77) 
0.680*** 
(10.07) 
MAIN3 
1.219*** 
(13.09) 
0.355*** 
(6.48) 
0.473*** 
(14.62) 
0.448*** 
(7.03) 
0.374*** 
(5.86) 
0.641*** 
(10.06) 
MAIN4 
0.106*** 
(19.84) 
0.204*** 
(3.67) 
1.233*** 
(19.53) 
0.352*** 
(5.36) 
0.277*** 
(4.22) 
0.610*** 
(9.11) 
MAIN5 
0.018 
0.32 () 
0.289 
(0.98) 
0.506*** 
(3.66) 
0.600*** 
(1.60) 
0.593 
(1.52) 
0.107 
(0.33) 
HOLIDAY 
0.071 
(0.45) 
0.019 
(0.42) 
-0.014 
()0.45 
-0.083*** 
(1.83) 
-0.057 
(1.29) 
-0.030 
(0.66) 
DURATION 
0.073*** 
(5.22) 
0.022*** 
(1.43) 
0.005 
(0.73) 
0.094*** 
(5.72) 
0.092*** 
(5.24) 
0.051*** 
(2.89) 
PAGES 
0.031*** 
(5.09) 
0.445*** 
(20.95) 
-0.031*** 
(3.97) 
0.214*** 
(11.56) 
0.317*** 
(15.27) 
0.242*** 
(11.07) 
EDU01 
-0.002*** 
(2.11) 
0.029 
(1.61) 
0.012 
(1.17) 
0.077*** 
(3.74) 
0.066*** 
(3.28) 
0.023 
(1.14) 
East 
-0.012 
(0.09) 
0.030 
(1.13) 
-0.004 
(0.27) 
0.018*** 
(0.58) 
0.024 
(0.80) 
0.038 
(1.29) 
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Independent 
Variables 
Dependent Measures 
Basket Size Variations in the Basket 
 
1. Total 
Price 
2. Purchase 
Quantity 
3. Average Unit 
Price 
4. Coefficient of 
Var 
5. Percentage of 
Diff. 
6. Number of 
Cat. 
Central 
-0.002*** 
(0.56) 
0.001 
(0.02) 
-0.007 
(0.45) 
-0.019*** 
(0.62) 
-0.004 
(0.14) 
0.012 
(0.43) 
South 
0.005*** 
(0.10) 
-0.003 
(0.11) 
-0.006 
(0.46) 
-0.001*** 
(0.02) 
0.003 
(0.09) 
-0.004 
(0.16) 
FSIZE01 
-0.028 
(0.25) 
0.053** 
(2.21) 
-0.016 
(1.15) 
0.045*** 
(1.67) 
0.048* 
(1.77) 
0.057** 
(2.13) 
AGE01 
0.035* 
(1.79) 
-0.009 
(0.45) 
-0.013 
(1.17) 
-0.003*** 
(0.14) 
-0.005 
(0.25) 
-0.016 
(0.76) 
INCOME01 
0.007** 
(2.31) 
0.042** 
(2.24) 
0.012 
(1.13) 
0.032*** 
(1.54) 
0.048* 
(2.33) 
0.039* 
(1.89) 
CHILDREN 
0.026 
(0.36) 
0.028 
(1.24) 
-0.005 
(0.39) 
0.016*** 
(0.63) 
0.025 
(1.00) 
0.000 
(0.01) 
SPEED 
0.055* 
(1.72) 
-0.011 
(0.59) 
0.004 
(0.41) 
0.008*** 
(0.40) 
0.005 
(0.22) 
-0.013 
(0.64) 
COUNTRY 
-0.275** 
(2.27) 
0.051* 
(1.74) 
0.025 
(1.52) 
0.021*** 
(0.62) 
0.024 
(0.75) 
0.007 
(0.23) 
Observations 12444 12444 12444 12339 12339 12444 
1. The independent variable is Product Total Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Purchase Quantity, 
Unit Price, Number of Category. 
2. The independent variable is Unit Price and its squared term when the dependent variable is Coefficient of variation, 
Percentage of Difference. 
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